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Abstract 
Since 1992, the Premier League has experienced considerable growth and, in 2015/16, had 
transformed into an industry – albeit one comprising just 20 firms – that generated revenue of £5.3 
billion (Deloitte, 2017a). The business models of the clubs has evolved so that they now generate over 
half of their income from broadcast revenue, compared to less than one-tenth in the inaugural Premier 
League season in 1992/93. Much of the growth in broadcast revenue has been from overseas 
markets, while, contemporaneously, owners, players, team managers and business executives have 
also become globalised. 
The Premier League and its member clubs have been transformed into global brands. 18 of the 50 
most valuable football club brands are members of the Premier League (Brand Finance, 2018), with 
Manchester United's brand alone valued at £1.4 billion. Clubs in England and Wales have been able 
to generate and appropriate considerable revenue by commercialising their resources and 
performance. Despite the dominance of Spanish clubs in the Champions League and Europa League, 
12 of the 20 clubs that generate the most revenue are members of the Premier League (Deloitte, 
2017b). For example, in 2015/16 Manchester United generated more revenue from finishing in fifth 
place in the Premier League than Real Madrid's earnings from winning the Champions League. Clubs 
in England and Wales no longer require a large stadium or a large local market to enter or maintain 
membership of the Premier League. Bournemouth sell as many tickets in an entire season at their 
11,000-seat Vitality Stadium as Manchester United in just three matches at Old Trafford, which seats 
76,000. This is further typified by a new generation of clubs with new venues, such as Brighton and 
Hove Albion, Huddersfield Town and Cardiff City, gaining promotion to the Premier League, while 
concurrently clubs with larger stadiums and larger local markets, such as Aston Villa and Newcastle 
United, were relegated in 2015/16. Instead, Premier League clubs are committing more capital and 
operating expenditure to team resources (Deloitte, 2017a), comprising transfer fees (£1.5 billion) and 
player wages (£2.3 billion) in 2016/17. These performance and resource trends indicate that the 
necessary resource and capability endowments of successful clubs are evolving, with team resources 
becoming more valuable than stadium resources. 
The relationship between team resources, sporting performance and financial performance has been 
theoretically and empirically established (Szymanski, 2015): Fundamentally, the best team usually 
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wins, and the clubs that win usually make more money, as exemplified by Manchester United. 
However, clubs are not homogenous and there have been examples of over- and under-performance, 
most notably when Leicester City won the Premier League in 2015/16. Furthermore, much sport 
management research separates sporting and financial performance, and infers that club owners and 
business executives are either win- or profit-maximisers, with only a few models incorporating sporting 
and financial performance (Dobson and Goddard, 1998; Gerrard, 2005; Baroncelli and Lago, 2006; 
Pinnuck and Potter, 2006; Galariotis et al, 2017). Many models of professional sport club performance 
are static, not dynamic. They do not consider the changing competitive environment of the Premier 
League, such as increased commercialisation and globalisation, nor the growth of Swansea City, who 
attained promotion through four divisions from the Football League to the Premier League in seven 
years, nor the sporting and financial failure of Portsmouth, who conversely suffered relegation through 
all four divisions and two administration events in just four years. Sport management research 
generally ignores over- and under-performing clubs, emergent clubs that have experienced growth, 
and failed clubs that have declined. Such clubs are treated as outliers but, conceptually and 
empirically, are the most interesting cases. 
Empirical research is therefore conducted to explain how and why some clubs generate and sustain 
superior sporting, business and financial performance advantage from their team, stadium and other 
resources. It utilises a panel that comprises a sample of 46 clubs that are or have been member of the 
Premier League in the 24-year observation period since its formation in 1992/93 to the end of 2016/17 
season and financial year1. Data is collected from the Premier League, Football League, UEFA, 
League Managers Association, the Annual Review of Football Finance and the Football Yearbook, 
with findings and conclusions drawn from statistical analysis using panel regression models and visual 
analysis of cross-case time-series data displays. 
Sport management theory is extended and tested using confirmatory and exploratory research. A 
series of models confirm the predicted relationships between team resources, sporting performance 
and business performance. More complexity is introduced by exploring competitive and dynamic 
dimensions, encompassing the multiple relationships between sporting, business and financial 
                                                     
1  The football season and financial year are concurrent for most professional football clubs and may 
be labelled on figures and tables by the season year end; for example, the 1992/93 season is 
labelled as 1993. 
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performance and the clubs' team and stadium resources, as well as the required capabilities that are 
associated with these resources. Further analysis of outliers, which represent over- and under-
performing (or under- and over-resourced) clubs, is proposed as being essential for explaining 
performance. Club owners and business executives formulate and implement unique resource and 
resource management strategies that result in divergent and equifinal paths. Premier League clubs 
are demonstrably resilient and adaptable to change, especially in bridging the gap between and within 
divisions and to commercialising the growth, globalisation and commercialisation of the Premier 
League and Champions League. 
The management of most Premier League clubs is, for most of the time, prudent. The concept of fit 
between resources and contingency factors is introduced to ascertain the appropriateness of a club's 
strategy to its competitive environment. Instances of misfit are always promptly resolved, usually by 
compensating for any under- or over-performance (or over- or under-resourcing), although there is 
limited evidence of a predictive relationship between fit and performance. The competitive 
environment of professional team sport is complex as the outcomes generated from club owners and 
business executives' decision-making are confounded by change in the league and competitive 
environment, and by the consequent change to the club's performance and resources. The 
performance of a club is therefore conditional on both internal and external contingency factors. 
Furthermore, strategic decision-making depends on perceptions of change by owners and business 
executives, and not just on the observed change to clubs, the league and competitive environment. 
Clubs strategies can be divergent or equifinal paths whereby similar strategies are evident for clubs 
with different outcomes but, conversely, do not always generate the same or similar performance 
outcomes. 
The findings and methodologies can be applied to inform strategic decision-making by club owners 
and business executives in the formation, implementation and evaluation of their resource strategies. 
The research methodology can be adopted by executives of leagues, governing bodies and 
federations to monitor and control the relative and changing performance of clubs, leagues and 
divisions. However, the application of the methods and findings for predicting or forecasting 
performance is limited as professional team sport requires at least some unpredictability and 
uncertainty of outcome in order for it to be competitive and viable. 
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1. Introduction: Professional team sport, the Premier 
League and professional football clubs 
 
Chapter summary 
• Sport is a global industry that is dominated by football, with the Premier League of England 
and Wales being the principal market. 
• The Premier League and Champions League were formed in 1992. 
• Premier League clubs possess considerable team and stadium resources which are utilised 
to generate sporting and business performance. 
• However, only some clubs are successful or experience growth, with others suffering from 
failure or enduring decline. 
• Sport management theory and contingency theory is developed and applied to explain how 
and why the resources and resource management strategy of club executives are formulated 
and implemented to generate sustained performance advantage. 
 
1.1. Professional team sport 
Sport is a global industry valued at $76.1 billion per annum in 2013 (AT Kearney, 2014). Most of the 
value is generated in North America and Europe, Middle East and Africa (AT Kearney, 2014), as 
illustrated in Figure 1.1. By revenue, the global sport industry is dominated by the sport of association 
football (46.4%), commonly referred to as football or soccer, and the North American major league 
sports (36.8%), which include American football, baseball, basketball and ice hockey (AT Kearney, 
2014). These sports exceed others such as Formula One, tennis and golf. The professional football 
leagues of Europe are the most valuable and alone represent 35.6% of the value of the global sport 
industry (AT Kearney, 2014). The Premier League of England and Wales is the market leader 
(Deloitte, 2017a, 2017b; Ernst & Young, 2015; KPMG, 2017). It generates the largest television 
audience of any professional football league and the second-highest stadium attendance, after 
Germany's Bundesliga (Curley and Roeder, 2016; Ernst & Young, 2015). 
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Figure 1.1: Global sport industry value, by region and sport, 2013 
Source: AT Kearney (2014) 
1.2. Professional football in England and Wales 
Professional sport clubs are typically incorporated as companies, with the league in which they 
compete being analogous to an industry. The sport in each country is administered by national 
governing bodies, which have legislative, judicial and executive functions (Hoehn, 2006). In England 
and Wales, professional football is governed by the Premier League, Football League and the Football 
Association (FA). In Europe, the sport is administered by the Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA). 
Premier League 
The Premier League was formed in 1992 (as the FA Premier League2) when it separated from the 
Football League (Premier League, 2017). It comprises 20 professional football clubs in England and 
Wales3. 47 clubs have been members of the Premier League and the Football League from 1992/93 to 
                                                     
2 The FA Premier League rebranded as the FA Carling Premiership, Barclaycard Premiership, 
Barclays Premiership and Barclays Premier League, and is now the Premier League (see Table 
2.6). 
3 The Premier League was reduced from its original 22 clubs to 20 from the 1996/97 season, while 
the fourth division was simultaneously increased from 22 to 24 clubs. Four clubs (Crystal Palace, 
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the end of the 2015/16 season4. Bournemouth were the most recent new member during this period 
when they promoted to the Premier League for the first time for the start of the 2015/16 season. Only 
seven clubs were permanent members that were not relegated during the period, although Aston Villa 
subsequently failed to maintain their membership of the when they were relegated at the end of the 
2015/16 season. Leicester City became the sixth club to win the Premier League when they did so in 
2016, with Manchester United being the most successful club having won 13 championships. 
English Football League (EFL) 
The Football League was founded in 1888 (Buraimo et al, 2006), rebranding as the English Football 
League (EFL) in 2015 (Football League, 2015). It comprises a hierarchy of divisions, comprising the 
Championship, League One and League Two5, as shown in Table 1.1. The 72 member clubs are 
organised into the three divisions, with 24 clubs in each division. There is a system of promotion and 
relegation between the divisions, with the three or four worst-performing clubs in the higher division 
being replaced by the comparable number of best-performing clubs from the lower division. There is 
also promotion from and relegation to the National League (formerly the Football Conference) for the 
worst-performing clubs in League Two. All Premier League and Football League clubs enter the EFL 
Cup (formerly the Football League Cup to 2015/16), which is a cup competition organised by The 
Football League6. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ipswich Town, Leicester City and Norwich City) were relegated from the Premier League and only 
two clubs (Bolton Wanderers and Middlesbrough) were promoted, instead of the usual three-up, 
three-down rule. 
4 In 2018 and since the end of the observation period, Brighton and Hove Albion and Huddersfield 
Town were promoted to the Premier League for the first time. There have been 49 member clubs 
as of the 2018/19 season. 
5 The Premier League can also described as the first division of professional football in England and 
Wales, with the Football League Championship as the second division, League One as the third 
division, and League Two as the fourth division. 
6 Now the Carabao Cup (since 2017). 
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Table 1.1: Professional Football in England and Wales 
Level Division League 
1 Premier League Football Association Premier League Limited 
2 Championship  
3 League One The Football League Limited 
4 League Two  
 
Ten former Premier League clubs have been relegated to League One via the Football League 
Championship. Three clubs – Bradford City, Portsmouth and Swindon Town – were then further 
relegated to League Two. Conversely, seven clubs have been promoted from League One to the 
Football League Championship and then the Premier League, and six clubs have been promoted from 
League Two to the Premier League. Four clubs – Leicester City, Manchester City, Norwich City and 
Southampton – have been relegated from the Premier League to League One and then promoted 
back to the Premier League during the observation period. There is therefore considerable mobility 
and change every season between, as well as within, the divisions. 
The Football Association 
The Premier League and Football League are sanctioned by the Football Association (FA), and all 
member clubs are affiliated to the FA via the relevant County Football Association (Football 
Association, 2017). The FA was formed in 1863 (Buraimo et al, 2006) and is recognised by the United 
Kingdom government – via Sport England (n.d.) and other sport councils – as the national governing 
body for association football in England. It is responsible for the governance of professional and 
amateur football in England (Football Association, 2017)7. The FA also manages the England national 
teams, which mostly draw on players from Premier League and Football League clubs. All Premier 
League and Football League clubs enter in the FA Cup, which is a cup competition organised by the 
FA8. The governance and administration of professional football is therefore shared by the Premier 
League, EFL and the FA. 
                                                     
7 The Premier League and Football League includes clubs from Wales, who are affiliated to the 
Football Association of Wales. 
8 Now the Emirates FA Cup (since 2015). 
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Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) 
The FA is a member of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)9. Club competitions 
organised by UEFA include the Champions League and Europa League (formerly the UEFA Cup to 
2008/09). Entry to the Champions League is currently awarded to the Premier League champions, 
runners-up and third- and fourth-placed clubs. The winners of the Champions League and, since 
2015/16, the Europa League, also qualify for the following season's Champions League competition 
(UEFA, 2013). Entry to the Europa League is currently awarded to the two next best-placed Premier 
League clubs and to the winners of the FA Cup and EFL Cup. 
1.3. The strategy of Premier League clubs 
Premier League clubs such as Manchester United, Chelsea and Arsenal possess superior team and 
stadium resources, from which they typically generate superior business and sporting performance. 
But it is not always the clubs with superior resources that are successful. Sometimes, smaller clubs 
compete in the Premier League, with Leicester City being the most recent example by winning the 
Premier League in 2015/16. Conversely, some large clubs have failed, either in terms of business or 
sporting performance, and sometimes both. A number of the large clubs that were founder members 
of the Premier League have been relegated to the Football League Championship and subsequently 
entered administration. Leeds United were the Football League champions in the season before the 
formation of the Premier League, and qualified for the Champions League in 1992/93 and 2000/01, 
but were then relegated to the Football League, and entered administration in 2007. Concurrently, 
small- and medium-size clubs such as Leicester City, Queens Park Rangers and Southampton have 
survived relegation and insolvency, and subsequently been promoted back to the Premier League. But 
sporting failure does not necessarily coincide with financial failure, as Derby County, Middlesbrough, 
Newcastle United, Sunderland and West Ham United have all been relegated from the Premier 
League but been promoted back to the division without entering administration. Occasionally, clubs 
with inferior resources outperform large clubs. These smaller clubs that possess inferior team and 
stadium resources have emerged and grown from the third and fourth divisions to become more 
successful than some clubs with superior resources. Blackpool, Cardiff City, Fulham, Hull City, 
                                                     
9 The FA is also a member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), which is 
the international federation of the sport and organises the FIFA World Cup. 
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Swansea City and Wigan Athletic have all won promotion from the fourth division to the Premier 
League. 
This demonstrates that professional team sport performance is not always predictable. Clubs can 
over- or under-perform relative to their team and stadium resources. Some of these clubs are outliers. 
Furthermore, success or failure can be sustained or temporary. Some clubs enjoy sustained success 
or have endured perennial failure, while others have experienced growth, decline or both periods of 
growth and decline. Clubs appears to fulfil unique paths of performance. Existing theories and models 
of professional team sport strategy do not adequately explain the variation in sporting and business 
performance of different clubs and in different eras. 
1.4. Why do some clubs succeed, but others fail? 
Professional sport club owners may seek to maximise winning, profits or both. However, few 
theoretical and empirical models of professional sport club performance incorporate both sporting and 
business performance. Furthermore, many models assume that club owners have either sporting or 
business objectives. Most empirical research of professional sport club performance focuses on 
describing and explaining the relationship between the resources and other inputs of clubs on their 
performance, but ignores the outliers of over-performing and under-performing clubs. It is these over- 
and under-performing clubs that, conceptually and empirically, are the most interesting, as evidenced 
by the aforementioned interest in Leicester City winning the Premier League, the failure of Arsène 
Wenger to sustain the success of Arsenal, the administration of Portsmouth, or the relegation of Aston 
Villa and Newcastle United to the Football League Championship. Empirical research of professional 
sport club performance is usually cross-sectional or encompasses a limited observation period that 
does not allow for analysis of the dynamic growth or decline of clubs, especially between divisions. 
There is an assumption that league or division membership is consistent, whereas there is 
considerable mobility via promotion and relegation between divisions. This is becoming more 
important as there is evidence of a growing gap between the Premier League and Football League, as 
well as between Champions League participants and the remaining clubs in the Premier League, and 
even between the Football League Championship and Leagues One and Two. 
There a need for theoretical and empirical research that considers the competitive and dynamic nature 
of professional sport club performance. The research incorporates performance, resources and the 
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competitive environment. Sporting and business performance is generated from team and stadium 
(and other) resources. But the paths of clubs change as performance changes, especially between 
and within divisions, and also as the owners and objectives of owners change, and as clubs acquire 
and divest of their team and stadium resources to adapt, or fit, to the changing competitive 
environment. Therefore, the fundamental aim for the research is to explain: 
How and why do Premier League football clubs utilise their resources to generate and 
sustain sporting and business performance? 
Empirical research is conducted in the context of professional team sport. The sample is professional 
football clubs in England and Wales that are, or have been, members of the Premier League since its 
formation in 1992/93 to the end of the 2015/16 season. Conceptual models are proposed for the 
relationships between the resources and performance of professional sport clubs. For each of the 
constructs, variables are defined and a series of hypotheses and propositions are proposed to test 
elemental and contingent relationships. Data is collected from archive sources, including the Annual 
Review of Football Finance and the Football Yearbook, which is then is analysed using statistical 
(pooled, fixed effect, time-fixed and two-way effects panel regression models) and visual methods 
(time-ordered cross-case displays). 
1.5. Sport management theory and practice 
The research indicates that the management of most Premier League clubs is, for most of the time, 
prudent. The predicted effects of team resources on sporting performance and of sporting 
performance on business performance are confirmed, and there are some distinctive patterns 
between some groups of clubs, especially those that enjoy success or endure failure. The resource 
and resource management strategies of clubs is further explored to establish how and why owners 
and utilise their team and stadium resources to generate and sustain superior sporting, business and 
financial performance. Club owners and business executives10 are usually willing and able to match 
resources to performance. Any instances of excessive misfit between inputs to outputs are promptly 
resolved, usually by compensating for the under- or over-fit. However, there is limited evidence of a 
                                                     
10 The term business executives is used to refer to business managers, such as the Chief Executive 
Officer, and team managers is used for sport managers, commonly referred to as the manager or 
the head coach (Szymanski, 2015). 
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predictive relationship between fit and performance, although some patterns were evident where clubs 
experienced misfit when winning promotion to the Premier League. 
The research contributes to sport management theory and practice. It develops and tests theory of 
professional sport club performance, ranging from simple, predictive models that confirm established 
relationships, through to more complex models that explore the multiple relationships between 
different types of resources and performance outcomes. The analysis of relationships is extended with 
further investigation of outliers, which represent the over- and under-performing (or under- and over-
resourced) clubs. The empirical models encapsulate the unique resource and resource management 
strategies that clubs adopt and their divergent and equifinal paths. They further evaluate and 
demonstrate the resilience and adaptability of clubs to change, and specifically to the gap between 
and within divisions and to the growth, globalisation and commercialisation of professional team sport. 
The findings and methodologies could be utilised by club and league decision-makers. Club owners 
and business executives can utilise the models to inform the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of strategy. There is further potential application for the monitoring and control of clubs by 
league, governing body and federation executives. 
1.6. The thesis 
The thesis comprises theoretical and empirical research. It commences with an explanation of the 
context of the research by charting the evolution of the Premier League (Chapter 2) plus a review of 
professional team sport management theory and the concepts of change and fit as an approach to 
explaining the variation in professional sport club performance (Chapter 3). Then, conceptual research 
explores the conceptualisation and measurement of clubs' resources and performance, with resources 
comprising teams, stadiums and other inputs that are utilised to generate business and sporting 
performance outputs (Chapter 4). The relationships between performance and resources are also 
examined to encompass the effects of change and introduce the concept of fit. Next, the adopted 
empirical research methodology for confirmatory and exploratory analysis is discussed and justified 
(Chapter 5). Confirmatory analysis examines the effects of team resources on sporting performance 
(Chapter 6) and of sporting performance on business performance (Chapter 7), and exploratory 
analysis investigates the contingency effect of sporting performance on the relationship between team 
resources and business performance (Chapters 8 and 9). Together, conclusions and 
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recommendations are drawn from these models to facilitate professional team sport management 
theory and practice (Chapter 10). The content of the thesis is summarised in Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2: Theoretical and empirical research 
Part 1: Theoretical research 
2. Literature review: The evolution of the 
Premier League 
3. Literature review: How and why do clubs 
compete? Professional team sport 
management theory and practice 
4. Conceptual research: The conceptualisation and measurement of professional team sport 
Part 2: Empirical research 
5. Research methodology: Describing and explaining professional sport club performance 
6. Empirical research: 
Sporting performance model 
7. Empirical research: 
Business performance 
model 
8. Empirical research: 
Contingency models 
9. Empirical research: 
Sporting and business 
performance model 
10. Conclusions: The conclusions to and recommendations from the thesis 
 
Evolution 
10 
2. Literature review: The evolution of the Premier 
League 
 
Chapter summary 
• Prior to 1993, the structure and strategy of professional football was mostly conservative and 
stable, but extensive and intensive change in the sporting and competitive environment 
stimulated and enabled the formation of the Premier League. 
• The growth of the Premier League was prompted by change in the finance and information 
and communication industries, and by emerging television, internet and mobile technology. 
• Commercialisation of professional team sport has enabled clubs to generate incremental 
revenue, but many clubs have also increased team resource expenditure, and especially 
player wages and overseas player trading, partly as a consequence of the Bosman case, 
while contagion from the failure of broadcasters ITV Digital and Setanta Sports led to 
insolvency for a number of Football League clubs. 
• Much of this expansion has been from overseas markets, while, contemporaneously, 
owners, players, team managers and business executives have also become globalised. 
• New stadiums have opened, which were obligated by government inquiries and additions 
and amendments to legislation following a series of disasters and incidents, and enabled by 
the growth of the financial sector and the enhanced commercialisation of professional team 
sport. 
• The Premier League has become established as one of the foremost professional sport 
leagues in the world and many of its member clubs now generate substantial revenue and 
profit, although sporting performance in UEFA competitions has been more erratic. 
• There is some evidence that the location of member clubs is becoming concentrated in 
London and the North West, with a concurrent trend of larger clubs in industrial regions 
being replaced by smaller clubs in post-industrialised towns and cities. 
• The gap between the Premier League and Football League has widened, with further 
divergence between the Championship to Leagues One and Two, and between the Premier 
League and Champions League. 
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The management of professional football in England and Wales has, historically, been conservative. 
There have been few changes to structure of club competitions since the restructure of the Football 
League to four divisions in 1958 (Anderson, 2016). Most of the clubs that are current or previous 
members of the Premier League were formed between the 1860s to the 1910s, as illustrated by Figure 
2.1. The oldest clubs were founded in the 1860s: Stoke City (1863), Nottingham Forest (1865) and 
Sheffield Wednesday (1867). Clubs continued to be formed until the 1910s, with the formation of 
Swansea City in 1912 and Leeds United in 1919. Since then, only Wigan Athletic and Milton Keynes 
have been formed. Wigan Athletic were founded in 1932, but did not enter the Football League until 
1978 and the Premier League until 2005. The formation of Milton Keynes is contentious and 
complicated by the club being formed from the relocation of Wimbledon in 2003 and by the 
consequent creation of AFC Wimbledon (see Section 5.3). Only four clubs (Accrington Stanley, 
Aldershot, Maidstone United and Newport County) have been dissolved and rescinded their Football 
League membership as a consequence of financial failure (Deloitte, 1993), and all have since re-
formed. 
Figure 2.1: Clubs founded per decade, Premier League clubs, 1880s to 2010s 
 
Source: Football Yearbook 
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However, in 1992 the Premier League and Champions League were launched and their growth has 
coincided with a period of change and uncertainty for professional team sport, and especially to 
economic, technological and legal trends (Deloitte, 1994; Gerrard, 2004). In the United Kingdom and 
Europe, changes in the financial, insurance, information and communication industries have affected 
the success and failure of professional football leagues and clubs. These trends have had a 
substantial impact on professional team sport (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Frick, 2007; Késenne, 
2007; Vrooman, 2007a; Vrooman, 2007b; Vrooman, 2013). 
2.1. Antecedents to the Premier League 
The reputation of professional football in the United Kingdom was severely damaged by a series of 
disasters and incidents in the 1970s and 1980s, as summarised in Table 2.1. These events had a 
considerable and detrimental impact on the reputation of the sport. In May 1985, there were 54 
fatalities and over 250 casualties as a consequence of a fire at Bradford City's Valley Parade (Elliott et 
al, 1997), and on the same day one spectator was killed and 20 were injured in crowd disorder at 
Birmingham City's St Andrews stadium (Elliott et al, 1997). Just 18 days later, there were a further 38 
fatalities and in excess of 600 casualties caused by public disorder before the 1985 UEFA European 
Cup Final between Liverpool and Italian club Juventus at the Heysel Stadium (now King Baudouin 
Stadium) in Brussels, Belgium (Elliott et al, 1997; Schwarz et al, 2010). English clubs were banned by 
UEFA from European competitions for five years (Boyle and Haynes, 2004). In response, the United 
Kingdom government commissioned the Popplewell (1985, 1986) Committee of Inquiry into Crowd 
Safety and Control at Sports Grounds and subsequently introduced legislation with the Fire Safety and 
Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987. Then, in 1989, 95 fans were killed and more than 400 injured 
before the FA Cup Semi-Final at Sheffield Wednesday's Hillsborough stadium. As a consequence of 
the Taylor (1989a, 1989b) inquiry into The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, further legislation was 
passed, including the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, the Football (Offences) Act 
1991 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.). 
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Table 2.1: Stadium disasters and incidents, United Kingdom football clubs, 1970 to 1992 
Venue Year Fatalities Casualties 
Ibrox Stadium, Glasgow 1971 66 145 
Brunton Park, Carlisle 1971 0 5 
Manor Ground, Oxford 1971 0 25 
Victoria Ground, Stoke 1971 0 46 
Molineux, Wolverhampton 1972 0 80 
Highbury, London 1972 0 42 
Sincil Bank, Lincoln City 1975 0 4 
Brisbane Road, London 1978 0 30 
Ayresome Park, Middlesbrough 1980 2 0 
Hillsborough, Sheffield 1981 0 38 
Fellows Park, Walsall 1984 0 20 
Valley Parade, Bradford 1985 54 250+ 
St Andrews, Birmingham 1985 1 20 
Heysel Stadium, Brussels 1985 38 600+ 
Easter Road, Edinburgh 1987 0 150 
Hillsborough, Sheffield 1989 95 400 
Ayresome Park, Middlesbrough 1989 0 19 
Adapted from: Elliott et al (1997) and Schwarz et al (2010) 
The Football Spectators Act 1989 provided for the establishment of the Football Licensing Authority, 
which became the Sports Ground Safety Authority in 2011 (Sports Ground Safety Authority, 2013), 
and the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds11. Clubs were compelled to improve their stadiums and 
enhance the management of facilities, which then attracted more spectators and enabled more 
matchday revenue to be appropriated from ticket and hospitality sales. Future editions of the Guide to 
Safety at Sports Grounds – commonly referred to as the Green Guide – were published by the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2008)12 and the Sports Grounds Safety Authority (2018). 
From the 1980s, change to national and international political and economic trends had a considerable 
impact on many industries, including professional team sport. In the United Kingdom, change was 
                                                     
11 The Green Guide was first published in 1973 as a consequence of the Wheatley (1972) Report of 
the Inquiry into Crowd Safety at Sports Grounds, commissioned in response to a disaster at Ibrox 
Stadium in Glasgow in 1971, with a revised edition in 1986 following the fire at Valley Parade, and 
again in 1990 after the Hillsborough disaster. The fourth edition was published in 1997, the fifth 
edition in 2008, and the sixth edition in 2018. 
12 Now the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (since 2017). 
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prompted by the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party in 1979 and, later, by the 
formation of the European Union in 1993, which enabled economic and monetary union from 1993 
(Gardiner et al, 2012). Globalisation has influenced professional team sport since the 1980s (Bourg 
and Gouget, 2006) and especially European sport from the 1990s (Vrooman, 2007b) by transforming 
the competitive environment of sport and other industries through change to the governance and 
organisation of leagues and clubs. 
The transformation of the United Kingdom economy from manufacturing to services continued during 
this period (Office for National Statistics, 2017), as illustrated by the relative growth in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in the services and manufacturing sectors from the 1990s shown in Figure 2.2. The 
services economy incorporates arts, entertainment and recreation (which includes sport) and the 
financial, insurance, information and communication industry, which facilitated the development of 
resource markets (for players and stadiums) and product markets (for matchday, commercial and 
broadcasting products and services) in professional team sport. Concurrently, the change from 
manufacturing to services and the associated change in employment, types of work, earnings and 
working patterns (Office for National Statistics, 2017) created new markets of consumers. Leagues 
and clubs developed products and services for these consumers and business customers as their 
business models evolved to encompass the marketing of sport, including tickets, food services and 
retailing, and marketing through sport, such as licensing and sponsorship (Mullin et al, 2014). 
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Figure 2.2: Gross Domestic Product, by sector, 1990 to 2016 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (2017) 
Change to the financial services industry in the United Kingdom and Europe had an immediate and 
lagged effect on professional team sport by supplying financial resources to broadcasters and, 
eventually, to professional sport clubs. The Financial Services Act 1986 regulated and made provision 
of financial services and coincided with the Big Bang of 1986 – the digitisation of the financial services 
markets in the City of London, while the Banking Act 1987 regulated and amended business and 
consumer financial services (Pilbeam, 2018). The Insolvency Act 1986 consolidated legislation relating 
to the insolvency and winding-up of companies, which was to have a significant effect on professional 
football in England and Wales (Kuper and Szymanski, 2012) with clubs being able to use, and 
arguably abuse, insolvency proceedings to survive and gain a competitive advantage despite financial 
failure. 
Concurrently, the broadcasting industry was transformed in the 1980s (Barnett, 1990; Boyle and 
Haynes, 2004; Buraimo, 2006) and 1990s (Boyle and Haynes, 2004; Buraimo, 2006). Previously, the 
BBC and ITV had an established duopoly for the broadcast of football in England and Wales (Boyle 
and Haynes, 2004; Buraimo, 2006), with the rights highlights divided between on BBC's Match of the 
Day on Saturday evening and ITV's The Big Match on Sunday afternoon. But, in 1988, the Football 
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League agreed a £44 million contract with ITV for the exclusive rights to broadcast of live matches on 
The Big Match for four years from the 1998/99 season (Boyle and Haynes, 2004; Gerrard, 2004). 
Meanwhile, new entrants pre-empted and reacted to change to legislation including the Cable and 
Satellite Act 1984 and the Broadcasting Act 1990 (Boyle and Haynes, 2004), while the European 
Union's Television Without Frontiers Directive (Milne, 2016) establish conditions for free movement 
and fair competition within a common market for the production and distribution of broadcasting 
services. The aforementioned evolution of the financial services industry facilitated the formation and 
subsequent growth of British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) in 1990 (Barnett, 1990; Boyle and Haynes, 
2004) and Sky Television in 1989 (Barnett, 1990). BSB was backed by Robert Maxwell (Gershon, 
2016), the owner of Oxford United and Derby County (Boyle and Haynes, 2004), while Sky was owned 
by Rupert Murdoch (Barnett, 1990), who later invested in a number of Premier League clubs. In 1990, 
British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) was formed with the merger of BSB and Sky (Buraimo, 2006), with 
Sky effectively taking over BSB (Boyle and Haynes, 2004). 
The development of the financial, information and communication industries that facilitated the 
formation of the Premier League is illustrated by Figure 2.3. There was considerable expansion in the 
financial sector after the Millennium, but stagnation since the recession of the late-2000s, while the 
information and communication sector has been more constant. The arts, entertainment and 
recreation sector is much smaller and has enjoyed lesser, but constant, expansion since the 1990s. 
Within this sector, there has been considerable growth in the professional football industry in England 
and Wales (Deloitte, 2017a), which was resistant to the recession of the late-2000s (Deloitte, 2010, 
2012). 
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Figure 2.3: Gross Domestic Product, by industry, 1990 to 2017 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (2017) 
The 1990s signalled the resurgence of professional football in England. England qualified for the Italy 
1990 FIFA World Cup and a television audience of 26 million – approximately half of the population of 
Great Britain – watched England lose in a penalty shoot-out to Germany in the Semi-Final (Greenfield 
and Osborn, 2000). The tournament had a substantial, and mostly more positive, effect on the 
reputation of English football (Davies, 1990). The Premier League and UEFA Champions League 
were formed in 1992 to exploit intensified competition in the broadcasting industry and capture 
increasing demand for football products and services from consumers and business customers. 
BSkyB launched its Sky Sports service and signed a £304 million contract for the broadcast of live 
Premier League matches for five years from 1992/93. The BBC regained the rights to broadcast 
highlights of Premier League matches on its relaunched Match of the Day (Boyle and Haynes, 2004), 
which offered free-to-air television broadcasting that presented a marketing channel to the clubs' 
consumer and business customers, including as sponsors and licensees. The Premier League clubs 
further benefitted from the increased broadcast revenue by appropriating a larger proportion of the 
revenue than when they were members of the Football League (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). 
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The transformation of the financial services sector introduced new providers of financial resources to 
professional football clubs. Financiers were assured by the broadcast rights that were generated by 
the Premier League and, importantly, appropriated by the member clubs, as well as the clubs' robust 
matchday and commercial revenue. This was evidenced by the increasing value and duration of 
broadcast and commercial rights contracts, and the increasing match attendances and television 
audiences. 
By 1996, the merger of BSB and Sky into BSkyB meant that the retention of the live Premier League 
broadcast rights was almost a foregone conclusion given the dominant position of BSkyB (Gerrard, 
2004). The broadcaster had, however, recognised the potential emergence of new entrants to the 
broadcast and telecommunications industry and negotiated a four-year contract (from 1997/98 to 
2000/01) for £670 million (Boyle and Haynes, 2004). The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) referred the 
contract to the Restrictive Practices Court (RPC), but the RPC concluded that the collective sale of 
broadcast rights was in the public interest (Buraimo, 2006; Gerrard, 2004). Nevertheless, the initial 
five-year (from 1992/93 to 1996/97) and four-year (from 1997/98 to 2000/01) contracts were 
subsequently replaced by three-year terms (Milne, 2016), as the growth of the broadcast industry 
accelerated towards the end of the Millennium (Boyle and Haynes, 2004). 
2.2. The evolving business model of Premier League clubs 
As professional sport leagues evolved, their member clubs required financial resources to fund the 
development of team and stadium resources. Some clubs issued debt and equity, meaning that the 
creditors and owners of the club companies changed. Consequently, the management of clubs 
changed as owners now had to meet interest and dividend obligations. The business models of clubs 
evolved as their financial resources and financial performance objectives changed. Clubs adopted 
divergent strategies to utilise their team, stadium and other resources. 
Professional sport clubs were able to access new forms of debt (Deloitte, 1998). Debt was issued in 
the form of mortgage securities (for example, by securing the debt against the club's stadium), and, 
more commonly in the Premier League era, by asset-based securities (which were secured against 
future matchday, commercial and broadcast revenue). Asset-based securities were typically secured 
against matchday revenue, and specifically general admission and hospitality tickets, and sometimes 
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on matchday and commercial revenue. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the largest debt issues by 
Premier League clubs, all of which occurred between 1999 and 2003. 
Table 2.2: Debt issued by Premier League clubs, 1999 to 2003 
Club 
Value 
(£,000) 
Issue 
Term 
(years) 
Matchday Commercial Broadcast 
Everton 30,000 2002 25 Yes No No 
Ipswich Town 25,000 2001 25 Yes No No 
Leeds United 60,000 2001 25 Yes No No 
Leicester City 28,000 2001 25 No Yes Yes 
Manchester City 44,000 2002 25 / 15 Yes No No 
Newcastle United 55,000 1999 17 Yes Yes No 
Norwich City 15,000 2003 15 Yes Yes Yes 
Southampton 25,000 2000 25 Yes No No 
Tottenham Hotspur 75,000 2002 20 Yes No No 
Source: Deloitte (2004, 2005) 
There were differences in the purpose of the financial resources raised by clubs. Only Leicester City 
and Southampton used their financial resources to fund new stadiums, for the Walkers Stadium (now 
King Power Stadium) and St Mary's Stadium respectively. However, Leicester City entered 
administration just a year after their issue in 2002, while Southampton went into administration in 
2009, although this was nine years after the completion of their offer. Some of the clubs that used debt 
for other purposes also experienced financial failure. Ipswich Town raised debt in 2001 to redevelop 
their Portman Road stadium but entered administration just two years later, and Leeds United, who 
restructured debt in 2001, were put into administration in 2007 (Deloitte, 2002). Manchester City's debt 
issue coincided with their relocation in 2003 to the City of Manchester Stadium (now Etihad Stadium), 
which is owned by Manchester City Council (Garrahan, 2002a, 2002b). Many of the clubs that raised 
debt had previously listed, indicating that these club companies were able to access a mix of financial 
resources and that lenders were more willing to lend to publicly-owned clubs. 
Equity was raised by professional football club companies through the initial public offering (IPO), or 
floatation (Deloitte, 1996). Shares were then traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), Alternative 
Investments Market (AIM) and OFEX13. Table 2.3 provides a list of the former and current Premier 
League clubs that are currently, or were previously, owned by a public limited company (PLC). With 
                                                     
13 OFEX was rebranded as Plus Markets and then to Nex Exchange. 
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the exception of Tottenham Hotspur (1997), Arsenal and Manchester United (1991) and Watford 
(2001), all of the IPOs were completed between 1995 and 1997. 
Table 2.3: Equity raised by Premier League clubs, 1983 to 2001 
Club Company Listed Market 
Arsenal Arsenal Holdings PLC 1991 OFEX 
Aston Villa Aston Villa PLC 1997 London Stock Exchange 
Birmingham City Birmingham City PLC 1997 AIM 
Bolton Wanderers Burnden Leisure PLC 1997 London Stock Exchange 
Charlton Athletic Charlton Athletic PLC 1997 AIM 
Chelsea Chelsea Village PLC 1996 AIM 
Leeds United Caspian PLC 1996 London Stock Exchange 
Leicester City Leicester City PLC 1997 London Stock Exchange 
Manchester City Manchester City PLC 1995 OFEX 
Manchester United Manchester United PLC 1991 London Stock Exchange 
Newcastle United Newcastle United PLC 1997 London Stock Exchange 
Nottingham Forest Nottingham Forest PLC 1997 AIM 
Queens Park Rangers Loftus Road PLC 1996 AIM 
Sheffield United Sheffield United PLC 1997 London Stock Exchange 
Southampton Southampton Leisure Holdings PLC 1997 London Stock Exchange 
Sunderland Sunderland PLC 1996 London Stock Exchange 
Swansea City Silver Shield Group PLC 1997 London Stock Exchange 
Tottenham Hotspur Tottenham Hotspur PLC 1983 London Stock Exchange 
Watford Watford Leisure PLC 2001 AIM 
West Bromwich Albion West Bromwich Albion PLC 1997 AIM 
Sources: Amir and Livine, 2005; Deloitte, 2007; Kuper, 1997a, 1997b; Morrow, 1999; Owen, 2001; Szymanski, 
2015 
However, there were immediate concerns about the public football club companies, both in terms of 
their financial performance (Deloitte, 1996) and sporting performance (Deloitte, 1999, 2000). Equity 
was raised by permanent Premier League members, including Arsenal, Chelsea, Manchester United 
and Tottenham Hotspur. However, floatation did not always lead to success. Queens Park Rangers 
and Swansea City both entered administration in 2001, five years and four years respectively after 
floatation. Leeds United, Leicester City and Southampton issued debt during the same era but 
subsequently entered administration; however, it is difficult to establish causality because of the lag 
between events. Leeds United went into administration in 2007 (nine years after floatation), Leicester 
City (five years later, in 2002) and Southampton (12 years later, in 2009). These three clubs issued 
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both debt and equity during the era, although this not necessarily explain their subsequent financial 
failure as Newcastle United and Tottenham Hotspur did likewise but remained solvent. 
The floatation of clubs as public companies enabled strategic alliances to be formed between 
professional football clubs and broadcasters. Clubs and broadcasters had identified the 
complementarity of emerging technology and live sport, and, to secure this relationship, a number of 
broadcasters acquired equity in Premier League clubs. Table 2.4 shows that BSkyB, Granada and 
NTL adopted such a strategy by investing in eleven clubs in 1999 to 2000. 
Table 2.4: Acquisitions of Premier League clubs by broadcasters, 1999 to 2000 
Club 
Value 
(£,000) 
Acquisition Equity Broadcaster 
Arsenal 77,000 2000 10.0% Granada 
Aston Villa 26,000 2000 10.0% NTL 
Chelsea 40,000 2000 9.9% BSkyB 
Leeds United 14,000 1999 9.1% BSkyB 
Leicester City 13,000 2000 10.0% NTL 
Liverpool 22,000 1999 10.0% Granada 
Manchester City 11,000 1999 9.9% BSkyB 
Manchester United 67,000 1998 9.9% BSkyB 
Middlesbrough 15,000 2000 5.6% NTL 
Newcastle United 41,000 1999 9.9% NTL 
Sunderland 7,000 1999 5.0% BSkyB 
Source: Deloitte, 2000; Garraham and O'Connor, 2002 
Broadcasters did not retain their equity in professional football clubs (Deloitte, 2002), and most shares 
– including those in the permanent Premier League members – were divested between 2003 and 
2007. In 2003, Aston Villa PLC, the then owner of Aston Villa, acquired the shares that had transferred 
from NTL to Premium TV (Aston Villa, 2003), while JP McManus and John Magnier increased their 
ownership stake in Manchester United by buying shares from BSkyB (Garrahan, 2003). Granada's 
shares in Arsenal and Liverpool had transferred to ITV PLC and these were also subsequently 
divested. In 2007, Stan Kroenke acquired ITV's equity in Arsenal (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2007) and Kop 
Football (owned by George Gillett and Tom Hicks) purchased ITV's stake in Liverpool (Blitz and 
Wilson, 2007). The exception was Chelsea, with shares in Chelsea Football Club Limited, a subsidiary 
of the Chelsea FC PLC, only being divested by BSkyB to Chelsea FC PLC in 2013 (Blitz, 2013). 
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The business model of the Premier League was changing and clubs therefore needed to generate 
revenue and profit, from which interest and dividend payments could be made. Most revenue was 
generated from matchday, commercial and broadcast sources. To appropriate this revenue, clubs 
needed to maintain Premier League membership and formulate and implement customer acquisition 
and retention programmes. 
Premier League clubs developed new and existing products and services for the changing markets 
that were watching football. These include ticketing, retailing and food services, mostly to consumers, 
and licensing and sponsorship, to business customers. Traditionally, products and services were 
delivered in-stadium, including matchdays and non-matchdays, but clubs were now diversifying into 
out-of-stadium channels (Deloitte, 1999). For example, Manchester United opened hotels (Manchester 
United, 1997) and the Red Cinema (Manchester United, 2003) near to its Old Trafford stadium, while 
developing local, national and international channels through its retail and Red Café brands 
(Manchester United, 1999) and a joint venture (Manchester United Merchandising) with Nike for its 
merchandise and retail operation (Manchester United, 2001). 
Owners appointed business managers as well as team managers (Deloitte, 1999), who in turn 
developed sponsorship and licensing partnerships with some of the providers from the financial, 
information and communication sectors that had enabled the launch and growth of the Premier 
League and Champions League. Companies and brands in these sectors were induced by the value 
and volume of national and international markets and the strong brand loyalty of the clubs' customers 
and fans. For example, Manchester United launched a package of financial products and services 
using the MU Finance brand, including a credit card with Mastercard and a personal bank account 
with the Britannia Building Society (Manchester United, 1999). The club utilised its existing relationship 
with BSkyB, the Premier League broadcaster that owned 9.9% of the club, to launch MUTV 
(Manchester United, 1998) and the ManUMobile service with the club sponsor Vodafone (Manchester 
United, 2000). This emerging technology enabled revenue to be generated and integrated with the 
marketing and delivery of other products and services (Deloitte, 1999). 
The Premier League and its member clubs became more protective and defensive of their brands and 
the associated revenue that could be generated. Manchester United were an early adopter of internet 
technology and registered the manutd.com domain name in 1996 (ICANN, 2018). A dispute between 
Arsenal and a stallholder who sold licensed and unlicensed merchandise near the club's Highbury 
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stadium (Arsenal Football Club v Reed 2002) reached the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
the Court of Appeal. The consequence of the case was that many clubs, including Arsenal, redesigned 
and trademarked their crests, badges and symbols (James, 2017). Everton and Tottenham Hotspur 
attempted to prevent other parties from using their clubs' name and nickname respectively (James, 
2017). Conversely, stakeholders have prevented club owners from making changes to a club's brand. 
The FA ruled against the proposal by the owners of Hull City to change the name of the club to Hull 
Tigers, with the matter being heard by an Arbitration Panel (Hull City Tigers Limited v Football 
Association Limited 2015). The club continued to trade as Hull City, but removed the name and 
nickname from the club logo (James, 2017) and replaced it with 1904, the year the club was founded 
(Anderson, 2016). Meanwhile, clubs and their stakeholders were attempting to restrict the bargaining 
power of new entrants. The Office of Fair Trading investigated the merchandising and retailing 
services of Manchester United and a number of suppliers and retailers (James, 2017). The club and 
three retailers were found guilty of price fixing (JJB Sports PLC v OFT; Allsports Limited v OFT [2004]; 
JJB Sports PLC v OFT; Allsports Limited v OFT; Umbro Holdings Limited v OFT; Manchester United 
plc v OFT [2005]; and JJB Sports PLC v OFT [2006]), with unprecedented fines imposed on JJB 
Sports (£6.7 million), Umbro Holdings Limited (£5.3 million), Manchester United (£1.5 million) and 
Allsports Limited (£1.4 million). 
2.3. First generation stadiums 
Enhanced sport facilities were compelled as a consequence of a series of disasters and incidents at 
British football stadiums in the 1970s and 1980s. The evolving business model of professional football 
further stimulated and enabled a new generation of venues. The first of this new generation of football 
stadiums in the United Kingdom was St Johnstone's McDiarmid Park in Perth, which opened in 1989 
(Anderson, 2016) and was cited as an example of good practice by the Taylor (1989b) inquiry. But it 
was not until 1993 that the next new stadium was opened in England and Wales, when Millwall 
relocated to a new facility that was also named The Den (Anderson, 2016). Figure 2.4 shows that 17 
of the 47 clubs who are or have been a member of the Premier League up to 2015/16 have relocated 
to a new stadium since 1992 (Anderson, 2016). 
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Figure 2.4: Stadiums opened per decade, Premier League clubs, 1880s to 2010s 
 
Source: Football Yearbook 
Most professional football clubs in England and Wales have utilised the same stadium since, or soon 
after, they were formed, with historic venues dating back to the 1880s. The number of new venues 
peaked in the 1890s but then declined with the advent of the First World War until, in 1935, Norwich 
City became the most recent current or former Premier League club to open a new stadium until the 
1990s. Even in the Football League, the only clubs to relocate between the Second World War and 
1990 were Leyton Orient (1937), Port Vale (1950), Southend United (1955), Accrington Stanley 
(1970), Stevenage (1980) and Scunthorpe United (1988). 
Most of the stadium projects opened since the 1990s have been completed by Football League clubs 
or by clubs that were unable to maintain their membership of the Premier League. The relocation of 
Middlesbrough, Bolton Wanderers, Derby County, Sunderland, Leicester City and Manchester City all 
coincided with promotion to or relegation from the Premier League. It was not until Southampton 
moved to St Mary's Stadium in 2001 that an established Premier League club opened a new facility, 
and even they were relegated just four seasons later. Arsenal became the first permanent member of 
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the Premier League to relocate when they moved to the Emirates Stadium in 200614 and, more 
recently, West Ham United had been a Premier League member for four seasons when they relocated 
to the London Stadium in 2016. Huddersfield Town, Stoke City, Reading, Wigan Athletic, Hull City, 
Swansea City and Brighton and Hove Albion opened their new venues many seasons before 
promotion to the Premier League, while Coventry City moved to the Ricoh Arena in 2005, having been 
relegated from the Premier League in 2000/01. 
The evolving business models meant clubs could now improve their stadium resources. Many of these 
first generation of contemporary stadiums were on a "sensible scale" (Deloitte, 1999, p. 17), as clubs 
responded to the Popplewell (1985, 1986) and Taylor (1989a, 1989b) inquiries, while new and existing 
products and services could be delivered to the clubs' emerging new markets. Professional football 
clubs also had access to the financial resources to develop venues. The stadiums were functional in 
terms of revenue generation – focusing mostly on ticketing, food services and retailing – and incurred 
modest capital and operating expenditure. 
There was an increase in both the supply and demand for tickets to watch professional football in 
England and Wales. Growth occurred in all divisions, with most recorded in the Premier League and 
Football League Championship. The average capacity of stadiums increased, especially at the start of 
the Premier League era, as shown in Figure 2.5. Average attendance followed a similar trend, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.6. Clubs subsequently consolidated their general admission ticketing revenue 
and developed hospitality facilities (see Section 2.6). Fluctuations in supply and demand are mostly 
due to change in the membership of each division, but also to the redevelopment of existing facilities 
and relocation to new venues. 
                                                     
14 Tottenham Hotspur are building a new stadium that is scheduled to open in 2019. 
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Figure 2.5: Average stadium capacity per year, by division, Premier League and Football 
League, 1996/97 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
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Figure 2.6: Average club matchday attendance per year, by division, Premier League and 
Football League, 1994/95 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
2.4. The expansion and contagion of professional football in 
England and Wales 
Most of the revenue generated by the Premier League and Champions League is appropriated by 
clubs. But, to capture this revenue, clubs have to be members of the Premier League or qualify for the 
Champions League. This is accomplished and sustained by winning matches and championships. But 
winning matches usually requires superior team resources, and players are now appropriating more of 
the increased revenue that is being generated by the leagues and clubs. 
Players have been able to do this as they have been afforded greater bargaining power as a 
consequence of change to the regulations of professional football in the United Kingdom, Europe and 
worldwide. The Bosman case (Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v 
Bosman [1995]) was a "turning point in football's history" (Deloitte, 1999, p. 33). The outcome of the 
case was immediately known to league and club executives, but its consequences were uncertain for 
each club (Deloitte, 1995) and division (Deloitte, 1999). The extent and immediacy of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union's decision had both short-term and long-term consequences, with 
Evolution 
28 
players holding more bargaining power and the development of a global market for the trading of 
players (Deloitte, 1999). The Bosman case changed the rights of a club (the employer) when a 
contract of employment with a player (the employee) had terminated. Clubs were no longer permitted 
to restrict the mobility of an out-of-contract player by demanding a transfer fee. Players therefore 
assumed more bargaining power, either by renegotiating their contract towards the end of the term of 
the contract or by allowing the contract to expire, and appropriating some or all of the value from the 
buying club that was previously received by the selling club as a transfer fee. This had positive and 
negative consequences for clubs and players (Késenne, 2006a). Clubs were now able to sign out-of-
contract players without incurring the payment of a transfer fee to the player's previous employer. 
However, they were now unable to solicit a transfer fees if a player's contract was allowed to expire. 
Players now had freedom when their contract had expired, but clubs responded by reducing the 
duration of player contracts. This led to an increase in the proportion of team resource expenditure 
that was appropriated by players as wages compared to the expenditure appropriated by selling clubs 
through transfer fee receipts, as illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7: Total club player wages and transfer fees, Premier League and Football League, 
1994/95 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
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The freedom of movement of persons, services and capital that was enshrined by the European Union 
in 1992 was further enforced in professional team sport by the Bosman case (Vrooman, 2007a). 
Coincidentally, in 1992, UEFA introduced quotas for professional football clubs on the number of 
players in a team who were not eligible to play for the national team of the nation in which the club 
was affiliated (James, 2017). For example, Premier League clubs were restricted by the number of 
players who were not eligible to play for England. These quotas were also abolished by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. The case therefore opened the European and global market for 
players, which are governed by UEFA and FIFA respectively (James, 2017), and enhanced players' 
mobility (Késenne, 2006a). Figure 2.8 shows how this has had an effect on the relative value players 
signed by Premier League clubs from other clubs in England and Wales and from overseas clubs. 
Figure 2.8: Total club transfer fees, by market, Premier League and Football League, 1994/95 to 
2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
At the start of the Millennium, new entrants emerged to bid for the rights to broadcast football and 
other sports. In the United Kingdom, BSkyB's dominant position in subscription and pay-per-view 
television was gradually being eroded (Gerrard, 2004). Broadcasters recognised the potential of live 
sport rights as (Buraimo, 2006) as the "killer content" (Deloitte, 2001, p. 15). But the broadcasters 
Evolution 
30 
were not always successful in generating audiences and revenue (Buraimo, 2006), and this failure 
coincided with the decline in advertising revenue for broadcasters in 2000s (Deloitte, 2001). This led to 
the insolvency of key broadcasters and, consequently, a number of clubs. 
ONdigital was a digital terrestrial television (DTT) service formed in 1998 (Boyle and Haynes, 2004) as 
a joint venture between Carlton and Granada (Boyle and Haynes, 2004; Szymanski, 2015). In 2001, 
the company was renamed to ITV Digital Holdings15 and rebranded as ITV Digital (Boyle and Haynes, 
2004), and then invested £315 million on the live broadcast rights for the Football League for three 
seasons from 2001/02 (Buraimo, 2006; Emery and Weed, 2006). However, the service was a 
commercial failure (Gerrard, 2004) as the company over-estimated the level of consumer demand and 
revenue (Emery and Weed, 2006).The company consequently entered administration in 2002 
(Deloitte, 2003), having broadcast live Football League matches for just one season (Buraimo, 
2006)16. The contagion from the failure of ITV Digital led to "years of adjustment" by professional 
football clubs in England and Wales (Deloitte, 2004) and by some of the broadcasters17. 
In 1998, BSkyB announced its intention to acquire Manchester United (Deloitte, 1999). The United 
Kingdom government referred the proposed takeover to the Monopoly and Mergers Commission 
(MMC), with the MMC ruling against the acquisition in 1999 (Deloitte, 2000), with the decision 
endorsed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Gerrard, 2004). In response, UEFA 
introduced regulations in 1998 that prevented multiple majority ownership of clubs by individuals or 
organisations, and only permitted a shareholder to hold 10% or more of the equity in multiple clubs 
(Deloitte, 2000). Concurrently, UEFA's rule that restricted the participation of clubs in its competitions 
where there was common ownership was challenged by ENIC PLC, which owned clubs in Czech 
Republic, Greece, Italy, Scotland and Switzerland, and subsequently acquired Tottenham Hotspur in 
2001 (ENIC, 2001). The challenge was rejected by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (1999) and on 
appeal by the European Commission (2002). This essentially restricted investors, including 
broadcasters, from acquiring 10% or more of the equity in more than one club (Deloitte, 2000). 
                                                     
15 The joint venture's company name British Digital Broadcasting was changed to ONdigital Holdings 
and then to ITV Digital Holdings. 
16 ITV Digital was subsequently relaunched as Freeview, but did not retain nor acquire any Premier 
League broadcast rights. 
17 For example, NTL merged with Telewest to form Virgin Media in 2006. 
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BSkyB then implemented an alternative strategy of acquiring a minority shareholding in Manchester 
United plus similar investments in Chelsea, Leeds United, Manchester City and Sunderland (Gerrard, 
2004; Gerrard, 2006). Meanwhile, BSkyB's competitors responded by adopting a similar strategy to 
prevent BSkyB from exerting bargaining power on the distribution of Premier League broadcasting 
rights (Gerrard, 2004; Gerrard, 2006). NTL withdrew their proposed takeover of Newcastle United, and 
instead acquired part of the equity in Aston Villa, Leicester City, Middlesbrough and Newcastle United, 
while ITV made similar investments in Arsenal and Liverpool (Gerrard, 2006). 
Setanta, a broadcaster based in the Republic of Ireland, entered the United Kingdom broadcast 
market by investing £392 million on the rights to broadcast live Premier League matches (Downward, 
2014) for four seasons from 2007/08. Similar to ONdigital, the company were unable to generate 
sufficient subscribers to its Setanta Sports service (Downward, 2014) and, as a consequence, 
defaulted on a payment of £10 million to the Premier League (Wilson, 2011). The company entered 
administration in 2009 (Downward, 2014) and the rights defaulted by Setanta were acquired from the 
Premier League by ESPN for £90 million (Downward, 2014)18. 
The failure of ITV Digital in 2002 and Setanta in 2009 had severe consequences for professional 
football clubs. It stimulated contagion, both in and out of the football industry. A number of clubs, all 
from the Football League, followed the broadcasters into administration. Professional sport clubs are 
mutually interdependent and are therefore exposed to the risk of contagion (BBC, 2015; Szymanski, 
2015). In the short-term, the failure of a club to complete the season would reduce revenue of other 
clubs as clubs yet to host the failed club would have fewer home matches. Other clubs, in the same or 
other divisions or leagues, may be creditors if, for example, there were due payment for transfer fees. 
In the long-term, the withdrawal of a club would diminish the reputation of the league and the other 
clubs as perceived by broadcasters, sponsors and licensees. The failure of one club could have 
consequences for the league and, furthermore, the failure of one professional football league could 
activate the "systemic failure" of other leagues (AT Kearney, 2010, p. 4). 
The failure of the broadcasters meant that Football League clubs would receive considerably less 
broadcast revenue. But some had committed to substantial and continuing contracts for team and 
                                                     
18 The Premier League broadcast rights defaulted by Setanta were acquired by ESPN, and were then 
acquired by BT. 
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stadium expenditure. This had a detrimental effect on professional football clubs and their 
stakeholders, with increases in the number of insolvency events, as shown in Figure 2.9. 
Figure 2.9: Club insolvency events per year, Premier League clubs, 1993 to 2016 
 
Source: Deloitte (2017a) 
Financiers became risk-averse towards professional football clubs. Simultaneously, debt and equity 
investors questioned or altogether abandoned the industry (Deloitte, 2004). Some of the clubs that 
entered administration had defaulted on secured debt and, consequently, other clubs could no longer 
raise capital using securitisation. Most public football club companies de-listed as the value of shares 
declined, as shown in Figure 2.10. Only two of the permanent members of the Premier League were 
owned by public companies at the end of the observation period: Arsenal Holdings PLC which 
transferred to the NEX Exchange in 2007, and Manchester United re-listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) in 2012 (Cotterill and Mackenzie, 2012). All other clubs have returned to private 
ownership. Chelsea FC PLC (formerly Chelsea Village PLC) and Aston Villa PLC were de-listed when 
they were taken into private ownership by Roman Abramovich in 2003 and Randy Lerner in 2006 
(Deloitte, 2007) respectively, while Tottenham Hotspur PLC delisted in 2012 (Tottenham Hotspur, 
2012). 
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Figure 2.10: Football club company share price, 1992 to 2017 
 
Source: STOXX (n.d. a, n.d. b) 
The failure of club companies had adverse consequences for a number of construction companies, 
who were creditors of the distressed clubs. Leicester City were relegated at the end of the season in 
2001/02 and immediately entered administration. The club, by then owned by a different company, 
won promotion back to the Premier League at the first attempt, which was described as "the 
equivalent of a snake shedding its skin" (Deloitte, 2003, p. 3) and financial "doping" (Deloitte 2009, p. 
3). Meanwhile, Birse Construction had to write-off £7.5 million from their contract to build Leicester 
City's £27 million Walkers Stadium (now King Power Stadium) in 2002 (Kipphoff and Owen, 2002). 
The construction company subsequently withdrew from an agreement to build Coventry City's Ricoh 
Arena, citing losses incurred from building Leicester City's new stadium (BBC, 2003). 
In England and Wales, the Premier League and Football League responded to the increasing number 
of administration events and, specifically, the aforementioned strategy adopted by the likes of 
Leicester City (Deloitte, 2003), by introducing sporting sanctions in 2003 (Deloitte, 2010; Kuper and 
Szymanski, 2012), a fit-and-proper persons test in 2004, and club ownership regulations in 2009 
(Deloitte, 2010). The Football Association's (2017) Rule 13 on Insolvency provisions introduced the 
deduction of points for clubs that entered administration. This resulted in relegation for some clubs, 
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meaning that business performance failure could cause sporting performance failure. Luton Town 
were deducted 30 points in 2009/10 and as a consequence were relegated from the Football League 
to the Football Conference (now the National League). For European competitions, UEFA introduced 
its Club Licensing system in 2004 (Deloitte, 2006) and the Financial Fair Play regulations from the 
from 2013/14 season (Deloitte, 2014). These imposed sporting and the financial sanctions, which 
professional football leagues were are permitted to supplement. The regulations aimed to incentivise 
and reward clubs for generating matchday and commercial revenue, while providing dispensation for 
expenditure on stadiums and on training and Academy facilities. 
2.5. The globalisation of the Premier League 
There has been substantial growth in the revenue generated by professional sport leagues and clubs 
for broadcast rights (Andreff, 2006) and from non-traditional sources of revenue such as food services 
and retailing (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). Clubs developed existing and new products and services to 
emerging global markets (Deloitte, 2005). According to Andreff (2006), the established Spectators–
Subsidies–Sponsors–Local (SSSL) model (p. 690) has been replaced by the contemporary Media–
Corporations–Merchandising–Markets (MCMMG) model (p. 693). The business model of professional 
team sport has changed from one based on tickets to one based on television. 
When the Premier League formed in 1992, many of the inaugural member clubs had large stadiums 
and accommodated large attendances, from which they generated most of their revenue (Deloitte, 
2013). By 2017, it was more commonplace for Premier League clubs to have small- and medium-size 
stadiums and limited attendances, but by then clubs were generating most of their revenue from 
broadcast rights. Figure 2.11 shows that matchday revenue has increased during the Premier League 
era, but most growth has been from broadcast rights, and while commercial revenue has generally 
remained constant, it represents a smaller share. 
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Figure 2.11: Total club revenue per year, by source, Premier League, 2001/02 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
Much of the growth in broadcast revenue has been extracted from overseas markets, as shown in 
Figure 2.12. The domestic market has reached saturation due to the limited population of the United 
Kingdom. Nevertheless, this source of revenue is still substantial, especially compared to other 
professional football leagues in Europe (Deloitte, 2017a). 
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Figure 2.12: Total league broadcast revenue per period, by market, Premier League, 1992/93 to 
2018/19 
 
Source: Deloitte (2015, 2017); Milne (2016) 
Concurrently, professional sport leagues and clubs have monetised emerging information and 
communication technology for the distribution of broadcast rights (Emery and Weed, 2006). Initially, 
growth was derived via television and internet (Deloitte, 2000) and, subsequently, by internet and 
mobile technology (Deloitte, 2006). This has been caused, in part, by the disruption from new entrants 
to the information and communication sectors and from emerging technology (Deloitte, 2016). The 
consumption of professional team sport products and services has evolved from the stadium 
experience (first generation) to the television experience (second generation), then to the internet 
experience (third generation) and, most recently, to the digital experience (fourth generation), which 
encompasses interactive and participatory internet and mobile services, such as social media (Helleu, 
2017). This has enabled clubs to target international as well as national and local geographical 
markets. There has also been some internationalisation of matchday attendances, particularly for the 
Premier League's most successful clubs and clubs located in Greater London (Visit Britain, 2015). 
Many large clubs, such as Manchester United (Deloitte, 1999), operate museums and tours on 
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matchdays and non-matchdays. The Premier League has become globalised in terms of owners, 
investors and lenders, players and team managers, and business and consumer customers. 
Overseas investors were enticed by the revenue and profit generated by the Premier League and its 
clubs, especially from overseas broadcast rights. It was anticipated that these new owners would 
change the management and financial performance of clubs (Deloitte, 2007). Six of the seven clubs 
that were permanent members of the Premier League until the end of the 2015/16 season were 
acquired by overseas owners. The first such acquisition was of Chelsea in 2003 by the Russian 
investor, Roman Abramovich (Deloitte, 2007). Most of the new generation of owners were American, 
with Manchester United being acquired by Malcom Glazer in 2005, Aston Villa by Randy Lerner in 
2006, Liverpool by Kop Football (owned by George Gillett and Tom Hicks) in 2007 (Deloitte, 2007) and 
then by New England Sports Ventures in 2010 (Deloitte, 2011), and Arsenal by Stan Kroenke, whose 
initial minority stake in 2007 (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2007) was increased to majority ownership in 2011 
(Blitz, 2011). Ownership became more geographically diverse towards the end of the Premier League 
era, with the acquisition of Everton by the Iranian investor Farhad Moshiri in 2016 (Everton, 2016), 
Manchester City by Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand in 2007 (Deloitte, 2008) and then Sheikh Mansour 
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates in 2009 (Deloitte, 2014) and, in 2010, Leicester City 
by Asia Football Investments Pte Limited (Deloitte, 2012), a company incorporated in Singapore 
(Leicester City, 2010). By now, it was apparent that the new owners were putting more emphasis on 
the business objectives of clubs (Deloitte, 2015). 
2.6. Second generation stadiums 
The first generation of new stadiums that opened from 1990 were commissioned in response to the 
Popplewell (1985, 1986) and Taylor (1989a, 1989b) inquiries and were enabled by transformation of 
the business models of professional football clubs in England and Wales (see Section 2.3). Stadium 
expenditure was further stimulated by England hosting the 1996 UEFA European Championship 
(Deloitte, 1997) and by the strategy of many Premier League and Football League Championship 
clubs to increase the capacity of their stadiums, as shown in Figure 2.13. In contrast, the second 
generation of stadiums from the 2000s has encompassed experiential venues for large clubs and 
flexible, compact venues for small- and medium-size clubs, which have been supplemented by 
enhanced training and Academy facilities. 
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Figure 2.13: Total stadium expenditure per year, by division, Premier League and Football 
League, 1992/93 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
Five of the permanent six members of the Premier League (Chelsea, Everton, Liverpool, Manchester 
United and Tottenham Hotspur) have redeveloped their stadiums. Arsenal are the only permanent 
member to have relocated, when they moved to the Emirates Stadium in 2006, which is adjacent to 
their former Highbury stadium. Tottenham Hotspur are building a new stadium adjacent footprint to 
their previous venue, while Chelsea and Everton have stated their intention to rebuild or relocate 
(Deloitte, 2018). Figure 2.14 plots the stadium capacity and average attendance of Premier League 
and Football League Championship clubs to demonstrate stadium utilisation, with the grey areas 
indicating slack capacity. 
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Figure 2.14: Average stadium capacity and average club matchday attendance, by division, 
Premier League and Football League, 1996/97 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
The expansion of stadiums in the first half of the observation period is evident in the Premier League 
and Football League Championship, and can be attributed to the implementation of the Taylor Report 
and, specifically, to the realisation of all-seater facilities. Clubs relocated or developed their stadium 
resources to create additional supply in response to, and to enable, increased demand for tickets. 
There is evidence of divergence in the second half of the Premier League era. Premier League clubs 
have maintained utilisation rates of 90 to 96% since 1997/98, and have recorded in excess of 95% 
since 2012/13. In contrast, the Football League has remained between 60% and 70% since 1996/97. 
The year-to-year fluctuation in each division is attributable to the mobility of clubs via promotion and 
relegation. 
In response, a number of clubs have opened flexible, compact venues that have a capacity that is 
sufficient for the Premier League but not excessive for the Football League Championship. For 
example, Brighton and Hove Albion opened their American Express Community Stadium in 2010 with 
an initial capacity of 22,000, which was subsequently expanded to 30,000 in anticipation of promotion 
to the Premier League in 2017. 
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Despite matchday revenue representing a declining share of total revenue, clubs continued to build 
new stadiums or redevelop existing venues. Matchday revenue was decreasing as a share of Premier 
League club revenue, especially compared to broadcast rights, but was still growing and remained an 
important source of revenue. Strategically, matchday and commercial revenue is mostly managed by 
clubs (Deloitte, 2000), whereas broadcast rights are generated by the Premier League and 
redistributed to the clubs. The stadium contributes to the commercial and matchday revenue as it 
hosts the club's home matches, and can enhance the club's brand (Brand Finance, 2017), as well as 
providing home advantage and therefore contributing to superior sporting performance (Courneya and 
Carron, 1992). 
Unlike other industries, clubs do not expand to new markets nor relocate to new markets, with the 
relocation of Wimbledon to Milton Keynes in 2003 (Anderson, 2016) being the exception in the 
Premier League era. The domestic market for Premier League clubs, including the successful, global 
brands, is mostly localised or regionalised (The Telegraph, 2017). However, the local market has 
become less important to clubs as most revenue is generated from broadcast rights, meaning that 
clubs do not require a large market or a large stadium to compete. More financial resources may then 
be dedicated to team resources, with the aim of attaining or retain Premier League status and 
success. 
Most recently, there have been fewer new stadiums opened by current and former Premier League 
clubs (Anderson, 2016). Since Arsenal opened the Emirates Stadium in 2006, the only new venues 
have been the Cardiff City Stadium, opened by Cardiff City in 2009, with West Ham United relocating 
to the Olympic Stadium in 2016. Instead, some of the investment that has been recognised as stadium 
expenditure in the Annual Review of Football Finance has been allocated to training and Academy 
facilities (Deloitte, 2017a). Such investment has been encouraged by the Football League's Centres of 
Excellence programme and the Premier League's Academy programme (Deloitte, 1999). The increase 
in facility expenditure is despite the opening of a global market for players and the decline in transfer 
fees generated from the divestment of in-contract players by clubs. This may indicate that the purpose 
of the facilities is more for the coaching and training of the club's Premier League squad than for the 
development of players. There is evidence of clubs adopting divergent strategies for player 
development and trading, such as Huddersfield Town's closure of their Academy (Threlfall-Sykes, 
2017). 
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2.7. The contemporary Premier League 
All of the regions of England and Wales (as defined by the Office for National Statistics (n.d.) have 
been represented in the Premier League. Figure 2.15 maps the distribution of clubs, which are located 
in large and small markets. Clubs tend to be clustered in conurbations and cities, with concentrations 
of permanent members of the Premier League in Greater London and the North West. In contrast, 
there are, or have been relatively few clubs in the East and South West regions. 
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Figure 2.15: Geographical location of Premier League clubs, 1992/93 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Football Yearbook 
 
Historically, the most successful football clubs in England and Wales were founded and established 
due to industrialisation (Szymanski, 2008). Many of these clubs were still in the first and second 
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divisions of the Football League when the Premier League was founded in 1992. Since then, however, 
there has been some evidence of clubs from smaller cities and towns replacing the established 
industrial clubs, as shown in Figures 2.16 and 2.17. This may be a symptom of the post-
industrialisation of the United Kingdom economy (see Section 2.1), although there are still a number of 
successful clubs located in traditionally industrial local markets. Nevertheless, the new business model 
of the Premier League means that clubs no longer require a large market or a large stadium to gain 
entry and retain a place in the most lucrative professional sport league. However, any conclusions 
drawn from the patterns in the mobility of clubs have to consider that the sample is limited and mobility 
is restricted by promotion and relegation. 
Clubs in the North West and London have maintained and strengthened their dominance in the 
Premier League. In the North West there has been consolidation, with the market now dominated by 
Manchester United, Manchester City, Liverpool and Everton. Even Blackburn Rovers, who won the 
Premier League in 2005, were relegated in 1999 and 2012. In contrast, a diversity of clubs has been 
maintained in London and the South East, despite the growth of Arsenal, Chelsea and Tottenham 
Hotspur, who are permanent members of the Premier League. Many of the remaining clubs have 
smaller, local markets and small- or medium-size stadiums, including Brighton and Hove Albion, who 
were promoted after the observation period in 2017. 
Some regions have only enjoyed temporary or occasional success. In the East region, Ipswich Town 
were relegated from the Premier League in 1995 and 2002, while Norwich City have survived only five 
seasons and have not been in the Premier League member since their third relegation in 1995. There 
have only been eight seasons during the observation period when three clubs from the North East – 
Middlesbrough, Newcastle United and Sunderland – were members of the Premier League. The South 
West region has only hosted two Premier League clubs. Swindon Town survived just one season, and 
are actually further North and to the East of some of the clubs in the South East region, while 
Bournemouth have survived their first three seasons to the end of 2017/18, but are much closer to 
Southampton (in the South region). There is a similar pattern in Wales, where Cardiff City survived 
only one season until their subsequent promotion in 2018, while Swansea City were members for 
seven seasons until their relegation in 2018. 
There has been considerable turbulence in the entry and exit of clubs from the East Midlands, West 
Midlands and Yorkshire. At present, Leicester City are the only club from the East Midlands in the 
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Premier League. There has been a comparable decline in the West Midlands. Aston Villa were 
permanent members until 2016 and, after the end of the observation period, Stoke City and West 
Bromwich Albion were replaced by Wolverhampton Wanderers in 2018. Yorkshire has previously been 
represented by Barnsley, Bradford City, Hull City, Leeds United, Sheffield United and Sheffield 
Wednesday, but Huddersfield Town are now the sole representative, having replaced Hull City in 
2017. This may indicate that there is a regional ecology in the Premier League, where at least one 
club from each region survives or is replaced by another. 
Despite the increase in broadcast revenue relative to matchday revenue, it appears that local network 
effects are still important. Spectator demand is higher for the so-called derby matches between local 
rivals, such as Manchester City versus Manchester United (Forrest and Simmons, 2006). However, 
the location of some of these matches has changed. Since 2015, the New Forest derby between 
Bournemouth and Southampton has become a more common occurrence in the Premier League than 
the Tyne and Wear derby between Newcastle United and Sunderland. 
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Figure 2.16: Map of Premier League clubs, 1992/93 
 
Source: Football Yearbook 
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Figure 2.17: Map of Premier League clubs, 2016/17 
 
Source: Football Yearbook 
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The Premier League has been dominated by a small number of large clubs, with occasional success 
by smaller clubs. Table 2.5 lists the winners of the Premier League since it was formed in 1992. 
Table 2.5: Premier League winners, 1992/93 to 2015/16 
Season Club 
1992/93 Manchester United 
1993/94 Manchester United 
1994/95 Blackburn Rovers 
1995/96 Manchester United 
1996/97 Manchester United 
1997/98 Arsenal 
1998/99 Manchester United 
1999/00 Manchester United 
2000/01 Manchester United 
2001/02 Arsenal 
2002/03 Manchester United 
2003/04 Arsenal 
2004/05 Chelsea 
2005/06 Chelsea 
2006/07 Manchester United 
2007/08 Manchester United 
2008/09 Manchester United 
2009/10 Chelsea 
2010/11 Manchester United 
2011/12 Manchester City 
2012/13 Manchester United 
2013/14 Manchester City 
2014/15 Chelsea 
2015/16 Leicester City 
Source: Premier League (n.d. a) 
Six clubs were champions from 1992/93 to 2015/16. Manchester United were the most successful club 
with 13 championships, with the other winners being Chelsea (four championships), Arsenal (three), 
Manchester City (two) and Blackburn Rovers and Leicester City (one). 
At the outset of the Premier League in 1992/93, clubs generated just 8.8% of revenue from broadcast 
rights, with most being derived from commercial rights (48.2%) and ticketing services (42.9%), but by 
2015/16, clubs were generating more than half (53.0%) of their revenue from broadcasting and almost 
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a third (30.0%) from ticketing, with the remainder (17.1%) from commercial sources (Deloitte, 2017a). 
The reliance on broadcast revenue is forecast to continue for the foreseeable future because of the 
enhanced contract for the Premier League rights from 2016/17 to 2018/19 (Deloitte, 2017a) and for 
the three seasons from 2019/20 (Murad, 2018). 
In contrast to ticketing and broadcasting rights, the commercial revenue generated by the Premier 
League and its members has been relatively modest. The name and title sponsor of the competition 
has changed on numerous occasions, as documented in Table 2.6. Previously, the competition was 
sponsored by Carling from 1993 to 2001, Barclaycard from 2001 to 2004, and Barclays from 2004 to 
2016. Since 2016/17, however, there has been no title sponsor and the Premier League is now 
aligned with the major sport leagues of North America (MLB, NBA, NFL and NHL) by not having a title 
sponsor. This may indicate that the Premier League has been unable to generate sufficient revenue 
from title sponsors and that its member clubs, who are the shareholders of the Premier League, can 
generate more commercial revenue with no title sponsor. The previous title sponsors (Carling, 
Barclaycard and Barclays) have been predominately domestic brands and, as the Premier League's 
global market develops, it may be able to exploit territorial rights from sponsors in different 
geographical markets. 
Table 2.6: Premier League title sponsors, 1992/93 to 2015/16 
Term Years Sponsor Title 
1992/93 1 None FA Premier League 
1993/94–2000/01 8 Carling FA Carling Premiership 
2001/02–2003/04 3 Barclaycard Barclaycard Premiership 
2004/05–2006/07 3 Barclays Barclays Premiership 
2007/08–2015/16 9 Barclays Barclays Premier League 
Source: Premier League (n.d. a) 
The growth in broadcast and commercial revenue has enabled the Premier League to become the 
foremost professional football league in Europe, at least in terms of business performance. European 
clubs, and Premier League clubs in particular, have dominated Deloitte's Football Money League 
(Deloitte, 2017b), which is determined by revenue. Manchester United have headed the Football 
Money League with Real Madrid and FC Barcelona (Spain) and Bayern Munich (Germany). Chelsea, 
Arsenal and Liverpool are typically ranked in the top ten, while Tottenham Hotspur, previously Leeds 
United and, more recently Manchester City have been present in the top 20. There is a similar pattern 
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in Brand Finance's (2017) Football 50, which values the brands of professional football clubs. The 
brands of Manchester United, Real Madrid and Barcelona have been valued at over £1 billion (Brand 
Finance, 2017). Most Premier League clubs are in top 50, including newly-promoted clubs. This 
implies that considerable brand value may be derived from membership of the Premier League. 
In contrast, sporting performance of Premier League clubs in the same period has been more modest 
when compared to other European professional football leagues. Premier League clubs have only 
enjoyed occasional success in UEFA's Champions League and Europa League, with most of the 
success being condensed within a period from 2004/05 to 2011/12. Table 2.7 lists the winners of the 
Champions League and the Europa League since 1992. 
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Table 2.7: UEFA Champions League and Europa League winners, 1992/93 to 2015/16 
Season Champions League Europa League 
1992/93 Marseille  Juventus  
1993/94 Milan  Internazionale  
1994/95 Ajax  Parma  
1995/96 Juventus  Bayern  
1996/97 Dortmund  Schalke  
1997/98 Real Madrid  Internazionale  
1998/99 Manchester United  Parma  
1999/00 Real Madrid  Galatasaray  
2000/01 Bayern  Liverpool  
2001/02 Real Madrid  Feyenoord  
2002/03 Milan  Porto  
2003/04 Porto  Valencia  
2004/05 Liverpool  CSKA Moskva  
2005/06 Barcelona  Sevilla  
2006/07 Milan  Sevilla  
2007/08 Manchester United  Zenit  
2008/09 Barcelona  Shakhtar Donetsk  
2009/10 Internazionale  Atlético  
2010/11 Barcelona  Porto  
2011/12 Chelsea  Atlético  
2012/13 Bayern  Chelsea  
2013/14 Real Madrid  Sevilla  
2014/15 Barcelona  Sevilla  
2015/16 Real Madrid  Sevilla  
Source: UEFA (n.d.) 
Premier League clubs have been champions of both the Champions League and Europa League, with 
most of the success being achieved by the permanent members. Three Premier League clubs have 
won the Champions League. Manchester United have twice been winners (1998/99 and 2007/08), 
while Liverpool (2004/05) and Chelsea (2011/12) have each won it once. Arsenal, Liverpool, Chelsea 
and Manchester United were runners-up in consecutive seasons from 2005/06 to 2008/09, including a 
Final between two Premier League clubs in 2007/08, with Manchester United again being runners-up 
in 2010/11. In contrast, the only winners of the Europa League during the period are Liverpool 
(2000/01) and Chelsea (2012/13). Liverpool were also runners-up in 2015/16, as were Arsenal in 
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1999/2000. Some of the non-permanent members of the Premier League have also been runners-up, 
although Middlesbrough (2005/06) and Fulham (2009/10) were both were relegated from the Premier 
League within four seasons (2008/09 and 2013/14 respectively). At the end of the 2015/16 season, 
Manchester United qualified for and subsequently (and after the observation period) won the Europa 
League in 2016/17. Achieving concurrent success in domestic and European competitions is evidently 
difficult to sustain. Premier League clubs have won the Champions League only four times in the 24 
seasons from 1992/93 to 2015/16. In contrast, Spanish La Liga clubs have been champions in nine of 
the seasons, and Italian Serie A clubs in five seasons. However, the Premier League has provided 
more unique winners. The business and sporting performance of these clubs is an indicator of the 
emergence of an "international gap" between professional football leagues in England, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain and the rest of Europe (Deloitte, 1999, p. 61). 
2.8. The gap 
The performance and resources of professional sport clubs in England and Wales differs by division. 
The difference is most evident between the Premier League and Football League, but also within the 
Football League, between the Championship, League One and League Two. Figure 2.18 plots the 
average revenue per club since the formation of the Premier League, with the average operating profit 
for the comparable period shown in Figure 2.19. 
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Figure 2.18: Average club revenue per year, by division, Premier League and Football League, 
1992/93 to 2015/16 
 
Figure 2.19: Average club operating profit per year, by division, Premier League and Football 
League, 1992/93 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
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During the Premier League era, its member clubs have generated considerable growth in revenue 
compared to the Football League Championship, which in turn has exceeded that of Leagues One and 
Two. Similarly, Premier League clubs have maintained profitability, with a shock in the financial year 
ending 2014 when operating profit margin increased from relatively modest 3.3% in 2012/13 to 11.9% 
in 2013/14. In contrast, Football League clubs, and Championship clubs in particular, have returned 
deteriorating losses. This may indicate that Championship clubs are accepting more risk in an attempt 
to gain the rewards that can be appropriated by promotion to the Premier League. The divergence 
between divisions is further emphasised by Figure 2.20, which compares the revenue and operating 
profit of the Premier League and Football League Championship clubs. 
Figure 2.20: Average club revenue and operating profit per year, by division, Premier League 
and Football League Championship, 1992/93 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 
The growth in Premier League club revenue has accelerated since 1992 due to the appropriation of 
Premier League and Champions League broadcast rights, especially since 2014 (Deloitte, 2018). This 
increase has, until recently, not been matched by a corresponding improvement in operating profit, 
although clubs have maintained profitability. However, the recent acceleration in broadcast revenue 
has coincided with a precipitous increase in operating profit. This shock may also be attributable to 
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new owners, who have been attracted by the increased broadcast rights, the revised objectives of 
existing owners, and UEFA's Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play. 
The divergence between the Premier League and Football League is exasperated by the more 
gradual growth in revenue of Championship clubs, which is mirrored by deteriorating operating losses. 
This divergence has, over time, been described as a "gap" (Deloitte, 1998, p. 41), an "abyss" (Deloitte, 
1999, p. 58), a "chasm" (Deloitte, 2001, p.8) and a "gulf" (Deloitte, 2005, p. 30). There is a further, and 
expanding, gap between the Football League Championship and Leagues One and Two (Deloitte, 
2001) and evidence of a further gap within the Premier League (Deloitte, 1999), between those clubs 
aiming and qualifying for UEFA competitions, and particularly the Champions League, and the rest of 
the member clubs. Club owners and business executives therefore have to not only manage the 
growth of professional football's national and international markets, but the increasing divergence and 
competition within divisions (Szymanski, 2015). 
2.9. Conclusions: The evolution of the Premier League 
The evolution of the Premier League has been affected by change that is internal and external to the 
clubs, the leagues, divisions and the professional team sport industry. In particular, clubs owners and 
business executives have had to formulate and implement strategies that have been apposite to 
positive and negative change in the finance and information and communication industries, and by the 
emergence of television, internet and mobile technology. Furthermore, decision-makers have had to 
consider, and sometimes compromise, their sporting, business and financial performance outcomes. 
The commercialisation and globalisation of the Premier League and Champions has meant that 
successful clubs have generated more revenue, but not necessarily profit, as team and stadium 
expenditure has also increased. There can be financial repercussions as a consequence of relegation 
from, or the failure to win promotion to, the Premier League. The gap between the Premier League 
and Football League and, more recently, between the Premier League and Champions League has 
widened, meaning that the acquisition, development and divestment of resources has become even 
more important. 
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3. Literature review: How and why do clubs compete? 
Professional team sport management theory and 
practice 
 
Chapter summary 
• Professional sport club owners and business executives may have congruent or conflicting 
sporting and business performance objectives, where they aim to win matches and 
championships (win-maximisation), generate revenue and profit (profit-maximisation), or a 
combination of both (utility-maximisation). 
• The fundamental relationships of sport management are that the clubs with the best teams 
usually win, and clubs with winning teams usually generate more revenue. 
• However, some clubs over-perform, while others under-perform, and success or failure can 
be sustained or temporary. 
• Professional team sport is more complex and, in practice, incorporates sporting, business 
and financial performance, and a bundle of team, stadium and other resources. 
• Sport management theory should have comparative and dynamic dimensions if it is to 
explain how and why clubs have generated success and growth, or suffered failure and 
decline. 
 
Professional sport clubs are like other types of firm that need to generate profit or surplus, or at least 
break-even, to survive and grow. However, an important difference is that they also aim to win 
matches and championships. Professional team sport management theory aims to explain how clubs 
compete and why clubs succeed and fail. The first part of the literature review explores what 
professional sport clubs do, and specifically the objectives of club owners. Fundamentally, they aim to 
make a profit, or win matches and championships, or both. This is dependent on whether the 
assumption is that professional sport club owners have similar aims to firms with business-orientated 
objectives, such as generating profit, or whether they are different because their aim is to win sporting 
championships. The second part reviews research that explains how clubs generate and sustain 
Literature review 
56 
superior business and sporting performance, while other clubs experience performance disadvantage 
or only gain temporary performance advantage. Clubs utilise team resources, including players and 
team managers, to win matches and championships, and stadium and other resources to generate 
revenue and, ultimately, profit. 
3.1. What do professional sport clubs do? 
Professional sport clubs have business and sporting objectives. Some clubs succeed at generating 
and sustaining both business and sporting performance. For example, Manchester United have won 
more Premier League championships (Premier League, n.d. a) than any other club and generate the 
most revenue (Deloitte, 2017a). But clubs can also have success in one objective, but failure in the 
other. Chelsea have won the Premier League and Champions League, but concurrently have 
accumulated net debt of over £1 billion (Deloitte, 2015). Conversely, Newcastle United were relegated 
in 2015/16 despite attracting 52,386 fans per match, which was the third-largest attendance in the 
Premier League that season. Sometimes, a club can suffer both business and sporting failure; most 
notably when in 2010 Portsmouth became the first Premier League team to enter administration, in the 
same year that they were relegated. Therefore, objectives may be congruent or conflict (Grant, 1996). 
Profit or prizes? 
Theories of professional team sport performance are founded on the assumption of whether clubs are 
similar or different to other types of firms. For some theorists, the assumption holds that club owners 
are profit-maximisers (Rottenberg, 1956). However, professional sport clubs also compete to win sport 
matches and championships (Neale, 1964), and clubs may be a unique type of firm, where owners 
aim to maximise winning (Sloane, 1969). Club owners may prioritise or hold single objectives, or have 
multiple mutual objectives, and be utility-maximisers (Sloane, 1969). Furthermore, owners and other 
stakeholders, such as league executives, may aim to optimise, rather than maximise, performance. 
The varied objectives of club owners can produce different outcomes (Késenne, 2006a), as these 
objectives may be realised or unrealised (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Profit-maximisation 
Professional sport clubs are similar to other types of firms that have business performance objectives, 
such as the maximisation of profit. Rottenberg (1956, p. 252) asserts that Major League Baseball club 
owners would not accept financial risk "for the pure joy of association with the game", while Noll (1974, 
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p. 154) observes that professional sport club owners "do not appear to be motivated by any goal other 
than profits". Quirk and Fort (1999) concede that the concept of owners who do not aim to maximise 
profits is attractive, but are sceptical and conclude that winning may be important, but that financial 
performance has precedence. The profit-maximisation hypothesis is supported by Fort and Quirk 
(1995) and Vrooman (1995) for North American professional sport leagues, and by researchers who 
examine specific competitions, such as Major League Baseball (MLB) by Alexander (2001), Quirk and 
Fort (1992, p 273) and Zimbalist (1992), and the National Hockey League (NHL) by Ferguson et al 
(1991). However, the assumption may not apply to professional football leagues. Kuper and 
Szymanski (2012) claim that it is almost impossible for owners to run a professional football club as a 
profit-making business because there will always be rival owners who are win-maximisers and who 
are able and willing to commit team resource expenditure regardless of whether they return a loss. 
Win-maximisation 
Alternatively, professional sport clubs differ from other firms as they aim to win matches and 
championships. Milton Friedman's (1962) assertions on the financial objectives of firms is popularly 
interpreted as the "business of business is business" (Hart, 2005, p. 69). Kuper and Szymanski (2012, 
p. 79) adapt this to emphasise the unique objectives and outcomes of professional football clubs by 
declaring that: "The business of football is football". Even Deloitte (1999, p. 56), who repeatedly advise 
caution on the financial management of clubs in the Annual Review of Football Finance, argue that 
owners and business executives also need to consider objectives other than profit: "What is 
sometimes overlooked is that football is, at the end of the day, about winning!" Dabscheck (1975) 
argue that club owners are win-maximisers as there would be no incentive to win matches or 
championships if they were profit-maximisers. For win-maximisers, the welfare to the owner is in the 
form consumption benefits rather than the financial benefits of profit-maximisers (Madden, 2012a). 
Here, the ownership of a professional sport club is a consumption good (Quirk and Fort, 1992). 
Alternatively, a club may be a positional good where ownership becomes a unique means to influence 
the owner's social status (Szymanski, 2015). These benefactor owners inject funds into a club, and 
are differentiated from profit takers, who take funds out of a club (Madden, 2012b). 
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Maximising profit or winning 
Professional sport club owners may aim to maximise either profit or winning (Borland, 2006b). This 
assumption means that owners have a single objective only, and the objectives of profit and winning 
therefore have specific implications (Késenne, 2006a). Such an assumption aids the development of 
theoretical and empirical models, but may not be practicable. 
The assumption of profit or win-maximisation can be dependent on the context. The context adopted 
by most researchers is either the professional sports leagues of North America (commonly referred to 
as major league sports) or the professional football leagues of Europe. There are notable differences 
between the markets (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Neale, 1964; Hoehn, 2006; Hoehn and 
Szymanski, 1999; Noll, 1974; Sloane, 2006). These differences encompass objectives, structure, size, 
geographical markets, international competition, player drafts, player trading, roster or squad size, 
revenue sharing, salary caps and company type (Sloane, 2006) and the league system, league 
functions, competition between clubs and between leagues, player market, revenue sharing and 
competition policy (Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999). Different assumptions may apply to certain leagues 
and markets; for example, Vrooman (2000, 2007b) adopts the utility-maximisation assumption for the 
major leagues sports of North America and win-maximisation for the European football leagues. It is 
more common for researchers to contend that profit-maximisation is more appropriate in North 
American major league sports and win-maximisation in European football leagues (Dietl and Lang, 
2008; Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Késenne, 1996, 2005, 2007; Madden (2012b; Madden and 
Robinson, 2012; Sloane, 2006), although the assumption that North American club owners are profit-
maximisers has been questioned by Davenport (1969) and El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971). 
Sloane (1969, 1971) argues that the difference between football and other sports is that professional 
football clubs are not profitable and their owners aim to maximise winning. But some clubs have since 
become more profitable (Késenne, 2006b). The objectives of clubs may have changed because they 
revised their motives or because they have new owners (Zimbalist, 2003). Change in the Premier 
League may be a consequence of existing owners revising their objectives as clubs became 
profitable, or because the clubs have been acquired by new owners with profit-making objectives, or 
both. The business model of professional team sport has evolved (Andreff, 2006) and therefore even 
recent theoretical models may be less practicable or even obsolete. Most empirical research that 
adopts the profit-maximisation assumption focuses only on matchday revenue and excludes broadcast 
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revenue (Madden, 2012b), whereas Premier League clubs now generate more revenue from 
broadcast rights than from matchday and commercial sources. Concurrently, the cost of professional 
sport club ownership has increased, which necessitates increased profits to provide any required 
return on owners' investment (Zimbalist, 1992). 
Maximising profit and winning 
Professional sport club owners may have mutual profit and winning objectives, and are therefore utility 
maximisers (Sloane, 1969). This means that they have multiple objectives. The objectives of profit and 
winning are complementary (Davenport, 1969) as win-maximisation does not exclude profit-making 
(Scully, 1995; Késenne, 2006b, 2007). Alternatively, clubs may aim to maximise winning but with a 
specified constraint, such as profit (Scully, 1995) or break-even (Késenne, 2007; Szymanski, 2015). 
The assumption of multiple objectives may be more applicable to sport management practice, but 
means that models are more complex. 
Utility-maximisers are owners who have objectives that are not limited to profit-maximisation (Sloane, 
1969, 1971, 2006). It is sometimes interpreted as being the same as win-maximisation (Dabscheck, 
1975; Dietl and Lang, 2008), but is more appropriately modelled as a utility function of multiple 
objectives. These objectives usually encompass profit and winning (Késenne, 1996; Rascher, 1997), 
but can be other performance outcomes such as competitive balance (Madden, 2012b; Madden and 
Robinson, 2012). These sportsman owners (Vrooman, 2015) have business and sporting performance 
objectives (Vrooman, 1995, 1997), compared to the pure profit-maximisers (Vrooman, 1997) who 
prioritise business performance. The utility-maximisation assumption is more appropriate for European 
professional football clubs (Frick, 2007), and empirical research supports the assumption that club 
owners maximise business and sporting performance in European professional football leagues 
(Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski, 2009), but also applies to the National Football League (Atkinson 
et al, 1988). 
Optimising profit and winning 
The business and sporting performance of professional team sport is generated by both clubs and 
leagues (Vrooman, 1995), but club owners and club and league executives may have distinct 
objectives (Dietl and Lang, 2008). For business performance, clubs and leagues generate and 
appropriate revenue from diverse sources. For example, the Premier League generates its revenue 
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from broadcast and commercial rights, most of which is then redistributed to the member clubs. Its 
member clubs generate the remainder of their revenue from matchday sources and from the club's 
commercial rights. For sporting performance, it is often assumed that clubs – and specifically players 
and team managers – aim to maximise winning. But, in professional team sport, remuneration 
depends on the generation and appropriation of revenue. League executives and some club owners 
may aim to optimise, rather than maximise, business and sporting performance. 
League executives and decision-makers may have a preference for the optimisation of business 
performance generated by the league and clubs, rather than for each club to aim to have profit-
maximisation objectives. The objective then becomes the competitive balance of sporting and 
business performance. Unlike club executives, the league executives do not have any win-
maximisation objectives, but may prioritise the optimisation of winning, or competitive balance, in its 
competitions. The uncertainty of outcome is a distinctive characteristic of sport. Sport comprises 
competitive contests between teams, be it the two teams competing in a match or all teams competing 
in a championship. Therefore an element of uncertainty of outcome is required, or otherwise the 
winner is known before the contest commences and the sport ceases to be competitive. Conversely, 
there is mixed evidence of whether fans prefer competitively-balanced matches and championships. 
Competitive balance is a virtue of professional sport leagues (Rottenberg, 1956). However, 
competitive balance can adversely affect attendance because most fans in the stadium are supporting 
the home team and want them to win and because larger clubs have more fans than small ones, and 
so more fans are satisfied if larger clubs win (Kuper and Szymanski, 2012). Sport fans are 
"surprisingly good at losing" and dominant teams create "special interest" (Kuper and Szymanski, 
2012, p. 208). 
Competitive balance can be accomplished via mechanisms such as the Premier League's 
redistribution of broadcast rights and UEFA's Club Licensing system and Financial Fair Play 
regulations. These are intended to ensure the sustainability of all clubs in the competition. However, 
league executives and some club owners may prefer to have at least some dominant clubs as this will 
enable those dominant clubs to acquire and develop superior team and stadium resources. These 
resources will enable such clubs to compete in the Champions League and other international 
competitions. The brand of the league and of all member clubs is then improved. For example, 
Manchester United's membership of the Premier League enhances the brand of the Premier League 
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and, by association, the brands of the other member clubs. Superior sporting performance in the 
Premier League and Champions League derived from these resources will enhance the brands of all 
clubs to global consumers and business customers. These superior resources and performance 
outcomes of the dominant clubs enable the league to maximise revenue from broadcast and 
commercial rights. This may be preferable to having only average clubs in the competition. The 
Premier League has more clubs in the Deloitte (2017b) Football Money League and Brand Finance 
(2018) Football 50 and also generates more broadcast revenue than Germany's Bundesliga, despite 
the latter being more competitively-balance (Kringstad et al, 2018). League and club executives may 
have congruent win-maximisation objectives when member clubs qualify for the Champions League 
and Europa League Koenigstorfer et (2010). This can enhance the reputation of the league and its 
member clubs and enables participating clubs to generate and appropriate further revenue. 
Professional sport clubs' objectives and outcomes 
Professional sport clubs have multiple and complex business and sporting performance objectives. 
They formulate and implement strategy to win matches and championships as they are sport clubs, 
and aim to generate profit or break-even as they are professional sport clubs. There are evident inter-
club differences in objectives between clubs in a league (Dietl et al, 2009) and intra-club differences 
for the owners and other stakeholders within a club (Scully, 1995). Some club owners will prioritise a 
single objective, while others will have mutual, multiple objectives. The objectives of a club are 
dynamic and may change because owners change their objectives or because of change in 
ownership. The objectives of professional sport clubs are much more complex than the dichotomy of 
making a profit or winning matches and championships. Therefore, no assumption of profit-
maximisation or win-maximisation is made to enable both business and sporting performance to be 
considered. 
3.2. How do professional sport clubs compete? 
Professional sport clubs compete to generate and sustain sporting performance advantage over other 
clubs, and a sustained business advantage over other clubs and firms. Clubs compete in multiple 
environments: They compete in a sporting environment to win matches and championships, and in a 
business competitive environment for matchday, commercial and broadcast revenue. This is 
accomplished by the possession and utilisation of bundles of team, stadium and other resources to 
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generate sporting and business performance. Sporting success or failure is dependent on players and 
the management of players by team managers. Business performance, and specifically matchday and 
commercial revenue, is generated from stadiums and other resources that are managed by the club, 
as well as from its team resources and sporting performance. In contrast, broadcast revenue is 
strongly related to, and dependent on, sporting performance. 
How do clubs win matches and championships? 
Professional sport clubs aim to win matches and, by doing so, win championships such as the Premier 
League and Champions League. They do this with teams of players, who are managed by the team 
managers. Together, players and team managers represent the key human resources utilised by clubs 
to generate sporting performance. 
Professional team sport is a unique industry in that human resources are traded – acquired and 
divested – between clubs. They can also be developed by a club, and then subsequently traded. 
Players are sometimes traded for a transfer fee, which is paid by the buying club for the transfer of the 
player's contract from the selling club. The market for players is commonly referred to as the transfer 
market, and is a form of resource market (Dabscheck, 1975). Team resource expenditure of most 
clubs comprises player numeration (wages or salaries) and transfer fees (Frick, 2007). Player wages 
are often the most substantial source of expenditure for professional sport clubs (Scully, 1989). 
Importantly, the sporting performance of a club is not only determined by its team resources, but by its 
resources relative to its opponents (Borland, 2006b), including the opposition team in each match and 
the other clubs competing for the championship. 
Player trading and development is a resource management capability of the club's team managers 
(Frick, 2013; Flint et al, 2014; Szymanski, 2015). Some clubs separate the trading and development 
functions, with player trading being managed by a club director and player development by the team 
manager. This is similar to the separation of the general manager and head coach in many major 
league sport clubs in North America (Szymanski, 2015). Fundamentally, team management 
capabilities aim to change and improve players (Hughes et al, 2010), which can occur during a match 
or during the season (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). 
The relative team resources of professional football clubs explain much of the variation in sporting 
performance advantage (Szymanski, 2013). Player wages expenditure explains performance 
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(Szymanski, 2013), although the causal relationship and presence of reverse causality between player 
wages and sporting performance is questioned (Hall et al, 2002; Szymanski, 2013). In contrast, there 
is no compelling explanation of the relationship between transfer fees and performance (Szymanski, 
2013). Evidence of team resource management capabilities is mixed, with only some team managers 
have a significant effect on a club's sporting performance (Bell et al, 2013; Szymanski, 2015). Team 
resources expenditure is as an indicator of team resources and, more specifically, the value of team 
resources as perceived by club owners and decision-makers. 
How do clubs generate matchday, commercial and broadcast revenue? 
The business performance objective of professional team sport is to generate revenue and to return a 
profit from its revenue. This performance is generated from the club's stadium and other resources 
that are owned, managed or controlled by the club. Business performance is typically segmented by 
matchday, commercial and broadcast sources. Matchday revenue is generated from the attendance 
watching matches at the venue. Commercial revenue is generated from sponsorship, licensing, 
merchandising and retailing. Broadcast revenue is generated from the audience watching on television 
or other media. 
Clubs generate matchday and most commercial revenue directly from consumer and business 
customers. In contrast, broadcast revenue is generated indirectly, with revenue being generated by 
the league from broadcasters and redistributed to member clubs. Broadcast revenue is dependent on 
clubs' sporting performance. It is appropriated by a club being a member of the Premier League, by 
retaining membership or attaining promotion and from its league position. Similarly, qualification for, 
and progression in, the Champions League and, to a lesser extent, the Europa League, is incentivised 
and rewarded by the redistribution of broadcast revenue by UEFA. 
The business performance of a club can be affected by the specification and location of its stadium, 
and by its team resources and sporting performance. The specification of a stadium is determined by 
the quality and quantity of facilities. The quality of the stadium has a positive relationship on 
attendance (Noll, 1974). This is often associated with the age of the stadium, including historic venues 
(Quirk and Fort, 1992) and new venues (Clapp and Hakes, 2005; Quinn et al, 2003). New venues may 
be subject to the so-called honeymoon effect (Evoy et al, 2005), where the incremental business 
performance generated from such stadiums is temporary. Quantitatively, the capacity of stadium can 
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be too small or, alternatively, too large (Szymanski, 2015). Price can further affect attendance (Noll, 
1974) and interacts with the volume of tickets sold to determine matchday revenue. The attendance 
and matchday revenue generated by a club is further influenced by the location of its stadium (Ahlfeldt 
and Kavestos, 2013) and, importantly for professional football in England and Wales, the location of 
the club's opponents. Team resources can influence attendance, including the players and team 
managers of both the home club (Ferguson et al, 1991) and the away club (Hart et al, 1975), as well 
as the opponents in each match and the other clubs in the league. Attendance and matchday revenue 
is also affected by the current, historic and expected sporting performance of the home and away 
clubs (Forrest and Simmons, 2006). 
The broadcast of matches is both a source of revenue for leagues and clubs, but may also affect 
attendance and matchday revenue. Televised matches, and especially the live broadcast of matches, 
can have a positive or negative effect on attendance. They can act as a complementary good or as a 
substitute good (Andreff and Szymanski, 2006; Buraimo, 2006). There is mixed evidence on the 
effects of broadcast rights, but there is more support for it being a complement than a substitute 
(Buraimo, 2006) and there may be more substitution effects in some international markets (Kringstad 
et al, 2018). 
Professional sport clubs' strategy 
The sporting and business performance of Premier League clubs is determined by unique bundles of 
resources and resource management capabilities. The variation in sporting performance is mostly 
explained by team resources, and specifically the players and the capability of the team manager to 
manage the players. Business performance is explained by stadium and other resources, and the 
previous, current and future team resources and sporting performance of the club and its opponents. 
However, a fundamental limitation of many models of professional sport club performance is that they 
separate the sporting and business performance outcomes, whereas the Literature Review (Section 
3.1) highlighted that club owners may have multiple and mutual sporting and business performance 
objectives. 
3.3. How do professional sport clubs win and make money? 
Premier League club owners may have contrasting objectives. Some prioritise winning and some 
profit, while others have mutual objectives. Furthermore, objectives and outcomes can change, either 
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because an owner's priorities change or because a club is acquired by new owners. Models that aim 
explain professional sport club performance should therefore incorporate business and sporting 
performance. The models summarised in Table 3.1 all incorporate business and sporting 
performance, but do so in different ways. 
L
it
e
ra
tu
re
 r
e
v
ie
w
 
6
6
 
T
a
b
le
 3
.1
: 
S
p
o
rt
in
g
 a
n
d
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 e
m
p
ir
ic
a
l 
re
s
e
a
rc
h
 
A
u
th
o
r,
 y
e
a
r 
o
f 
p
u
b
li
c
a
ti
o
n
 
S
z
y
m
a
n
s
k
i,
 2
0
1
5
 
D
o
b
s
o
n
 a
n
d
 G
o
d
d
a
rd
, 
1
9
9
8
 
G
e
rr
a
rd
, 
2
0
0
5
 
B
a
ro
n
c
e
ll
i 
a
n
d
 
L
a
g
o
, 
2
0
0
6
 
P
in
n
u
c
k
 a
n
d
 P
o
tt
e
r,
 
2
0
0
6
 
G
a
la
ri
o
ti
s
 e
t 
a
l,
 2
0
1
7
 
B
o
o
k
 o
r 
J
o
u
rn
a
l 
M
o
n
e
y
 a
n
d
 S
o
c
c
e
r:
 A
 
S
o
c
c
e
rn
o
m
ic
s
 G
u
id
e
 
A
p
p
lie
d
 E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 
J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
S
p
o
rt
 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
S
p
o
rt
s
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 
F
in
a
n
c
e
 
A
n
n
a
ls
 o
f 
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s
 
R
e
s
e
a
rc
h
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 
P
re
m
ie
r 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 a
n
d
 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 
P
re
m
ie
r 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 a
n
d
 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 
P
re
m
ie
r 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 
S
e
ri
e
 A
 a
n
d
 S
e
ri
e
 B
 
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
n
 F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 (
A
F
L
) 
L
ig
u
e
 1
 
G
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
l 
m
a
rk
e
t 
E
n
g
la
n
d
 a
n
d
 W
a
le
s
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
 a
n
d
 W
a
le
s
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
 a
n
d
 W
a
le
s
 
It
a
ly
 
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
 
F
ra
n
c
e
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
lu
b
s
 
1
0
0
 
7
7
 
2
0
 
–
 
–
 
1
2
 
Y
e
a
rs
 
1
9
5
8
–
2
0
1
3
 
1
9
4
6
/4
7
–
1
9
9
3
/9
4
 
1
9
9
7
/9
8
–
2
0
0
1
/0
2
 
  
1
9
9
3
–
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
–
2
0
1
2
/1
3
 
O
b
s
e
rv
a
ti
o
n
 
p
e
ri
o
d
 
5
6
 y
e
a
rs
 
4
8
 y
e
a
rs
 
5
 y
e
a
rs
 
–
 
1
0
 y
e
a
rs
 
3
 y
e
a
rs
 
C
a
s
e
s
 
>
4
0
0
0
 
–
 
9
7
 
–
 
2
1
9
6
 
–
 
C
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ts
 
a
n
d
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
e
a
m
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
P
la
y
e
r 
w
a
g
e
s
 
(W
A
G
E
S
) 
–
 
P
la
y
e
r 
w
a
g
e
s
 
(W
A
G
E
S
);
 P
la
y
e
r 
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 
P
la
y
e
r 
w
a
g
e
s
 
(W
A
G
E
S
);
 P
la
y
e
r 
v
a
lu
e
 (
V
A
L
U
E
) 
–
 
–
 
S
ta
d
iu
m
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
–
 
–
 
–
 
–
 
S
ta
d
iu
m
 c
a
p
a
c
it
y
 
–
 
O
th
e
r 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
–
 
–
 
–
 
–
 
M
a
rk
e
ti
n
g
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
–
 
S
p
o
rt
in
g
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 r
a
n
k
 (
R
A
N
K
) 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 r
a
n
k
 (
R
A
N
K
) 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 r
a
n
k
 (
R
A
N
K
);
 
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 
(P
R
O
M
O
T
IO
N
);
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 p
o
in
ts
; 
M
a
tc
h
e
s
 w
o
n
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 r
a
n
k
 
(R
A
N
K
),
 P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 
(P
R
O
M
O
T
IO
N
);
 
M
a
tc
h
e
s
 w
o
n
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 r
a
n
k
 (
R
A
N
K
);
 
M
a
tc
h
e
s
 w
o
n
, 
C
h
a
m
p
io
n
s
h
ip
s
 w
o
n
 
(P
R
E
M
IE
R
);
 P
la
y
-o
ff
s
 
q
u
a
lif
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 r
a
n
k
 (
R
A
N
K
) 
L
it
e
ra
tu
re
 r
e
v
ie
w
 
6
7
 
A
u
th
o
r,
 y
e
a
r 
o
f 
p
u
b
li
c
a
ti
o
n
 
S
z
y
m
a
n
s
k
i,
 2
0
1
5
 
D
o
b
s
o
n
 a
n
d
 G
o
d
d
a
rd
, 
1
9
9
8
 
G
e
rr
a
rd
, 
2
0
0
5
 
B
a
ro
n
c
e
ll
i 
a
n
d
 
L
a
g
o
, 
2
0
0
6
 
P
in
n
u
c
k
 a
n
d
 P
o
tt
e
r,
 
2
0
0
6
 
G
a
la
ri
o
ti
s
 e
t 
a
l,
 2
0
1
7
 
B
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 (
R
E
V
E
N
U
E
) 
M
a
tc
h
d
a
y
 r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
(M
A
T
C
H
D
A
Y
) 
A
tt
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
(A
T
T
E
N
D
A
N
C
E
);
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 (
R
E
V
E
N
U
E
) 
B
ro
a
d
c
a
s
t 
re
v
e
n
u
e
 
(B
R
O
A
D
C
A
S
T
);
 
C
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l 
re
v
e
n
u
e
 
(C
O
M
M
E
R
C
IA
L
);
 
M
a
tc
h
d
a
y
 r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
(M
A
T
C
H
D
A
Y
) 
M
a
tc
h
d
a
y
 r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
(M
A
T
C
H
D
A
Y
);
 
M
a
tc
h
d
a
y
 a
tt
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
; 
M
e
m
b
e
rs
h
ip
 r
e
v
e
n
u
e
; 
M
e
m
b
e
rs
; 
C
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l 
re
v
e
n
u
e
 
(C
O
M
M
E
R
C
IA
L
) 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 (
R
E
V
E
N
U
E
);
 
C
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l 
re
v
e
n
u
e
 
(C
O
M
M
E
R
C
IA
L
);
 
A
tt
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
–
 
–
 
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 p
ro
fi
t 
(P
R
O
F
IT
) 
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 p
ro
fi
t 
(P
R
O
F
IT
) 
–
 
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 p
ro
fi
t 
(P
R
O
F
IT
) 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
–
 
–
 
–
 
D
e
b
t;
 E
x
tr
a
o
rd
in
a
ry
 
c
o
s
ts
 
–
 
D
e
b
t;
 E
q
u
it
y
 
C
o
n
c
e
p
tu
a
l 
m
o
d
e
l 
T
e
a
m
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 h
a
s
 a
 
p
o
s
it
iv
e
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 
s
p
o
rt
in
g
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 s
p
o
rt
in
g
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 h
a
s
 a
 
p
o
s
it
iv
e
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
S
p
o
rt
in
g
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
h
a
s
 a
 r
e
c
ip
ro
c
a
l 
e
ff
e
c
t 
w
it
h
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
T
e
a
m
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 h
a
s
 a
 
p
o
s
it
iv
e
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 
s
p
o
rt
in
g
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
, 
w
h
ic
h
 h
a
s
 a
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
 
e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
T
h
e
re
 i
s
 a
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
 
v
ir
tu
o
u
s
 e
ff
e
c
t 
fr
o
m
 
te
a
m
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 t
o
 
s
p
o
rt
in
g
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
, 
to
 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
, 
to
 
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
, 
a
n
d
 t
o
 
te
a
m
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
S
p
o
rt
in
g
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
h
a
s
 a
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 s
ta
d
iu
m
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
h
a
v
e
 a
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
h
a
s
 a
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 s
p
o
rt
in
g
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
, 
w
h
ic
h
 
h
a
s
 r
e
c
ip
ro
c
a
l 
e
ff
e
c
t 
w
it
h
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
D
a
ta
 c
o
lle
c
ti
o
n
 
D
e
lo
it
te
 A
n
n
u
a
l 
R
e
v
ie
w
 
o
f 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
F
in
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 
U
E
F
A
 C
lu
b
 L
ic
e
n
s
in
g
 
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
rk
 R
e
p
o
rt
 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
Y
e
a
rb
o
o
k
, 
D
ig
e
s
t 
o
f 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
S
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
, 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 
D
e
lo
it
te
 A
n
n
u
a
l 
R
e
v
ie
w
 
o
f 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
F
in
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
Y
e
a
rb
o
o
k
 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 (
S
u
p
e
rv
is
o
ry
 
C
o
m
m
is
s
io
n
 o
n
 t
h
e
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
ie
s
 o
f 
P
ro
fe
s
s
io
n
a
l 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
(C
o
m
m
is
s
io
n
e
 d
i 
V
ig
ila
n
z
a
 s
u
lle
 
S
o
c
ie
tà
 d
i 
C
a
lc
io
 
P
ro
fe
s
s
io
n
is
ti
c
h
e
 
(C
o
V
iS
o
C
))
 a
n
d
 
N
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r 
(L
a
 
R
e
p
u
b
b
lic
a
) 
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
n
 F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 
P
ro
fe
s
s
io
n
a
l 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
L
e
a
g
u
e
 (
L
ig
u
e
 d
e
 
F
o
o
tb
a
ll 
P
ro
fe
s
s
io
n
n
e
l 
(L
F
P
))
 a
n
d
 N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
D
ir
e
c
to
ra
te
 o
f 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
(N
D
M
C
 (
D
ir
e
c
ti
o
n
 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
le
 d
u
 C
o
n
tr
ô
le
 
d
e
 G
e
s
ti
o
n
 (
D
N
C
G
))
 
D
a
ta
 a
n
a
ly
s
is
 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 a
n
a
ly
s
is
 
C
a
u
s
a
lit
y
 t
e
s
ts
 
R
a
ti
o
 a
n
a
ly
s
is
 a
n
d
 
re
g
re
s
s
io
n
 a
n
a
ly
s
is
 
–
 
R
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
 a
n
a
ly
s
is
 
S
tr
u
c
tu
ra
l 
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
 
m
o
d
e
ls
 
Literature review 
68 
The model proposed by Szymanski (2015) in Money and Soccer: A Soccernomics Guide has its 
origins in Winners and Losers by Szymanski and Kuypers (1999). It identifies the fundamental 
relationships in professional team sport (see Figure 3.1). Relative to its competitors, a club's team 
resources explain its sporting performance: The best team usually wins (Deloitte, 1994). In turn, 
sporting performance explains business performance: A winning team usually makes more money 
(Deloitte, 1999). Sporting performance is incorporated into both parts of the model, but the 
relationships are detached. This means that there is no connection made between the business 
performance of clubs and their team resources. 
Figure 3.1: Szymanski's (2015) Soccernomics model 
 
Adapted from: Szymanski (2015) 
The relationship between sporting performance and business performance is further examined by 
Dobson and Goddard (1998). Szymanski (2015) models the relationship as uni-directional, but bi-
directional causality is identified by Dobson and Goddard (1998), as shown in Figure 3.2. The causal 
relationship of business performance on sporting performance is stronger than sporting performance 
to business performance. This is especially so for smaller clubs, as larger clubs can sustain 
attendance and matchday revenue if there is a decline in sporting performance. Dobson and Goddard 
(1998) caution that there are differentiated relationships for clubs according to their geographical 
location and market, although the model does not incorporate resources, such as teams or stadiums, 
as a predictor of performance. 
Figure 3.2: Dobson and Goddard (1998) performance model 
 
Adapted from: Dobson and Goddard (1998) 
Literature review 
69 
Further consideration of the positive effect of sporting performance on business performance is 
provided by Pinnuck and Potter (2006). Their performance model (see Figure 3.3) introduces stadium 
resources, which, along with other resources such as marketing, and sporting performance, has a 
positive effect on business performance. Business performance is conceptualised and measured as 
attendance and revenue. Pinnuck and Potter (2006) also incorporate a temporal dimension, with the 
business and sporting performance that is generated during the previous season being adopted as 
predictors of performance for the current season. They further identify a dynamic relationship between 
sporting and business performance, with clubs acquiring more fans when sporting performance 
improves, but there is not a comparable level of attrition when sporting performance declines. 
Figure 3.3: Pinnuck and Potter's (2006) performance model 
 
Adapted from: Pinnuck and Potter (2006) 
The resource utilisation model proposed and empirically-tested by Gerrard (2005) incorporates the 
positive effects of team resources on sporting performance with the positive relationship between 
sporting performance on business performance (see Figure 3.4). Gerrard (2005) introduces the 
separation of business and financial performance, and the effects of sporting performance are 
extended to explain both business performance (revenue) and financial performance (profit). The 
model further examines the relationship of external factors (local market) and internal factors 
(company type) on team resources, as well as the link between internal factors and the business and 
financial performance of clubs. 
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Figure 3.4: Gerrard's (2005) resource utilisation model 
 
Adapted from: Gerrard (2005) 
Most professional sport leagues have small and large clubs as members. Baroncelli and Lago (2006) 
therefore develop separate models for each size of club, which are incorporated in Figure 3.5. Both 
models further confirm the positive relationship of team resources on sporting performance, and of 
sporting performance on business performance. A virtuous relationship between team resources, 
sporting performance, business performance and financial resources is introduced. The best teams 
win more matches and championships, and winning teams generate more revenue and profit, and 
consequently have more financial resources to invest in team resources. For larger clubs, player 
wages are separated from team resources, both of which predict sporting performance. This is 
presumably because player wages expenditure is much higher for larger clubs. Baroncelli and Lago 
(2006) further highlight capital gains from transfer fees, which, with business performance (revenue), 
contribute to financial resources. This is assumed to only be applicable to smaller clubs, but may also 
be relevant to some larger clubs, especially since the introduction of UEFA's Club Licensing and 
Financial Fair Play, as highlighted in Section 2.4. Furthermore, the model does not consider that the 
sale of players will diminish team resources, but instead assumes that the depleted team resources 
will be replaced by further player trading or development. Baroncelli and Lago (2006) model business 
performance (revenue) as a predictor of financial performance (operating profit). 
Literature review 
71 
Figure 3.5: Baroncelli and Lago's (2006) virtuous circle 
 
Adapted from: Baroncelli and Lago (2006) 
Galariotis et al's (2017) model, which is summarised in Figure 3.6, is inspired by Lago et al (2006) and 
offers a contradictory perspective to the preceding models. They propose that financial performance 
has a negative, uni-directional relationship on sporting performance. Sporting performance, in turn, 
has a bi-directional relationship with business performance. Fundamentally, winning teams generate 
higher revenue, and clubs with higher revenue are more likely to win, but they are not necessarily able 
to return a profit from this superior sporting and business performance. However, Galariotis et al 
(2017) exclude resources from their model, and instead propose that financial performance have an 
effect on sporting performance, whereas financial performance may in practice be related to team 
resources, which then affects sporting performance. 
Figure 3.6: Galariotis et al's (2017) dynamic model 
 
Adapted from: Galariotis et al (2017) 
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3.4. Conclusions: Profits and prizes 
Theoretical models that incorporate sporting and business performance provide a more pragmatic 
model of professional sport management theory and introduce unique perspectives. They are, 
however, more complex than models that predict only sporting or business performance. The most 
important contribution of these models is that business and sporting performance are connected 
(Dobson and Goddard, 2011). The effect of team resources on sporting performance are emphasised, 
and the possibility of a reciprocal relationship (where increased player wages and transfer fees may 
be a consequence of sporting success) is addressed. A successful club, for example, may have to 
increase player wages in the form of bonus payments to current players or from contracts that are 
either renegotiated with current players or negotiated with new players. Similarly, the club may incur 
incremental transfer fee payments to other clubs, as the selling clubs attempt to appropriate the 
incremental revenue that was generated by the buying club from their sporting success. Further 
examination of the effects of sporting performance on business performance is provided. But, here, 
there is no reverse causality, as business performance does not have an immediate effect on sporting 
performance, other than for sporting sanctions from mechanisms such as the Football Association's 
(2017) Rule 13 (Insolvency provisions) for clubs entering administration and UEFA's Club Licensing 
and Financial Fair Play. Other resources, most notably the club's stadium, have an effect on business 
performance. There may be a further reciprocal relationship; for example, if demand for tickets 
exceeds supply (stadium capacity), then clubs may formulate and implement a strategy to develop 
their stadium resources. 
These models contribute to professional sport team management theory by explaining sporting and 
business performance. However, there are some evident limitations. The models separate the 
relationship between team resources and sporting performance from that of sporting performance and 
business performance. Some models (Szymanski, 2015) do not incorporate business and sporting 
outcomes, while others, such as Dobson and Goddard (1998), Pinnuck and Potter (2006) and 
Galariotis et al (2017), exclude team resources. There is no consideration of the management of 
resources. Most models are static, not dynamic, with causality often implied and reciprocal feedback 
not always examined. Only Dobson and Goddard (1998) and Baroncelli and Lago (2006) account for 
the differences between clubs, but otherwise theoretical and empirical sport management research 
assumes that clubs are homogenous. 
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4. Conceptual research: The conceptualisation and 
measurement of professional team sport 
 
Chapter summary 
• Professional sport clubs generate sporting, business and financial performance from bundles 
of resources. 
• Sporting performance is conceptualised and measured by winning matches and 
championships, and is realised by trading and developing teams of players. 
• Business and financial performance is generated by clubs and leagues from matchday, 
commercial and broadcast revenue, and is appropriated by the ownership, management and 
control of team, stadium and other resources. 
• Professional sport club strategy has competitive and dynamic dimensions, with clubs aiming 
to generate and sustain performance advantage over competitors, utilising an analogous 
accumulated resource advantage. 
• The performance outcomes generated from a club's strategy is contingent on the degree of 
observed or objective change in the internal and external competitive environment and, 
importantly, the decision-makers' perceptions of change. 
• The concept of fit is adopted to incorporate the complex, competitive and dynamic 
relationships between clubs' resources, the competitive environment and performance, with 
fit modelled as mediation, moderation and deviation. 
 
The performance of professional sport clubs is the output that is generated from the formulation and 
implementation of their strategy. Their business and sporting performance is generated from inputs 
including team and stadium resources. However, the Literature Review (Section 3.3), highlights that 
models of professional sport club performance are more complex than simple input–output 
relationships. Each club generates distinct performance outcomes, and the resources they utilise can 
change by financial year and season. Therefore, professional team sport theory needs to further 
consider how clubs change as the competitive environment in which clubs compete changes, and why 
some clubs are able to succeed or grow, but others fail or decline. 
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4.1. What is professional team sport performance and how is it 
evaluated? 
Professional sport clubs can be conceptualised as a type of firm, and they share many of the 
performance outcomes of firms in other industries. However, they have some unique characteristics in 
their business and sporting performance outcomes. Clubs compete with other clubs and firms, and 
sometimes also cooperate with their competitors (Neale, 1964). The business performance of clubs 
(matchday, commercial and broadcast revenue) is generated and appropriated from multiple sources. 
They aim to win championships and to generate profits, but not just in the current season or financial 
year. Relative and dynamic performance is essential to the conceptualisation and measurement of 
professional sport club performance. 
The performance of professional sport clubs 
Performance is the measurement of the objectives and outputs of firms. It is the outcome or 
dependent variable of strategy (Barney and Clark, 2007). Firms aim to gain a performance advantage 
over their competitors and to sustain any performance advantage. The performance of a firm is a 
measure of comparative and dynamic competitiveness, and of success or failure, survival, or growth 
or decline. Performance outcomes are how firms "keep score" (Thompson, 1967, p. 83). For most 
firms, the score is measured in financial metrics, such as revenue and profit. In professional sport, the 
"score" more typically refers to sporting outcomes, such as the goals scored and points won by a club 
in a match, and the points or position achieved by club in the championship. Professional sport clubs 
also generate business performance and sporting performance (Vrooman, 2007a) or, alternatively, 
financial and sporting performance (dell'Osso and Szymanski, 1991) or commercial and sporting 
performance (Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999). Clubs can experience success and failure in their sport 
and business outcomes (Scully, 1992; Scully, 1995), and these outcomes may be congruent or 
conflict. Professional sport clubs generate business performance that is similar to firms in other 
industries, but sporting performance is unique to the sport industry. 
The sporting performance of professional sport clubs 
Professional team sport is structured by matches and seasons (Neale, 1964). Clubs aim to win 
matches, which determine the champions of league and cup competitions (Buraimo et al, 2015), as 
described in Section 1.2. These championships are organised as a series of matches, which are 
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dyadic contests between clubs (Sirmon et al, 2008). A series of matches are played during a season, 
and the cumulative performance from these matches during a season determines which club wins the 
championship. For matches in the Premier League, Football League and other league competitions, 
each club is awarded 3 points for a win and 1 point for a draw, but no points for a defeat. In leagues, 
points are accumulated during the season to determine the club's position in a division, with the 
position determining the winner of the league or division. In contrast, the FA Cup, EFL Cup and other 
cup competitions comprises a series of rounds, where the winner of each match progresses to the 
next round, with the loser being eliminated. The rounds of matches continue to the Quarter-Final, 
Semi-Final and, ultimately, the Final, which is the match that determines the winner. The Champions 
League and Europa League are hybrid competitions that are structured with a group stage in league 
format followed by a series of rounds to determine the champion. 
The business performance of professional sport clubs 
The revenue of professional football clubs is typically segmented as matchday, commercial and 
broadcast performance (Zimbalist, 1992), as presented in the Annual Review of Football Finance 
(Deloitte, 2017a) and Football Money League (Deloitte, 2017b). There is a correlation between the 
segmented sources of revenue (Késenne, 2014; Szymanski, 2015). Some sources of revenue are 
generated and appropriated by the league, and some by both the league and its member clubs. 
Matchday revenue is generated from general admission and hospitality ticketing, which may be 
marketed as luxury suites or boxes and as club or loge seats (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). It includes 
primary and secondary revenue streams: Ticketing represents a club's primary matchday revenue, 
with secondary matchday revenue generated from sources such as concessions, parking and retailing 
(Zimbalist, 1992). Secondary revenue is related to, and dependent on, attendance. The attendance 
generated by a club, with price, determines matchday revenue, and can also be an indicator of a 
club's marketing resources, and specifically its brand and fan loyalty resources. Furthermore, 
attendance can have an effect on sporting performance, by creating a home advantage (Dobson and 
Goddard, 2011). 
The key sources of commercial revenue include sponsorship and merchandising (Szymanski, 2015) 
and licensing and retailing (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). Sponsorship and licensing is concerned with the 
association of the club's brand to other products and services, whereas merchandising and retailing is 
Conceptualisation and measurement 
76 
the production and sale of club-branded products and services. Commercial revenue is generated 
both by the league and by its member clubs. For example, both the Premier League and member 
clubs generate revenue from sponsorship and licensing, while clubs have their own merchandising 
and retailing agreements. Sponsorship and licensing represent the contractual exchange of rights to 
utilise brands. Sponsorship rights are granted where a sponsor pays a fee to the sponsee (the club) to 
have their brand associated with the club's brand and its products and services, while licensing rights 
are granted where the licensor's products and services are enhanced by the association with the 
club's brand. There are also more complex relationships, where the club's and sponsor's brands are 
applied to co-branded products and services. Commercial contracts that include licensing rights can 
be extended to the production and sale of licensed products. Merchandising is the production of 
licensed goods, and these products and services can be club-branded or co-branded, where the club 
and the sponsor's brands are incorporated. Retailing is the sale of these goods to customers, which 
can be at the club's stadium to the club's local market or to national and international markets. There 
are also combined merchandising and retailing contracts where the licensor both supplies and sells 
the goods, such as the Manchester United Merchandising joint venture between Nike and Manchester 
United (2001). 
The broadcast revenue appropriated by Premier League clubs is generated and redistributed by the 
Premier League to current and recent member clubs and to (members of) the Football League. Some 
clubs also appropriate substantial revenue from the Champions League and Europa League, with 
further receipts from other competitions such as the FA Cup and EFL Cup. The distribution of Premier 
League broadcast revenue at present comprises a Basic Award, Facility Fee, and Merit Award 
(Premier League, 2017). The Basic Award, which represents 50% of broadcast revenue, is distributed 
evenly between all member clubs. The Facility Fee (25%) is based on the number of matches in which 
the club is televised live in the United Kingdom. The Merit Award (25%) is derived from league 
position, and is therefore a correlate of sporting performance. 
The business performance of a firm is sometimes conceptualised and measured as profit (Wernerfelt, 
1984). Firms that generate superior revenue to their competitors are not necessarily profitable, and 
may return a loss. This is a common occurrence in professional team sport, where, as explained in 
Section 3.1, club owners may be win-maximisers rather than profit-maximisers. This suggests that 
profit (revenue less expenditure) may be a more appropriate measurement of performance (Dierickx 
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and Cool, 1989). However, this means that resources are used to estimate inputs and part of the 
estimate of outputs. Resource expenditure then becomes both the predictor and, when deducted from 
revenue, part of the outcome of a firm's strategy. 
Cash can be used to assess the inputs and outputs of firm strategy (Barney, 1986b). Specifically, it 
can be considered as financial performance, but also a financial resource that is used to acquire and 
accumulate other resources. A firm's positive net cash inflows at the end of the financial year are 
carried forward as financial resources at the start of the next financial year. Then, as financial 
resources, they can then be used as cash outflows to fund the acquisition or accumulation of other 
resources. Conversely, negative net cash flow can diminish the financial resources of a firm. Net cash 
flow is an important measure of financial resources and performance of professional sport clubs 
(Szymanski, 2015). Furthermore, net cash is an indicator of financial success or failure. This may be 
evident if a firm enters administration due to insolvency, where it has insufficient cash or, conversely, 
firms can have excess cash, which is considered as inefficient use of shareholders' funds. 
Administration events are more common in professional football in England and Wales than in other 
industries (Szymanski, 2015) and cash may be a useful indicator of the success, or at least the 
avoidance of financial failure. 
Sustained performance advantage 
Performance can conceptually be similar to, or distinct from, competitive advantage. Firms utilise 
resources to gain competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and therefore competitive advantage is the 
outcome (Barney, 1986b). Here, relative performance is the "empirical correlate" of competitive 
advantage (Sirmon et al, 2010, p. 1387). Alternatively, competitive advantage can be a predictor of 
performance. Competitive advantage is attributed to certain resources that enable a firm to generate 
superior performance (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). Competitive advantage is then the successful 
realisation of the firm's strategy (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). It can be conceptualised as an input, 
which is something a firm utilises (a resource advantage) or as an output, which is something a firm 
generates (a performance advantage). 
Superior performance is fundamental to strategy (Barney and Arikan, 2001) and relative, rather than 
absolute, measurement of performance is advocated for the evaluation of a firm's strategy (Arend, 
2003; Powell, 2003). Relative performance is particularly important for professional team sport as 
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clubs share a competitive environment through their membership of a league (Holcomb et al, 2009). 
This applies to both business performance but particularly to sporting performance. For business 
performance, clubs do not only compete with other clubs in their league, but may compete with clubs 
in other divisions and leagues, as well as with other sports and industries such as arts, entertainment 
and recreation. It is an open competitive environment that is not distinct from other sectors. All clubs 
can be successful (by, for example, being profitable), but all could fail (by returning a loss). In contrast, 
sport is a zero-sum game (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007; Vrooman, 1995). There are identical 
performance outcomes for all clubs in sporting competitive environments, with the nature of 
competition set in the laws of the sport and the rules and regulations of the championship in which 
clubs compete. The sporting competitive environment is closed or discrete, where sporting 
performance advantage is relative to – and only to – other clubs competing in the same competition. 
Here, there is one winner (the champion) or a predetermined number of winners (for example, the 
clubs that win promotion to another division or qualification to another competition), and a set number 
of losers (such as the clubs that are relegated). In contrast to business performance, not all clubs can 
be successful, but nor can they all fail. As discussed in Section 3.1, clubs do not want absolute 
success to the extent that their opponents fail and cease to compete, as sport depends on competitors 
for matches and championships (Neale, 1964; Szymanski’s, 2015). Professional sport clubs compete 
and cooperate with other clubs to win matches and championships (Neale, 1964), and to generate and 
sustain revenue and profit. The application of absolute and relative measures of professional sport 
club performance is recommended for the evaluation of sporting performance (Scully, 1989; Moliterno 
and Wiersema, 2007). 
Professional sport clubs owners and managers are similar to their counterparts in other firms in that 
they do not just want to be successful in the short-term, but instead aim for long-term performance 
advantage. For business performance, firms aim to generate and sustain performance (Barney and 
Arikan, 2001; Peteraf and Bergen, 2003). Ideally, this performance advantage becomes permanent, 
rather than just a temporary, advantage (Barney, 1986a; Barney, 1997; Peteraf and Bergen, 2003). 
Similarly, clubs aim to sustain sporting performance for more than one season. They compete in 
league and cup competitions each season, and will aim to maintain their membership of a league, 
while the winners aim to retain their championship the following season. Success or failure in the 
preceding season can affect performance in the current season; for example, by being promoted or 
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relegated between divisions or qualifying for the Champions League or Europa League. Business 
performance failure in the form of administration can be penalised by the deduction of points in the 
next season by the Premier League (and Football League), while sporting sanctions from UEFA's Club 
Licensing system and Financial Fair Play regulations may adversely affect the club's team resources 
that can be utilised during the next season. The shock of relegation can, but not always, leads to 
insolvency (Szymanski, 2015). Sporting success or failure can have an effect on the club's business 
performance in the current and subsequent seasons. 
The performance of professional sport clubs has both competitive and dynamic dimensions. Clubs aim 
to generate a performance advantage over competing clubs in the championship and firms from other 
sectors. They also aim to generate and sustain sporting performance over multiple seasons and 
business performance over multiple financial years. Therefore, the output of professional sport club 
strategy is conceptualised and measured as sustained performance advantage. 
The generation and appropriation of performance 
The success or failure of a firm's strategy depends not only on the generation of performance, but on 
its appropriation (Coff, 1999). In particular, financial performance can be appropriated by a firm's 
shareholders, managers and employees (Coff, 1999). For professional sport clubs, shareholders may 
receive capital gains and dividends (Sloane, 1971), while managers (team managers and business 
executives) and employees (including players) typically appropriate remuneration. The proportion of 
appropriation depends on the bargaining power of the respective stakeholders. 
As with other firms, the business performance of a professional sport club can be appropriated by 
internal and external stakeholders. However, the appropriation of business performance, and 
specifically financial performance, by managers and other employees differs from other industries 
(Hoye et al, 2018). Premier League club owners (the shareholders) do not always appropriate financial 
performance in the form of dividends, but more commonly appropriate capital gains when the club is 
divested (Scully, 1995). Uniquely, the players of professional sport clubs, who are the employee's in 
Coff's (1999) model, often appropriate higher earnings than the clubs' shareholders and managers. 
Similarly, the team managers of professional sport clubs, who are essentially "department heads" 
(Moore, 2013), may receive higher remuneration than business executives such as the Chief 
Executive Officer or Managing Director. 
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Clubs appropriate financial performance from the league and sometimes from other clubs by being a 
member of a league. This appropriation can be direct and indirect. Directly, broadcast and commercial 
revenue is generated by the league, with most being redistributed to, and appropriated by, member 
clubs. Furthermore, each club monetises their home matches against the opposition or away team 
(Neale, 1964). Indirectly, a club's brand is enhanced by being a member of a league. For example, the 
Premier League is the most valuable professional football league in the world because its members 
includes clubs such as Manchester United, which are valuable brands (Brand Finance, 2017). Smaller 
clubs appropriate value from larger clubs as the distribution of broadcast and commercial revenue is 
only partially correlated to sporting performance (Premier League, 2017). 
In contrast, the appropriation of sporting performance is constrained to the clubs that compete in each 
competition. Sport is a zero-sum game and hence all sporting performance advantage is generated by 
clubs. Superior sporting performance is appropriated by the winning team in a match or by both teams 
if the match is drawn, and by the champion of each league and cup competition per season. 
4.2. What are professional sport club resources and how are they 
managed? 
Professional sport clubs possess their team and stadium resources to generate and sustain sporting 
and business performance. The success or failure is clubs is further determined by the management 
of these resources. Unique bundles of resources are utilised by different clubs, and the acquisition, 
divestment and accumulation of such assets can be short-term or long-term. Therefore, the 
conceptualisation and measurement of competitive and dynamic resources is essential to the analysis 
of professional sport club performance. 
The resources of professional sport clubs 
Resources are utilised by firms to formulate and implement strategy and, ultimately, to generate 
performance. They are the inputs and performance is the output of strategy. Firms can even be 
conceptualised as a bundle of resources (Wernerfelt, 1984). As with other types of firms, clubs utilise 
various types of resources, such as financial resources, physical resources, human resources, 
technological resources, reputation and organisational resources (Grant, 1991). 
The key resources of professional sport clubs are its team and stadium (Borland, 2006a), which are 
types of human and physical resources (Dabscheck, 1975; Neale, 1964; Quirk and Fort, 1992; 
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Szymanski, 2015). Team resource expenditure typically comprises player wages and transfer fees. 
Clubs utilise teams of players, which are managed by the team manager, to win matches and 
championships. The key physical resource for professional sport clubs is its stadium (Szymanski and 
Kuypers, 1999; dell'Ossi and Szymanski, 1991; Szymanski, 2015). The facility is utilised to host a 
club's home matches, from which matchday, commercial and broadcast revenue is generated. 
Decisions to make changes to the stadium are some of the most important for clubs (Quirk and Fort, 
1992). 
Firm resources and capabilities 
Capabilities or competencies are how a firm utilises its resources to formulate and implement strategy 
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). The differences between resources, capabilities and competence can 
be "subtle" (Barney, 1997, p. 144) and definitions of resources and capabilities are often interchanged 
(Barney and Clark, 2007). The management of resources can be simply conceptualised as another 
resource (Barney, 1989) or, more specifically, the ownership, control and management of resources 
can be considered as an organisational resource (Grant, 1991). Alternatively, there is a conceptual 
distinction between resources and capabilities (Barney and Arikan, 2001). Superior performance 
depends not only on the resources that a firm utilises, but on the management those resources 
(Sirmon and Hitt, 2003; Hansen et al, 2004; Holcomb et al, 2009; Ndofor et al, 2011). Capabilities can 
be modelled as the management of resources (Augier and Teece, 2009). Regardless of their similarity 
to, or differentiation from, resources, the management of resources and capabilities are often ignored 
in strategy research (Augier and Teece, 2009; Ndofor et at, 2011; Sirmon et al, 2007). 
Professional sport clubs own, manage or control bundles of team and stadium resources. Club 
owners, business executives and other decision-makers require team resource management and 
stadium resource management capabilities if they are to optimise their resources to generate and 
sustain performance advantage. These capabilities encompass planning, organising, leading and 
controlling (Lussier and Kimball, 2014). 
Team management capabilities encompass player trading and player development (Zimbalist, 1992). 
Player trading is the acquisition and divestment of players to and from the club (Lewis, 2003; Hakes 
and Sauer, 2006). Player development encompasses the improvement of individual players (Berri and 
Brook, 2010) and of the team (Berri et al, 2009). The management of the team may change, both as 
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players are traded and developed, and as performance objectives are realised or unrealised. Any such 
change may be made during the season or between seasons, especially when a team wins a 
championship or is promoted or relegated. 
Stadium management comprises supply-based and demand-based capabilities. Supply-based 
capabilities include capital and operations management. Capital projects encompass the acquisition, 
divestment and accumulation of land, building and equipment, whereas operations management is the 
ongoing management of the venue, including the delivery of matchday and non-matchday products 
and services. Demand-based capabilities include the club's brand management (Irwin et al, 1999), fan 
loyalty management (Wakefield and Sloan, 1995; Funk and James, 2006), and price management 
(Ferguson et al, 1991). By incorporating supply and demand management capabilities, it is assumed 
that a club will change the supply of facilities, such as the capacity of the stadium, and change the 
operation of the venue to meet and create demand. 
Resource management must further consider the management of the club as a firm or company. A 
unique characteristic of professional team sport is the influence and autonomy of the team manager. 
The business executives of professional sport clubs typically determine the management of stadium 
and marketing resources. But they usually do not exert explicit influence on the management of team 
resources, even though sporting performance can affect business performance (Irwin et al, 1999). 
Accumulated resource advantage 
Competitive advantage can be separated into performance advantage and resource advantage (See 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2). Firms aim to generate superior performance over their competitors, which can 
be realised by having a resource advantage (Coff, 2010; Hunt, 1997; Hunt and Morgan, 1996, 1997; 
Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) and a capability advantage (Makadok, 2001). The performance of a firm 
is further determined by its strategy relative to its competitors (Ndofor et al, 2011), and relative firm 
resources and capabilities are often more important to competitive outcomes than absolute resource 
endowments (Sirmon et al, 2008). For professional sport clubs, the conceptualisation and 
measurement of resource advantage is recommended because clubs possess similar resources and 
share a common resource market (Holcomb et al, 2009). 
Professional sport clubs do not just aim to generate superior performance in the current season or 
financial year, and, correspondingly, they do not acquire, divest and accumulate all resources and 
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capabilities simultaneously. The current performance of a firm is derived from its current and historical 
resource (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997). Clubs accumulate resources and capabilities. For 
professional sport clubs, the accumulation of resources differs for team and stadium resources. Clubs 
typically develop their team resources over multiple financial years and seasons. For example, 
transfer fees are usually depreciated over three to four years (Forker, 2005; Frick, 2007; Buraimo et al, 
2015; Amir and Livine, 2005) and the average duration of a professional footballer's contract is three 
years (Szymanski, 2015), while the average tenure of a Premier League team manager is just two 
years, and less than two years in in the Football League (Kuper and Szymanski, 2012). In contrast, 
stadiums can take years and sometimes decades to plan, design and construct. No club that has 
opened a new stadium during the Premier League era has since relocated (Anderson, 2016). 
Like performance, resources have competitive and dynamic dimensions. A club can have a team or 
stadium resource advantage over other clubs, while, each season and financial year, the club will 
acquire, divest and otherwise accumulate these resources. Therefore, the inputs that enable 
professional sport clubs to formulate and implement strategy are conceptualised and measured as 
accumulated resource advantage. 
4.3. The concept of change in professional team sport 
The Premier League was formed in 1992 and, as established in Chapter 2, has changed considerably 
since its inaugural season. During this time, a number of clubs have experienced success, whether 
winning championships or attaining membership of the Premier League, while others have 
experienced failure, be it relegation or administration. Club owners and business executives have 
utilised their resources to generate this sporting and business performance. They trade and develop 
players, and build new stadiums or rebuild or redevelop existing facilities. The basic input–output 
model, illustrated in Figure 4.1, where clubs with the superior teams and stadiums (resource 
advantage) generate and sustain superior sporting and business performance (performance 
advantage) is inadequate. It does not explain how and why some clubs succeed while other clubs fail, 
or why performance is sometimes sustained but often temporary. 
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Figure 4.1: The input–output model 
 
 
Resources may not always be a reliable predictor of performance. The Premier League has grown 
since its formation, while its membership has changed as clubs are relegated and promoted. Each 
club has acquired, accumulated and divested resources, and have experienced unique types and 
levels of success and failure. The owners and business executives make distinct decisions at specific 
times, the outcomes from which are subject to change in the competitive environment and specifically 
to change in the Premier League and competitor clubs. Change has a dynamic and a competitive 
dimension and so it is necessary to define change, the implications of change for Premier League 
clubs, and specifically the degree of change and the differences between perceived and objective 
change. The approaches to the management of change by club decision-makers are explored, and a 
model for identifying how club owners and business executives formulate and implement strategy in a 
changing competitive environment is proposed. 
4.4. What is change? 
Decision-makers formulate and implement strategy to effect change in the resources and capabilities 
of the firm. Such change is intended to enhance performance outcomes, but can be detrimental, 
creating a performance disadvantage. A further complication is that change in performance can have 
an effect on resources; for example, the growth or decline in financial performance (such as 
generating a profit or returning a loss) can enhance or diminish financial resources (for example, 
retained earnings and net cash). Performance outcomes generated from resources may also vary 
because of change in the competitive environment, such as the strategic behaviour of competitors. 
Together, these internal and external changes are contingency factors that a firm's decision-makers 
do not necessarily make, but can affect the outcomes that are realised from its decisions. Change can 
affect a firm's resources, its performance, and the relationship between resources and performance. 
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Change represents risk. Risk can have consequences for the owners and business executives of a 
firm (Anderson and Tushman, 2001; Thompson, 1967), and for a firm's resources and performance 
(Anderson and Tushman, 2001; Duncan, 1972; Milliken, 1987). Risk can have a positive effect on a 
firm's strategy as well as the more common interpretation of risk as negative. It is the benefit of being 
right versus cost of being wrong. Risk is inherent in professional team sport. Clubs take a short-term 
risk in player trading, and a long-term risk with player development. The rebuilding of, or relocation to, 
a new stadium is usually the most substantial risk taken by club owners and business executives, due 
to the capital and operating expenditure that is committed and the economic useful life of the asset. 
The consequence of risk is that a club may under-perform or, alternatively, be over-resourced. 
Ultimately, professional team sport is "risky" (Szymanski, 2015, p. 210). 
Firms formulate and implement strategy in the present. However, the outcomes of a firm's strategy, 
whether realised or unrealised (Mintzberg, 1978), will occur in the future. The future is not known with 
certainty and may be subject to change (Rumelt, 1984), and this change can be internal or external. 
Internally, the resources and capabilities of the firm may change (Thompson, 1967) or may need to 
change in the future (Paine and Anderson, 1977). In sport, clubs need to consider their endowments 
of team and stadium resources, and the required resource management capabilities. From an external 
perspective, the managers of a firm can never know with certainty what its competitors and other 
stakeholders will do in the future (Thompson, 1967, p. 88). For example, a professional sport club may 
enhance its player trading and development, but rival clubs may acquire or accumulate superior 
players. Similarly, a club can develop its stadium or relocate to a new stadium, only for a competitor in 
the local market to develop or open a superior facility. Strategy models should incorporate internal and 
external factors (Anderson and Paine, 1975; Paine and Anderson, 1977). 
The degree of change 
Firms may initiate "incremental" or "radical" change relative to the evolving competitive environment, 
or may be in a period of "flux" (Johnson, 1992, p. 34). The degree of change in a competitive 
environment is a function of dynamism and complexity (Anderson and Paine, 1975; Bourgeois, 1985; 
Child, 1977; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Change has a static–dynamic and a simple–complex 
dimension (Duncan, 1972). The static–dynamic dimension is more important than the simple–complex 
dimension (Duncan, 1972). Change can be modelled as cross-sectional complexity (how many 
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contingency factors affect a firm's strategy?) and time-series dynamism (when do contingency factors 
affect the firm's strategy?). 
Professional sport clubs can experience dynamic change to performance and resources. This change 
can be considerable, such as effects of promotion and relegation, especially between the Premier 
League and Football League Championship (see Section 2.8). Furthermore, clubs may need to 
immediately respond to change – especially if they have been promoted, relegated or qualified for 
European competition – as they typically have from just a couple of months (Deloitte, 2005) to ten 
weeks (Deloitte, 1999) to formulate and implement a revised strategy. The change experienced by 
promoted clubs has been described as being analogous to the transition from a convenience store 
(Deloitte, 1999) or corner shop (Deloitte, 2005) to a supermarket (Deloitte, 1999, 2005) and, for 
relegated clubs, changing back again (Deloitte, 1999). Furthermore, promotion and relegation can 
occur in consecutive seasons, meaning that growth, decline, or fluctuation between growth and 
decline, can occur within just a few seasons. There is then limited time for clubs to make any required 
adjustment to their team and stadium resources. 
Premier League clubs are relatively simple firms. Sporting performance is governed by the league 
through laws and rules, which are identical for all clubs, and is derived from a set number of players in 
the team and squad, as set in the laws of the sport and the rules for each competition. They generate 
business performance from a limited number of products and services, conducting most of their 
trading from one facility. Nevertheless, the competitive strategy of clubs is complex. As with other 
industries, performance still derives from multiple resources and capabilities (Teece et al, 1997; 
Sirmon et al, 2007), with most products (and services) requiring several resources, and most 
resources being utilised for several products (Wernerfelt, 1984). Players and team managers 
contribute to sporting performance (by winning matches and championships) and business 
performance (including matchday, commercial and broadcast revenue), while the stadium is essential 
for sporting performance (to host home matches) and business performance (to generate matchday 
and commercial revenue). Further complexity is added when the strategy of competitors is considered, 
as the performance of any firm or club is the result of multiple competitive contests (Sirmon et al, 
2008). Performance is a multidimensional construct (Combs and Ketchen, 1999) and can be 
evaluated using multiple criteria (Sirmon et al, 2008). The use of combined, multiple performance 
measures is recommended (Coff, 1999; Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Holcomb et al, 2009). 
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Objective and perceived change 
It is not change per se, but the certainty or predictability of change that affects the outcome of strategic 
decision making (Anderson and Paine, 1975; Milliken, 1987). The capability to predict change is not 
the same as observed change (Anderson and Tushman, 2001). There is a difference between 
objective change and perceptions of change as part of strategic decision-making (Anderson and 
Paine, 1975; Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Bourgeois, 1985; Milliken, 1987). Objective change 
can be stable or volatile, whereas perception of change range from predictable to uncertain. 
Managers may have uncertain perceptions of change in the competitive environment in which their 
firm competes, but also uncertainty about the need for the firm to change and, specifically, to change 
its strategy (Anderson and Paine, 1975). Perceptions of change differ in industries and firms. There 
are inter-firm differences between firms in an industry and intra-firm differences within firms (Milliken, 
1987). Different firms have unique perceptions of uncertainty (Child, 1977) and, within firms, there may 
be differing perceptions of change as perceived by managers (Anderson and Paine, 1975; Paine and 
Anderson, 1977) or decision decision-makers (Anderson and Tushman, 2001; Bourgeois, 1985; 
Galbraith, 1973). 
The degree of objective change in professional team sport is highlighted in Chapter 2. Much of this 
change is observed as stable, rather than volatile, growth. However, there is mixed evidence of the 
perceptions of change as comprehended by Premier League club decision-makers. Much of the 
change in the Premier league appears to have been predictable, as evidenced by forecasts in 
Deloitte's Annual Review of Football Finance. Deloitte (2017a) are consultants to a number of Premier 
League clubs, and the published data and information is in the public domain and is used in media 
and academic research. However, this does not necessarily mean that all decision-makers at all clubs 
shared the same interpretation of this evidence, and club decision-makers are likely to have drawn on 
other evidence when forming their perceptions of change. Many trends were predicted, but it is difficult 
to predict success and failure of individual clubs or by division (Deloitte, 1999). There is also an 
important distinction between the prediction of future change and the ambition or aspiration of owners 
and business executives to realise change, especially in sporting and business performance. Peter 
Risdale, the then Chairman of Leeds United, described the club's growth as "living the dream" (Wilson, 
2006), but "chasing the dream can mean living a financial nightmare" (Deloitte, 1999, p. 60). 
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Furthermore, there is a paradox if decision-makers aim to formulate and implement strategy that is 
both flexible and predictable (Thompson, 1967). In the long-term, decision-makers aim to optimise the 
flexibility (or freedom from commitment) of their resources because the firm's competitive environment 
in the future is uncertain (Thompson, 1967). However, in the short-term, decision-makers have a 
preference for predictability by reducing or eliminating uncertainty (or technical rationality), as they aim 
to optimise the effective and efficient utilisation of the firm's resources to generate performance 
advantage (Thompson, 1967). This is further complicated as decisions are made at institutional (or 
executive), managerial and technical level (Thompson, 1967). At institutional level, strategic decision-
makers aim to optimise resource flexibility, whereas at the technical level, technical rationality is 
optimised by reducing or eliminating uncertainty. The interim managerial level is the translator 
between resource flexibility and technical implementation. In professional team sport, there is 
separation in strategic decision-making for specific resources. With the growth of team resource 
expenditure in the Premier League, it is becoming more common for the trading and development of 
players to be managed by a director, while the management of players during each season and match 
is usually the performed by the team manager with the support of technical staff such as coaches. For 
stadium resources, the decision to rebuild or relocate to a new stadium may be taken at institutional or 
executive level, with the management of the facility by the stadium manager, and specific functions 
such as ticketing, hospitality, food services and retail management being managed at technical level. 
4.5. How do professional sport clubs manage change? 
There has been considerable growth in the revenue generated by Premier League clubs and in the 
expenditure allocated to team and stadium resources. Concurrently, there has been divergence in 
revenue and expenditure between divisions, and especially between the Premier League and Football 
League Championship, and, more recently, between the Premier League and Champions League 
(see Section 2.8). The Premier League has expanded since 1992, but only a few clubs have sustained 
success during the era. Most clubs have, at least at some stage, enjoyed or suffered varying degrees 
of success, failure, growth or decline. These outcomes have been short-term for some clubs and long-
term for others. It is evident that clubs have formulated and implemented unique strategic paths. This 
is despite much of the objective or observed change in the competitive environment being the same 
for all clubs. It is assumed that the unique decisions made by club owners and business executives 
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must, at least in part, be due to contrasting perceptions of change, be it change in the competitive 
environment or to the individual club. 
The combination of objective and perceived change may provide unique insight and explanation of the 
decision-making of club owners and business executives. Importantly, this enables research to 
consider not just what clubs do, but why they do it. The dimensions of perceived and objective change 
are presented as a matrix (as used by Daase and Kessler (2007) and Luft (1984)) in Figure 4.2. 
Perception of change can be predictable or uncertain, and objective change is stable or volatile. 
Figure 4.2: The perceived–objective change matrix 
  Objective change 
  Stability Volatility 
Perceived 
change 
Predictable 
1. Predictable 
stability 
2. Predictable 
volatility 
Uncertain 
3. Uncertain 
stability 
4. Uncertain 
volatility 
 
Each cell represents a specific approach for decision-makers based on their perceptions of the 
change (the vertical dimension) and for each type of objective change (the horizontal dimension). Cell 
1 is predictable stability, where managers correctly forecast that the competitive environment would be 
stable. For example, the growth in Premier League broadcast rights has been predictable and stable. 
Cell 2 is predictable volatility, where decision-makers correctly expected that the competitive 
environment would be volatile. Although the environment changes, the firm makes appropriate change 
to maintain competitiveness. Clubs that have experienced promotion and relegation have had to 
revise their strategy according to which division they will compete in the following season. Cell 3 is 
uncertain stability, where the decision-makers did not anticipate stability; they thought the competitive 
environment would be volatile. Additions and amendments to law, such as the Arsenal Football Club v 
Reed 2002 case highlighted in Section 2.2, were expected to have considerable impact on 
professional sport clubs, but their consequences were limited. Cell 4 is uncertain volatility, where 
managers did not did not predict volatility. This is the most chaotic competitive environment. 
Contagion caused by the administration of ITV Digital and Setanta Sports was the most intense 
example of unpredictable volatility. 
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For professional sport clubs, perceptions of change are not dichotomous, either–or, decisions. Clubs 
make decisions about a bundle of resources to effect specific types of performance outcomes. 
Furthermore, many strategic decisions are constrained. Managers may be willing to make a specific 
decision, but are unable to formulate or implement their preferred strategy as their strategic choices 
are constrained by their frequency, certainty, reversibility, functionality and occurrence (Rumelt, 1984). 
For example, the trading of players to and from Premier League clubs is frequent, but irregular. Each 
season, a number of clubs are promoted and relegated, or have new owners, business executives or 
team managers. Most players have short-term contracts, and player trading decisions can be reversed 
by trading on the transfer market, subject to the player's contract and market liquidity. Player 
development is longer-term, and related strategic decision-making is less frequent and more difficult to 
reverse than for player trading, and irregular. Conversely, the acquisition or accumulation of stadium 
resources is much longer-term than for team resources (Szymanski, 2015). Strategic decisions on the 
development or relocation of a club's stadium can take many years and sometimes decades to 
formulate and implement, and require considerable financial resources, and are infrequent, irregular 
and, essentially, irreversible. The decision-making of club owners and business executives will vary 
according to what is being changed or is changing, and how change is realised or unrealised. 
4.6. The concept of fit in professional team sport 
There has been extensive and intensive change in the Premier League since its formation. Decision-
makers have to perceive and then respond to, or pre-empt, such change. Strategy, therefore, is not 
static, and is more like "shooting at a moving target" (Thompson, 1967, p. 148). Professional sport 
club decision-makers may have to change their team and stadium resources due to change in 
performance and the competitive environment. The concept of fit (Rumelt, 1987) aims to explain the 
realised and unrealised outcomes of firm strategies. It can be applied to explain how Premier League 
clubs maintain fit, go into misfit, and then refit, and why this has an effect on sporting and business 
performance. 
Firms that are in fit (Donaldson, 2001) or balance (Naman and Slevin, 1993) are expected to generate 
superior performance to those in misfit (Donaldson, 2001). Fit is a dynamic and changing concept, as 
firms that are in misfit can attain or regain fit (Donaldson, 2001). Firms can have an under-measure or 
over-measure of fit (Naman and Slevin, 1993) or, alternatively, under-fit or over-fit. Under-fit may be 
more problematic than over-fit as it may represent critical factors, whereas under-fit may be "merely" 
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slack resources (Naman and Slevin, 1993, p. 146). Furthermore, the degree of fit or misfit may is 
expected to affect performance (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Donaldson, 2001). Firms that have 
excessive misfit are predicted to have inferior performance to those that are in fit or have moderate 
misfit. The duration of fit or misfit may further affect performance, with firms that experience long-term 
misfit returning performance that is inferior to firms that have short-term misfit before regaining fit or 
achieving refit. 
There are different conceptions of fit, with typologies proposed by Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) and 
Venkatraman (1989). Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) identify selection, interaction and systems as 
types of fit. The selection approach is the relationship between resources and contingency factors, but 
does not aim to explain performance. Interaction explores how the deviation or residuals between 
resources and contingency factors explain performance. Systems fit is a holistic or gestalt approach, 
by which performance is explained by the consistency between resources and contingency factors. 
Venkatraman (1989) models fit as mediation, moderation, matching, gestalts, deviation and 
covariation. Models that predict performance are functionalist theories (Donaldson, 2001). For 
predictive models, the conceptualisation of fit as moderation, mediation and deviation are relevant as 
they are "anchored" to an outcome variable (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 425). Fit as mediation and 
moderation are complementary perspectives, but the mediation model offers less precision than 
moderation (Venkatraman, 1989). Therefore, fit as mediation (Venkatraman, 1989), fit as moderation 
(Venkatraman, 1989) or interaction (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985), and fit as deviation (Venkatraman, 
1989) are applicable to the explanation of professional sport club performance. 
Fit as mediation 
The conceptual model in Figure 4.3 shows how contingency factors mediate, or intervene on, the 
relationship between inputs and outputs. Inputs are expected to have a positive effect on outputs, and 
outputs will be further enhanced if mediated by positive contingency factors. 
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Figure 4.3: Contingent resource-based conceptual model, fit as mediation 
 
 
The team resources of professional sport clubs may be related to business performance, but the 
relationship is not immediate as players and team managers do not generate revenue and profit. 
Clubs have to generate sporting performance from their team resources, and winning matches and 
championships then enables the generation of matchday, broadcast and commercial revenue. 
Sporting performance can be modelled a contingency factor that mediates the relationship between 
team resources and business performance. 
Fit as moderation 
Figure 4.4 illustrates how contingency factors moderate the relationship between inputs and outputs. 
As with the mediation model, inputs are expected to have a positive effect on outputs, but instead the 
contingency factor moderates the effect of resources on performance. 
Figure 4.4: Contingent resource-based conceptual model, fit as moderation 
 
 
This tripartite relationship is further illustrated in Figure 4.5. Firms that utilise low inputs with low 
contingency factors are expected to generate the lowest output (the white zone). However, as the firm 
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enhance its inputs, or the contingency factor increases, their output will improve. Ultimately, firms with 
the highest inputs and highest contingency factors will generate the highest outputs (the black zone). 
Figure 4.5: Fit as moderation 
 
 
Team resources are not purposely utilised to generate business performance but, where fit is 
modelled as moderation, it is the interaction of team resources and sporting performance that explains 
the variation in business performance. Clubs with low endowments of team resources and inferior 
sporting performance will have inferior business performance. Superior business performance is 
generated by clubs with high endowments of team resources and superior sporting performance. 
Sporting performance then becomes a contingency factor that moderates the relationship between 
team resources and business performance. However, Donaldson (2001) counters that the interaction 
model does not reflect the concept of fit. 
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Fit as deviation 
Figure 4.6 shows how outputs are affected when the fit between inputs and contingency factors is 
modelled as deviation. Here, the fit between inputs and contingency factors is expected to have a 
positive effect on outputs. Conversely, deviation from fit, or to misfit, will have a negative effect on 
outputs. 
Figure 4.6: Contingent resource-based conceptual model, fit as deviation 
 
 
Fit as deviation can be modelled as iso-performance or hetero-performance (Donaldson, 2006). Iso-
performance is illustrated in Figure 4.7. Firms that fit or balance their inputs to the contingency factor 
will generate superior outputs (represented by the white zone). But clubs that misfit their inputs to the 
contingency factor will generate inferior outputs (represented by the black zone). 
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Figure 4.7: Fit as deviation (iso-performance) 
 
 
Clubs that have an over-fit of team resources to sporting performance are under-performing or, 
alternatively, are over-resourced, where they have excessive or slack resources. Conversely, clubs in 
under-fit are over-performing or under-resourced. The limitation of the iso-performance model is that 
the outcome (business performance) is assumed to be constant for all inputs (such as endowments of 
team resources) and for all outputs (such as sporting performance). Therefore, a club with low team 
resource endowments and low sporting performance is predicted to generate the same business 
performance as a club with high team resources and high performance. This does not adequately 
model how successful clubs enhance both their resources and their sporting performance as they are 
promoted from the Football League to the Premier League, and nor the reverse effects on the 
business performance of clubs that are relegated from the Premier League to the Football League. 
The hetero-performance model illustrated in Figure 4.8 is similar to the iso-performance model in that 
firms that have a misfit between inputs to the contingency factor will generate inferior outputs (the 
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black zone). Firms that match or balance their inputs to the contingency factor will generate outputs 
that are superior to the clubs in misfit, but the difference is that firms that fit or balance low inputs to 
low contingency factors will generate moderate outputs (the grey zone), and firms with high inputs and 
high contingency factors will generate superior outputs (the white zone). 
Figure 4.8: Fit as deviation (hetero-performance) 
 
 
Hetero-performance represents a better depiction of how professional football clubs grow and decline. 
It emphasises the difficulty of sustaining success (remaining in the white zone in the top right corner) 
and how some clubs are able to experience promotion or relegation without experiencing business 
performance failure, such as an administration event. These clubs will move up and down the diagonal 
spine of the grid. Clubs that move into misfit and are unable to regain fit will return inferior business 
performance, and possibly administration. This is depicted as transitioning from the spine of the grid to 
the black tips in the top left or bottom right corners. 
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4.7. Conclusions: Conceptualisation and measurement of 
performance 
The competitive and dynamic conceptualisation of professional team sport performance, and of the 
requisite resources, is essential in a competitive environment that is subject to considerable change. A 
club can enhance its inputs in order to improve its outputs, but, if its competitors enhance their 
performance to a superior degree, then the club's relative performance will decline. There are 
important differences between sporting and business performance. The sporting competitive 
environment is closed and discrete, and is a zero-sum game where there is only one winner or a set 
number of clubs that qualify for another competition or win promotion (or suffer relegation) to another 
division. In contrast, the business performance of professional sport clubs is more open and can 
comprises inter- and intra-industry competition. Performance can be conceptualised and measured as 
absolute or relative outcomes, as all or most clubs can contemporaneously be successful or, in 
contrast, endure failure. 
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5. Research methodology: Describing and explaining 
professional sport club performance 
 
Chapter summary 
• Empirical research is conducted to explain how and why professional sport clubs generate 
and sustain superior performance. 
• The context of research is the Premier League of England and Wales, with a sample of 47 
current and former members and a 24-year observation period from 1992/93 to 2015/16. 
• Conceptual models and variables are proposed, with propositions to confirm the relationship 
between the constructs of the team resources and sporting performance and from sporting 
performance to business performance, and to explore the relationship between team 
resources and sporting performance on business and financial performance. 
• Archival data is collected from sources such as Deloitte's Annual Review of Football Finance 
and the Football Yearbook, plus the Premier League, Football League and League 
Managers Association. 
• Statistical and visual analysis is utilised with panel regression models and cross-case time-
series data displays. 
 
The research methodology describes the empirical tests that are adopted to explain the variation in 
the performance of professional sport clubs. The aim of the research is to explain how and why 
Premier League clubs utilise their team and stadium resources to generate and sustain sporting, 
business and financial performance. The context of the study is the Premier League of England and 
Wales, with the sample and observation period being the 47 clubs that are or have been members of 
the Premier League for the 24 years since its formation in 1992 to the end of the 2015/16 season. This 
represents a potential panel of 1128 club years. Conceptual models are proposed to establish the key 
relationships between the clubs' resources and their performance outcomes. Variables are selected to 
operationalise these constructs, with a set of hypotheses stated to test the relationships between 
constructs. Data is collected from archive sources, including the Annual Review of Football Finance 
and the Football Yearbook. This is analysed using panel regression models and cross-case time-
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ordered displays. Together, the research methodology describes the constructs, the relationships 
between constructs, and the context in which the empirical research is conducted (Whetten, 1989). 
5.1. Aim and research questions 
Empirical research is conducted to explain the strategy of Premier League football clubs, and 
specifically how and why clubs utilise resources to generate and sustain superior performance, and 
whether success or failure is conditional on the contingency factors. This is accomplished first by 
confirmatory analysis to establish that team resources explain the relative sporting performance of 
clubs, and, subsequently, that this sporting performance is related to business performance. Second, 
exploratory research is introduced to establish whether the performance generated from resources is 
conditional on change in the fit between resources and contingency factors. 
Fundamentally, the clubs with the best teams usually win, and winning clubs usually make more 
money than losing clubs. It is therefore necessary to confirm the established relationships that are 
evident in professional team sport, as highlighted in Section 3.3, and the first two research questions 
are: 
Do the team resources of Premier League football clubs explain superior sporting 
performance? 
Is the sporting performance of Premier League clubs related to business performance? 
However, professional team sport is more complex, and clubs utilise multiple resources and have 
contrasting objectives and outcomes. They own, manage or control team and stadium resources and 
aim to generate and sustain sporting and business performance. Therefore, the third research 
question is: 
How and why do Premier League football clubs utilise team and stadium resources to 
generate and sustain superior sporting, business and financial performance? 
5.2. Context 
Sport is institutionalised, competitive, physical activity (Coakley, 1978) that can be amateur (including 
participation, recreation and development) or professional (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000), where 
professional players are remunerated. Most participation sport is amateur, while spectator sport is 
mostly, but not exclusively, professional. Professional sport depends on the generation and 
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appropriation of revenue to cover players' remuneration and other resource expenditure. Sport can be 
played by individuals, such as golf and tennis, or by teams, such as football and baseball (Szymanski, 
2003). The context of the research is professional team sport and specifically the sport of football. 
Sport provides an interesting context for research, as Vrooman (2007a, p. 309) observes: "The world’s 
games are ready-made laboratories." Professional team sport has been used for strategy research, 
including Major League Baseball (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007; Sirmon et al, 2008) and the National 
Football League (Holcomb et al, 2009). Professional sport leagues represent a "natural experiment" 
(Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007, p. 1071) or "natural laboratory (Berri et al, 2009, p. 76) for strategy 
research, and are "empirically interesting" (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007, p. 1074). Professional 
sport clubs are appropriate for strategy research as they have comparable resources and a common 
competitive environment (Holcomb et al, 2009), with similar objectives and strategies (Jane et al, 
2009). Unlike many industries, the firms that compete in the professional football leagues of England 
and Wales are consistent. They are rarely subject to merger or liquidation, although the companies 
that own the club may change when the club is acquired. Clubs have greater longevity and 
consistency than other industries (Szymanski, 2015), which enables comparative and dynamic 
empirical research. However, Holcomb et al (2009) concede that generalisability of findings from the 
professional team sport to other industries may be limited. 
Most empirical sport management research focuses on sporting performance (for example, Moliterno 
and Wiersema, 2007; Sirmon et al, 2008; Holcomb et al, 2009), but ignores the business and financial 
performance of clubs. Researchers have documented the difficulty of collecting financial data for 
professional sport leagues and clubs (Davenport, 1969; Noll, 1974). For example, Moliterno and 
Wiersema (2007) concede that financial performance data would be desirable for their empirical 
research of Major League Baseball clubs, while the availability of data is limited for many European 
football leagues (Deloitte, 1997). Such data is, however, available for Premier League clubs and 
empirical sport management research can be extended by incorporating team resources with sporting, 
business and financial performance. Furthermore, the Premier League provides a unique setting for 
collecting and analysing data on human resources (Amir and Livine, 2005). Data is available on player 
wages and the payments of transfer fees where players are traded between clubs (on the transfer 
market). Professional sport leagues are a "unique laboratory" that overcomes the limitations of other 
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contexts (Jane et al, 2009, p. 139) and represent a "unique opportunity" for human resource 
management research (Frick, 2007, p. 424). 
5.3. Sample 
The sample includes clubs that have won and been permanent members of the Premier League, as 
well as clubs that been promoted and relegated since its formation in 1992. It also include clubs that 
have entered administration. This means that the sample includes clubs that have experienced 
success and failure, be it in sporting, business or financial performance. This is necessary for 
empirical research that is intended to explain the variation in performance of professional sport clubs 
and their sustained or temporary success and failure. 
Wimbledon have been omitted from the sample. They were founder members of the Premier League 
but were relegated in 2000. The club relocated to Milton Keynes in 2003, subsequently rebranding as 
Milton Keynes Dons in 2004 (Anderson, 2016). In anticipation of the relocation, a new club, AFC 
Wimbledon, was formed in 2002 and were promoted to the Football League in 2012 (Anderson, 2016), 
but have yet to be promoted to the Premier League. The resource and performance data for 
Wimbledon and Milton Keynes Dons is not continuous during the observation period. There are 46 
clubs in the revised sample. 
The sample of current and former member clubs enables analysis of the pre-entry paths (promotion 
from the Football League to the Premier League) and the post-exit paths (relegation from the Premier 
League to the Football League) of clubs. It does not, however, include clubs that have never been 
members of the Premier League. The sample could be extended to include all current and former 
members of the Football League, rather than just the Premier League. However, this would then 
require the collection of additional data for resources and performance for when clubs were members 
of League One and Two of the Football League or of the National League (formerly the Football 
Conference to 2014/15), for which there is considerable missing data. The additional insight generated 
from including more clubs would be limited as there would be analytical limitations due to this missing 
data. 
Observation period 
As documented in Section 2.1, the Premier League and Champions League were formed in 1992. 
This represented a pivotal change in the structure of professional football in England and Wales, and 
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in the resources and performance objectives of professional football clubs. Concurrently, more data 
has been collected on business and financial performance, such as Deloitte's Annual Review of 
Football Finance, since the 1992/93 season. The specified observation period is from 1992/93 to 
2015/16, representing 24 years. For most clubs, the financial year is concurrent to the sporting 
season. 
The observation period covers a period of intense growth for the Premier League, but does not 
encompass the transition from the Football League. It could be extended to prior to the formation of 
the Premier League, when professional football clubs in England and Wales competed in the four 
divisions of the Football League. This would provide insight into the effects of the formation Premier 
League and Champions League. However, resource and performance data before published before 
1992 is incomplete (Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999). 
Panel 
Data for the sample of clubs and observation period constitutes panel data. Panel data has cross-
sectional and time-series dimensions (Brooks, 2008, p. 5). For the cross-sectional dimension, the 
sample is 46 clubs with the omission of Wimbledon. For the time-series dimension, the observation 
period, from 1992/93 to 2015/16, is 24 years. This provides a potential panel of 1,128 club years, each 
of which represents a financial year or sporting season. The panel specified for the analyses varies for 
each model according to the variables used (see Section 5.5). 
5.4. Conceptual models 
Theoretical frameworks need to be sufficiently comprehensive so that they represent the phenomena 
that are being modelled and parsimonious to enable empirical testing (Whetten, 1989). Rumelt (1984) 
recommends that models be specialised and simple, and have the fewest necessary constructs. The 
conceptual models in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 exhibit the fundamental relationships in professional team 
sport. Each model depicts the key constructs and the theorised direction and sign of the relationships 
between the constructs. The direction can be uni-directional (one-way) or bi-directional (two-way), 
while the sign indicates whether each relationship is expected to be positive, negative, or either 
positive or negative. 
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Sporting performance model 
The fundamental relationship in professional team sport is that the clubs with the best teams usually 
win more matches and championships. Figure 5.1 shows that team resources, including players and 
team managers, are expected to have a positive effect on sporting performance. The relationship is 
incorporated in many of the conceptual models, highlighted in the Literature Review (Section 3.3), that 
aim to explain both sporting and business performance (Baroncelli and Lago, 2006; Gerrard, 2005; 
Szymanski, 2015). 
Figure 5.1: Team resources to sporting performance conceptual model 
 
 
Business performance model 
Clubs that win more matches and championships tend to make more money from matchday, 
commercial and broadcast revenue. More formally, there is expected to be a positive effect from clubs' 
sporting performance to their business performance. Figure 5.2 shows the key relationship for 
explaining business performance, which can be supplemented with other predictors, such as stadium 
and marketing resources. This relationship between performance outcomes is incorporated in most of 
conceptual models that incorporate both sporting and business performance (Baroncelli and Lago, 
2006; Dobson and Goddard, 1998; Galariotis et al, 2017; Gerrard, 2005; Pinnuck and Potter, 2006; 
Szymanski, 2015). 
Figure 5.2: Sporting performance to business performance conceptual model 
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Sporting, business and financial performance models 
Professional team sport theories that separate the prediction of sporting performance from that of 
business performance imply that club owners are either win-maximisers or profit-maximisers (see 
Section 3.1). Furthermore, they ignore the relationship between sporting performance, business and 
financial performance. Professional sport clubs needs to generate business performance (such as 
revenue) to cover team resource expenditure. These enhanced team resources then enhance the 
club's aim to win matches and championships, from which can generate further revenue. Team 
resources are anticipated to be positively related to business performance as Premier League clubs 
are expected to generate more revenue than Football League clubs, and Champions League clubs 
more than other Premier League clubs. Of course, the reverse may apply to clubs with inferior team 
resources, which lose matches and championships and therefore do not generate as much revenue 
as the winners. Clubs' stakeholders may appropriate business performance, with the remainder being 
recognised as financial performance, such as profit or net cash. This also represents the clubs' 
financial resources that can then be invested in team and stadium resources. Section 4.6 proposes 
that the concept of fit can be applied to explain the performance variation of professional sport clubs. 
Here, the fit between team resources and sporting performance is expected to have an effect on 
financial performance, with fit being conceptualised and measured as mediation, moderation and 
deviation. 
Fit as mediation 
The relationship between team resources and financial performance is not immediate. Clubs that win 
more matches and championships usually generate more revenue or make more money, but this 
relationship is not explicit. Only some revenue is linked to sporting performance, such as the 
performance-based share of broadcast revenue (see Section 4.1). Instead, professional sport clubs 
have to commercialise their success or, alternatively, compensate for sporting failure. Here, a club's 
sporting performance mediates the relationship between team resources and financial performance. 
This relationship is conceptualised in Figure 5.3, where fit is modelled as mediation. 
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Figure 5.3: Sporting and financial performance conceptual model, fit as mediation 
 
 
Fit as moderation 
Clubs that gain a sporting performance advantage from superior team resources should be able to 
commercialise this success, which is realised as superior financial performance. Such clubs are able 
to maximise profits from their superior sporting performance or minimise losses if and when they have 
inferior sporting performance. Those clubs with either inferior team resources or inferior sporting 
performance may not be able to generate as much matchday, commercial and broadcast revenue, 
while clubs with both inferior team resources and inferior sporting performance are expected to return 
the least financial performance. The relationship between team resources and financial performance is 
moderated by a club's sporting performance. This is conceptualised in Figure 5.4, with fit being 
modelled as moderation. 
Figure 5.4: Sporting and financial performance conceptual model, fit as moderation 
 
 
Fit as deviation 
Professional sport club decision-makers have to manage bundles of resources to realise multiple 
performance outcomes. The fit or match of team resources to sporting performance is hypothesised to 
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be an indicator of resource management capability, and clubs with such capability are expected to 
return superior financial performance. Conversely, it is anticipated that clubs whose team resources 
are in misfit to their sporting performance will return inferior financial performance. The deviation of 
team resources from sporting performance is expected to have a negative effect on financial 
performance. There may be unique consequences of under-fit and over-fit. Clubs that under-perform 
or, alternatively, have excessive resources, may be unsustainable due to losses incurred from inferior 
sporting performance (such as failure to qualify for the Champions League or relegation from the 
Premier League) or from excessive expenditure on players or stadium resources. This is especially so 
if the under-performance or over-resourcing is excessive or persistent. Over-performance could be 
assumed to be beneficial, but may be indicative of under-resourcing. This would be critical if the over-
performance or under-resourcing were acute, while clubs that are over-performing in the short-run 
may have insufficient team resources, which are then unsustainable in the long-run. The 
conceptualisation of fit as deviation enables the measurement of fit, over-fit and under-fit, and this 
relationship is shown in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5: Sporting and financial performance conceptual model, fit as deviation 
 
 
The professional team sport resource and performance model 
The aforementioned models are constrained by the tripartite relationship between team resources, 
sporting performance and financial performance. A more comprehensive model is proposed to 
incorporate other resources, such as a clubs' stadium, and to further consider the relationships 
between business performance to financial performance and the virtuous effect from financial 
resource to team and stadium resources. Therefore, Figure 5.6 is presented as a more 
comprehensive model of contemporary professional sport club performance. Team resources, 
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sporting performance and the deviation of fit between team resources and sporting performance are 
included as separate predictors of business performance, which is also predicted by stadium 
resources. Business performance in turn is related to financial performance, where, for example, 
positive revenue flows will increase profit and net cash, but negative revenue will decrease profit or 
return a loss and decrease net cash. Positive financial performance is either appropriated by 
stakeholders or is reinvested in the acquisition or accumulation of team and stadium resources. 
Conversely, negative financial performance may require the divestment of team and stadium 
resources. 
Figure 5.6: Resource and performance model 
 
 
5.5. Variables 
Variables are selected for the constructs for each of the conceptual models. Table 5.1 lists the 
variables that are adopted in the statistical and visual analysis. The variables used in the statistical 
analysis are highlighted by an asterix (*) and for the visual analysis by the dagger symbol (†), with the 
variable names shown in the results presented in italics and parenthesis. For each variable, the type 
of data is listed with the range of values that can be applied to each club and for each season and 
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financial year19. The observation period (to 2015/16) and the sources for each variable are listed, and 
are discussed in Section 5.7. 
                                                     
19 The football season and financial year are concurrent for most professional football clubs and may 
be labelled on figures and tables by the season year end; for example, the 1992/93 season is 
labelled as 1993. 
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Table 5.1: Constructs and variables 
Construct Variable Type Values 
Observation 
period 
Source 
Sporting 
performance 
League rank (RANK)*† Ordinal 1–92 
1992/93– Premier League, 
Football League 
Promotion to Premier 
League (PROMOTION)† 
Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
Football League 
Relegation from Premier 
League (RELEGATION)† 
Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
Premier League 
Premier League winners 
(PREMIER)† 
Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
Premier League 
Champions League winners 
(CHAMPIONS)† 
Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
UEFA 
Europa League winners 
(EUROPA)† 
Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
UEFA 
FA Cup winners (FA.CUP)† Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
FA 
EFL Cup winners 
(EFL.CUP)† 
Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
Football League 
Business 
performance 
Revenue (REVENUE)† Continuous £(,000) 
1992/93– Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Trading revenue 
(TRADING)*† 
Continuous £(,000) 
1999/ 
2000– 
Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Broadcast revenue 
(BROADCAST) 
Continuous £(,000) 
1999/ 
2000– 
Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Financial 
performance 
Operating profit (PROFIT)*† Continuous £(,000) 
1992/93– Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Net cash (CASH)† Continuous £(,000) 
1992/93– Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Administration 
(ADMINISTRATION)† 
Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Team 
resources 
Player wages (WAGES)* Continuous £(,000) 
1993/94– Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Player net book value 
(VALUE)* 
Continuous £(,000) 
1998/99– Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
Team manager 
(MANAGER)† 
Continuous £(,000) 
1992/93– Football Yearbook; 
League Managers 
Association 
Stadium 
resources 
Stadium expenditure 
(EXPENDITURE) 
Continuous £(,000) 
1992/93– Annual Review of 
Football Finance 
New stadium (NEW)† Discrete 
0=No; 
1=Yes 
1992/93– 
Football Yearbook 
Notes: *Variable used in Propositions 1 to 5. †Variable used in Proposition 6. 
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The sporting performance of professional football clubs in England and Wales can be measured by 
the division in which they compete each season and by position in that division at the end of the 
season. The combination of these scales provides a league rank (RANK), which ranges from 1 (best-
performing club) to 92 (worst-performing club)20. The strategy of clubs will be affected, positively or 
negatively, by promotion or relegation between divisions, and most notably by promotion 
(PROMOTION) to the Premier League or relegation (RELEGATION) from the Premier League. Clubs 
aim to win, and not just compete in, championships, and sporting success is an essential performance 
outcome, such as being Premier League (PREMIER) winners. Similarly, clubs aim to win European 
cup competitions, specifically the Champions League (CHAMPIONS) and Europa League (EUROPA), 
and domestic cup competitions, with the most important being the FA Cup (FA.CUP) and EFL Cup 
(EFL.CUP), which offer qualification to the aforementioned UEFA competitions. 
Professional sport clubs generate and appropriate multiple types of business performance. The most 
fundamental form of business performance is revenue (REVENUE), which comprises matchday, 
commercial and broadcast sources. Matchday and commercial revenue are difficult to separate and 
segmented data is only provided for revenue and broadcast revenue in Deloitte's Annual Review of 
Football Finance. Therefore, the clubs' business performance is measured by trading revenue 
(TRADING), which comprises matchday and commercial revenue. Matchday and commercial revenue 
is preferred to matchday attendance as matchday revenue is a composite variable of attendance 
(quantity) and the price of tickets and other matchday products and services. Clubs also appropriate 
broadcast revenue (BROADCAST) that is generated by the Premier League, Champions League and 
other competitions, which is determined by sporting performance, by membership of, and success in, 
                                                     
20 The league rank of 1 to 92 has limitations as the degree of success or failure is not consistent 
throughout the scale. There is a substantial difference between being ranked first (champions) and 
second (runner's-up), and it ignores qualification for the Champions League or winning the 
Champions League and other cup competitions. Clubs that are ranked from 1 to 20 are members 
of the Premier League, and 21 to 92 are in the Football League. Therefore, the difference between 
rank 20 and 21 is more significant than, for example, between rank 10 and 11. Furthermore, clubs 
that are ranked 18, 19 and 20 are relegated from the Premier League (sporting failure), but clubs 
ranked 21 and 22, plus one club ranked between 23 to 26 (via the play-offs) are promoted to the 
Premier League (sporting success). The scale has been retained as from 1 to 92 as adopted by 
Pinnuck and Potter (2006) rather than the reverse scale (Hall et al, 2002; Szymanski, 2015). The 
reverse scale means that a positive coefficient between team resources and sporting performance 
is generated, but then assigns a larger value (92) for last place than the smallest value (1) for last 
place. It does not affect the interpretation of the coefficients. 
Research methodology 
111 
the Premier League and Champions League. Trading revenue is therefore considered to be a better 
indicator of business performance generated from a club's stadium and other resources. 
Financial performance is conceptually distinct from business performance as it incorporates measures 
of inflows and outflows. Operating profit (PROFIT) is revenue less operating expenditure for the 
financial year. Clubs return an operating loss when operating expenditure exceeds revenue, which is 
an indicator of business performance failure. However, a profitable club can still fail if it is insolvent 
and enters administration. Solvency is measured by net cash (CASH) at the year end. Insufficient net 
cash can cause insolvency, and financial performance failure is measured by the year that a club 
enters administration (ADMINISTRATION). 
The team resources of Premier League clubs include their players and the team manager. Team 
resource expenditure is used as an indicator of decision-makers' perceptions of the value of these 
resources and includes players’ remuneration (salaries or wages) and transfer fees (Deloitte, 1999), 
which are measured by player wages (WAGES) and the net book value of players (VALUE) 
respectively. Player wages comprises signing-on and bonus fees to a club's players and team 
managers (Deloitte, 2017a), compensation payments to other clubs for players and team managers, 
and termination payment to the club's players and team managers (Deloitte, 2011)21. The net book 
value of players is the transfer fee paid for a player that is adjusted for amortisation over the initial 
term of the players' contract (Deloitte, 2017a). The accounting standard for intangible assets were 
revised by the Accounting Standard Board's (ASB) Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 10: Goodwill 
and Intangible Assets in 1998 and the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 38: Intangible Assets in 1999 (Amir and Livine, 2005). These were adopted 
by clubs for the valuation of players from the 1998/99 financial year, with the comparative data for 
1997/98 restated by Deloitte (2000). Team resource management capability is captured by the tenure 
of the team manager (MANAGER) for complete seasons. 
Stadium resources are an important asset for professional sport clubs. Stadium expenditure 
(STADIUM) includes capital and operating expenditure (Okner, 1974; Quirk and Fort, 1992). As 
                                                     
21 For example, Arsenal's player wages expenditure includes the salary of their team manager, 
Arsène Wenger, which was £8 million per annum from the 2015/16 season (Cross, 2006, p. 395) 
and their Chief Executive Officer, Ivan Gazidis, who earnt £2,299 million in the 2015/16 financial 
year (Arsenal Holdings, 2016). Nevertheless, this represents a small proportion (approximately 4% 
and 1% respectively) of team resource expenditure, which for Arsenal was £195 million in 2015/16. 
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explained in Section 2.6, stadium expenditure may also include training and Academy facilities 
(Deloitte, 2017a), but most is allocated to the stadium. The development of a new stadium is a critical 
decision for club owners and business executives, and the year a club relocates to a new stadium 
(NEW) is recorded. 
Missing data 
Missing data is anticipated as it is present in previous research; for example, Kuper and Szymanski 
(2012) found that 15% of clubs had filed financial statements that did not reveal player wages 
expenditure. Missing cases are removed to the recommend 5% threshold as recommended by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). However, missing data is not always random (Hair et al, 2010; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). In professional sport leagues, missing data may be related, or 
coincidental, to inferior financial performance, such as administration events, with many clubs entering 
administration in the same season as, or season subsequent to, relegation. Similarly, there is less 
data available for clubs relegated to the third and division clubs, which represents inferior sporting 
performance. There is potential bias as the results exclude some clubs that have suffered failure or 
inferior business and sporting performance, but this is accepted as one of the limitations of including 
clubs that have experienced success and failure rather than focusing only on successful or surviving 
Premier League clubs.Each of the propositions requires a unique set of variables, and therefore there 
are differences in the missing data for each model. Cases are removed by the amending the sample 
of clubs and the start of the observation period, according to the number of missing observations per 
club and by the availability of data per season and financial year. The data for each of the propositions 
is summarised in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Variables, sample and observation period 
Proposition Variables Sample Observation 
period 
1 RANK, WAGES, 
VALUE 
Swindon Town, Bradford 
City, Oldham Athletic, 
Bournemouth, Barnsley 
2000–2016 
2 TRADING, RANK Swindon Town, Bradford 
City, Oldham Athletic, 
Bournemouth, Barnsley, 
Crystal Palace, Swansea 
City, Blackpool, Coventry 
City, Portsmouth 
2000–2016 
3-5 PROFIT, WAGES, 
VALUE, RANK 
Swindon Town, Bradford 
City, Oldham Athletic, 
Bournemouth, Barnsley 
2000–2016 
6 RANK, WINNERS, 
PROMOTED, 
RELEGATED, 
CHAMPIONS, 
EUROPA, FA.CUP, 
EFL.CUP, REVENUE, 
PROFIT, CASH, 
ADMINISTRATION 
Swindon Town, Bradford 
City 
1994–2016 
 
5.6. Propositions 
The propositions examine unique insights into how and why the resources of professional sport clubs 
explain the variation in performance outcomes. The first two propositions are intended to confirm the 
existence of fundamental relationships that are identified in Section 3.3 of the Literature review. The 
remaining four propositions explore the more complex and contingent relationships between team 
resources, sporting performance and business performance. 
It is anticipated that team resources explain variation in the sporting performance of professional sport 
clubs. Premier League clubs with superior team resources should gain and sustain a sporting 
performance advantage: 
Proposition 1: The player wages and player value of Premier League football clubs have a 
positive effect on their league rank. 
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The sporting performance of a club will affect its business performance. Therefore, Premier League 
clubs with superior sporting performance are expected to generate and sustain superior business 
performance relative to their competitors: 
Proposition 2: The league rank of Premier League football clubs has a positive effect on their 
trading revenue. 
Premier League clubs with superior team resources are expected to generate and sustain financial 
performance advantage. However, this is not an immediate relationship, as clubs generate sporting 
performance from their team resources. This sporting performance is then commercialised, by stadium 
and other resources, to generate business performance. Here, the relationship between team 
resources and business performance is mediated by sporting performance: 
Proposition 3: The effect of Premier League football clubs' player wages and player value on 
operating profit is mediated by league rank. 
As previously, clubs with superior team resources are expected to generate and sustain financial 
performance advantage. But clubs with enhanced endowments of team resources and superior 
sporting performance are expected to generate a business performance advantage over other clubs. 
In contrast, clubs with subordinate team resources and inferior sporting performance are expected to 
record the worse business performance of the clubs in the sample. It is proposed that this relationship 
is moderated by sporting performance: 
Proposition 4: The effect of Premier League football clubs' player wages and player value on 
operating profit is moderated by league rank. 
Premier League clubs that maintain the fit between team resources and sporting performance are 
expected to generate and sustain financial performance advantage. In contrast, deviation or misfit 
between clubs' team resources and sporting performance is expected to have a negative effect on 
financial performance. The fit between the predictor and contingency factors is modelled as deviation: 
Proposition 5: The deviation of fit between Premier League football clubs' player wages and 
player value and their league rank has a negative effect on operating profit. 
Team resources, sporting performance and the fit between team resources and sporting performance 
may have unique effects on business performance, along with stadium resources. In turn, it is 
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anticipated that business performance is related to financial performance, which then has a virtuous 
effect on team and stadium resources. 
Proposition 6: The deviation of fit between a Premier League football clubs' player wages 
and league rank has a negative effect on trading revenue. Clubs' player wages (contingent 
on the team manager effect) and league rank – plus the effects of promotion, relegation and 
winning the Premier League, Champions League, Europa League, FA Cup and EFL Cup – 
have a positive effect on trading revenue. Stadium expenditure (contingent on new stadium 
effects) also has a positive effect on trading revenue. Trading revenue will then have a 
positive effect on operating profit and net cash, which in turn has a positive virtuous effect on 
player wages and stadium expenditure. The effects may differ between and within groups of 
club and eras. 
5.7. Data collection 
Data is collected from appropriate sources for each variable. Team and stadium resource and sporting 
performance data is sources from the Premier League (n.d. b), Football League (n.d. a, n.d. b, n.d. c), 
the League Managers Association (2018) and the Football Yearbook from 1992 to 2017, with further 
team and stadium resource data and business and financial performance data from Deloitte's Annual 
Review of Football Finance from 1994 to 2017. The Football Yearbook was first published in 1970 and 
the first edition of the Annual Review of Football Finance in 1993. They provide a comparable and 
consistent set of data for all clubs and for all seasons. 
Data collection is constrained by the requirement for panel data for all clubs in the sample and for the 
duration of the observation period. Comparable and consistent data for each variable is required for 
all, or at least most, clubs and seasons. Sport provides sufficient data to this specification, as noted by 
Sloane (2015, p. 1): "The abundance of statistics makes sport an ideal laboratory in which to test 
various economic theories." The sources of data are similar to or exceed previous empirical research 
set in the context of professional sport leagues. For example, Holcomb et al (2009) use official and 
unofficial sources for the resources and performance of National Football League (NFL) clubs, while 
Moliterno and Wiersema (2007) and Sirmon et al (2008) employ unspecified sources for Major League 
Baseball (MLB) clubs. Empirical research of professional football leagues in England and Wales has 
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used data from the Annual Review of Football Finance (for example, Gerrard, 2005; Szymanski, 2015) 
and the Football Yearbook (for example, Dobson and Goddard, 1998; Gerrard, 2005). 
5.8. Data analysis 
The empirical research encompasses confirmatory and exploratory analysis of professional sport club 
performance. Confirmatory analysis is conducted to test the expected predictive relationships between 
team resources and sporting performance and from sporting performance to business performance. 
Then, exploratory analysis is conducted of more complex relationships between team and stadium 
resources go clubs and their sporting, business and financial performance. Statistical and visual 
methods are adopted for the empirical research. All statistics, tables and figures are generated using 
the R programming language. 
Panel data is deployed for all of the empirical tests, but the method of data analysis differs between 
propositions. Statistical analysis is applied in Propositions 1 to 5 and visual analysis for Proposition 6. 
More specifically, Propositions 1, 2 and 5 employ panel regression models, but for different purposes: 
Propositions 1 and 2 are predictive regression models which aim to describe and evaluate 
relationships between constructs, whereas Proposition 5 is a contingency model that tests for the 
effects of deviation from the regression model. Propositions 3 and 4 are also contingency models that 
utilise panel data, and are tested using mediation and moderation analysis. 
Statistical analysis: Regression and contingency models 
Propositions 1 and 2 are tested with panel regression models (Brooks, 2008; Gujarati, 2003), which 
enable the analysis of time-series cross-sectional data. The aim of regression analysis is to describe 
and evaluate the relationship between changes in variables (Brooks, 2008). Tests are completed for 
pooled, fixed effects, time-fixed and two-way effects panel regression models. The pooled model 
assumes that all entities and all time periods are homogeneous, and therefore excludes cross-
sectional and time-series effects. In this model, professional sport clubs are assumed to grow and 
decline over time on the same path. For fixed effects models, the intercept differs by cross-sectional 
entity but not by time. Slope coefficients are fixed cross-sectionally for all entities at each point of time. 
The fixed effects model assumes that clubs grow and decline on individual, but parallel paths. For 
time-fixed effects models, the intercept differs by time, but not by entity. The slope coefficients are 
fixed cross-sectionally for all entities at each time period. The time-fixed effects model assumes that 
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clubs share a common path each year, but the path may change over time, remaining parallel with 
preceding and subsequent years. The two-ways effects model allows for fixed and time-fixed effects to 
be incorporated in the same model. Further explanation of the pre-test statistics (including the 
assumptions of the regression models) and post-test statistics is provided in Appendix 5.1. 
Panel data is further deployed for the contingency models that are empirically tested by Propositions 3 
and 4. These use regression analysis to explore mediating and moderating effects. Proposition 3 use 
a three-step procedure, as described by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). Hair et al's (2010) two-step 
procedure model is employed for Proposition 4. 
Proposition 5 also uses a regression model, but for a different purpose to the predictive models of 
Propositions 1 and 2. Regression models comprise a deterministic component, which is represented 
by coefficients or parameters, and a random component that is indicated by the error term (Gujarati, 
2011). The coefficients are specified so that the collective fit between the observations and the 
regression model is optimised (Brooks, 2008). However, a perfect fit is not realistic for financial models 
and a random disturbance term is added. Furthermore, dummy variables and other methods can be 
used to remove outliers (Brooks, 2008) or reduce influential observations (Hair et al, 2010; Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007) to enhance the predictive capability of the model. For contingency models, where fit 
is modelled as deviation, residuals are adopted as a predictor. 
There are limitations to the analysis of panel data. The conclusions drawn from such analysis may be 
limited if the panel data does not capture change between observation periods (Glick et al, 1990). In 
professional team sport, most strategic decisions made by clubs owners and business executives are 
not short-term decisions that recur within a financial year or season, with the notable exception of the 
appointments and termination of team manager, which can occur more than once during a season. 
Most decisions, including those about stadiums and marketing resources, are long-term and are 
formulated and implemented for periods of multiple years, and are captured by the annual resource 
and performance data collected at the year end for each season or financial year. Panel regression 
models require more data that cross-sectional or time-series model because of their comparative and 
dynamic dimensions. The fixed, time-fixed and two-way effects models are more difficult to interpret 
than pooled models, which may limit the practical application of the method and findings. 
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Visual analysis: Cross-case time-series data displays 
Proposition 6 is explored using cross-case time-series data displays, which are adapted from 
Ehrenberg (1982) and Miles and Huberman (1994). This enables more complex analysis of 
performance and resources by season and financial year, and of the variation in performance and 
resource advantage between clubs. The data reduction and display procedure is adopted (Ehrenberg, 
1982; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Data is reduced to a panel of data for key variables (as highlighted 
Section 5.5) and displayed using a series of charts (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Findings and 
conclusions are drawn by comparing and contrasting groups of clubs and eras (Miles and Huberman, 
1994) and by matching patterns over time and between cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2009). 
Visual analysis can be too complex (Ehrenberg, 1982). This complexity is exasperated by the use of 
panel data that has time-series and cross-sectional dimensions, and by there being a mix of 
continuous, ordinal and discrete data for the measurement of performance outcomes and resources 
(see Section 5.5). Therefore, the data and the data displays are simplified. First, a common horizontal 
axis (representing the season and financial year) is applied for all variables in all charts. Second, data 
is presented in three panels, each with a unique vertical axes to represent different types of data 
(league rank; business performance and financial resources; and standardised fit scores). The vertical 
axes are uniform between clubs, with the exception of the scale on the middle panel for those clubs 
that are permanent members of the Premier League plus Manchester City, which have been adjusted 
to aid legibility as the maximum and minimum values of the clubs' financial performance and 
resources are more extreme. Similarly, for clarity, team and stadium resource expenditure is not 
shown separately and instead data is limited to revenue and operating profit (revenue less operating 
costs). Third, a combination of lines, areas, rectangles and symbols are used to indicate change in 
events and states. Vertical lines indicate significant events (winning the Premier League or promotion 
to or relegation from the Premier League), with symbols used to highlight the winning of cup 
competitions and of administration events. Change in key resources – team managers in the top panel 
and new stadiums in the middle panel – are highlighted by grey rectangles. For the middle panel, 
revenue is indicated by the grey area, operating profit by a solid line and net cash by a dashed line. 
For the bottom panel, the points with black circles and white fill represent standardised values of fit, 
with points with black fill representing excessive misfit, and the grey rectangular area representing the 
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range of fit values within approximately two standard deviations above and below the mean value of 
fit. Fourth, the 41 clubs in the sample are clustered by groups to aid comparisons and contrasts. There 
are five groups, which are described as permanent, growth, decline, yo-yo and volatile clubs: The 
permanent members of the Premier League, clubs that have experience periods of growth or decline, 
the so-called yo-yo clubs (Deloitte, 1999) that have been members of the Premier League and the 
Football League Championship since 1992, and current and former clubs that have experienced 
volatility with both promotion and relegation between the Premier League and the third or fourth 
division (the volatile clubs). Further description of the groups is provided in Appendix 5.2 
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Appendix 5.1: Panel regression models 
Pre-test diagnostic statistics 
Pre- and post-test diagnostic statistics are conducted to inform and assess the specification of the 
predictive models for Propositions 1 and 2. The pre-test diagnostics test the assumptions of the 
classic linear regression model (Brooks, 2008). These address the assumptions of functional form, of 
multicollinearity, that average value of errors is zero, of homoscedasticity, that the covariance of errors 
is zero, of non-stochastic regressors, and that disturbances are normally distributed. The requirements 
for the contingency models (Propositions 3 to 6) are different to the predictive models (Propositions 1 
and 2) as the contingency models each utilise a two- or three-step procedure. Furthermore, the 
principal purpose of the regression models for Propositions 5 and 6 is to identify outliers of under- and 
over- performing clubs, and not just to describe and evaluate the relationship between resources and 
performance. The models are specified to enable the description and evaluation of outliers rather than 
optimising the goodness of fit. Sport is also characterised, and depends on, unpredictability (see 
Section 3.1), and perfect fit is neither realistic nor anticipated. 
Assumption of functional form 
The assumption of linear regression models is that the functional form is linear. If the relationship 
between explanatory variables and the outcome variable is non-linear then the linear equation will 
over- or under-estimate predicted values for the different values of the explanatory variable. The 
assumption is tested with plots of each explanatory variable to the outcome variable, with the dashed 
line indicating the linear regression line for each bivariate relationship. Many of the relationships in 
professional team sport are not expected to be linear, as there are diminishing returns on investment 
as club sporting performance improves from the Football League to the Premier League and, 
moreover, to the Champions League (Deloitte, 2005). 
Where applicable, additional plots are presented for the explanatory variables that have been 
transformed using a logarithm scale22. Logarithm values aid interpretation as they represent a 
percentage change in value. The data could be further transformed to produce a log-log model. 
However, a percentage change in league rank is not easy to interpret given that it is an ordinal scale 
                                                     
22 Other transformations, such as a quadratic model, do not improve the linear model and are not as 
interpretable as the logarithm model. 
Research methodology 
121 
of 1 to 92. Specifying the sporting performance of clubs as a percentage of league rank is not as 
useful as presenting the clubs' league rank. 
Assumption of multicollinearity 
For multiple regression models, the explanatory variables should not be correlated with each other. 
The inclusion of multicollinear variables will reduce the contribution of each variable to the model, and 
will adversely affect the sensitivity to change in the specification and predictive effectiveness of the 
model. Variables that are highly-correlated and may indicate that one of the variables is redundant 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). For models of professional sport club performance, there is expected to 
be some correlation between the explanatory variables as the clubs with superior endowments of 
resources tend to generate superior performance. Similarly, clubs with the best teams tend to have 
superior stadiums, and clubs that win more matches and championships tend to generate the most 
revenue and profit. 
Assumption that average value of errors is zero 
The average mean of the error terms of the regression model is assumed to be zero. Here, the errors 
are not correlated with previous value for time-series, or ordered cases. This assumption is never 
violated if a constant term in included in the regression equation. For the regression models of 
professional sport team performance, there is no evident justification for omitting a constant term. This 
would assume that the line of best fit includes the origin, where the explanatory variable and outcome 
variable both equals zero. 
Assumption of homoscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is that the variance of errors from the regression model is 
constant. Otherwise, the errors are heteroscedastic, where change to the variance of errors is related 
to change in ordered cross-sectional or time-series explanatory variables. If heteroscedastic data is 
used, the standard errors of the regression model may be under- or over-estimated. If errors terms 
increase by ordered or time-series variable, then the standard errors for the model will be too low, and 
if errors decrease then the standard errors will be too high. However, heteroscedasticity weakens, but 
does not invalidate, regression models (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Homoscedasticity is tested 
using plots of residual to fitted values and the Goldfeld-Quandt and Breusch-Pagan tests. The residual 
values from the diagnostic panel linear regression model are plotted by the fitted values (Tabachnick 
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and Fidell, 2007) with plots of the residuals for each of the explanatory variables (Brooks, 2008). The 
Goldfeld-Quandt test assumes heteroscedasticity is a linear function of explanatory variables. If the 
Goldfeld-Quandt test statistic is statistically significant then the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected and the model is assumed to be heteroscedastic. However, the Goldfeld-Quandt test 
assumes heteroscedasticity is a linear function of explanatory variables. Similarly, if the Breusch-
Pagan test statistic is significant then the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected and the 
model is assumed to be heteroscedastic. The Breusch-Pagan test statistic is preferred for models 
where data has been transformed. 
For professional sport clubs, there is expected to be some heteroscedasticity because of the nature of 
competition. In the Premier League, there can only be one winner and only a limited number of clubs 
qualify for the Champions League. Similarly, the Premier League is restricted to just 20 clubs, with 
mobility limited to the three clubs promoted and three clubs relegated each season. The successful 
clubs appropriate all of the sporting performance, and most of the business performance that is 
generated by the league and clubs. There are a few successful clubs that win championships and 
generate revenue and profit, and lots of unsuccessful clubs that either occasionally or never win 
championships and return operating losses. Heteroscedasticity may also be present due to the growth 
of the Premier League. The sporting and business resources and the business performance of 
Premier League have increased since its formation in 1992 and, as revealed in Section 2.8, the 
difference between the Football league, Premier League and Champions League has become more 
pronounced. The rich are getting richer and not only are some clubs making larger profits, but others 
are incurring larger losses. 
Assumption that covariance of errors is zero 
The covariance of errors in the model should be zero, so that the errors from the regression model are 
not correlated with previous values of errors. This can apply to ordered cross-sectional data (serial 
correlation) and to or time-series cases (autocorrelation). Where the covariance of errors is not zero, 
the standard errors of the regression model may be under- or over-estimated and the R² of the model 
is likely to be inflated. If there is positive autocorrelation, the standard errors are likely to be under-
estimated, or over-estimated if negatively autocorrelated. Serial correlation or autocorrelation is tested 
by the autocorrelation function plot and the Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey tests. The 
autocorrelation function (ACF) shows the lagged autocorrelation for each season and financial year of 
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the observation period. The null hypothesis for the Durbin-Watson test is that there is no 
autocorrelation or serial correlation. However, the Durbin-Watson test only tests for one lag and will 
not detect autocorrelation for two or more lags. For the Breusch-Godfrey test, the null hypothesis is 
also that there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation. Positive autocorrelation is expected as 
professional sport clubs have "cycles of momentum" (Scully, 1995, p. 84), encompassing within-game 
and across- or between-game momentum (Parsons and Rohde, 2015). Clubs tend to experience eras 
of success and failure, rather than performance that alternates from season-to-season. This is, in part, 
a consequence of the regulated mobility between divisions that is derived from promotion and 
relegation. Furthermore, and as addressed in Section 4.2, clubs acquire, divest and accumulate their 
team and stadium resources over many years. 
Assumption of non-stochastic regressors 
The linear regression model assumes that the regressors or predictor variables are non-stochastic or 
non-random. Whereas the explanatory variable is assumed to be random or stochastic in that it has a 
probability distribution, the predictor variables are assumed to have fixed, non-random, non-stochastic 
values in repeated samples (Brooks, 2008, p. 28)23. Furthermore, the outcome variable should be 
endogenous in that it is conditional on the values of the predictors and not vice versa (Brooks, 2008, p. 
266). In the sporting performance model, there may be some reverse causality as league rank may 
directly affect player wages and value (see Section 5.4). However, most of the effects in this and the 
business performance model will be indirect, where enhanced performance enables a club to improve 
business and financial performance, which is then reinvested in team resources (see Figure 5.6). 
Assumption that disturbances are normally distributed 
The disturbance of residuals in the model should be symmetric about the mean. The normal 
distribution is one that is not skewed, and that is mesokurtic rather than leptokurtic or platykurtic. The 
use of data with non-normal residuals will generate coefficient estimates that may be wrong. To test 
the assumption of normality, the residuals from the model are presented as a histogram, with statistics 
                                                     
23 Estimators will be consistent and unbiased even if the regressors are stochastic provided the 
regressors are not correlated with the error term (Brooks, 2008, p. 160). If the error term is high, 
then the outcome variable is also likely to be high and, if the error is correlated with any of the 
explanatory variables, then the regression model incorrectly attributes the high value of the 
outcome variable to the explanatory variable, rather than to the error term. It is therefore biased 
and inconsistent (Brooks, 2008, p. 161). 
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for skewness (where a skewness score of zero represents a normal distribution) and kurtosis (where a 
kurtosis score of three represents a normal distribution). The Jarque-Bera test is applied to assess the 
assumption of normality by mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis. The null hypothesis is that the 
residuals of the model have a normal distribution. If the Jarque-Bera panel test statistic is statistically 
significant then the null hypothesis of normality is rejected and it is concluded that the distribution of 
residuals non-normal. For models of professional team sport performance, there is expected a non-
normal skew of residuals as there are typically fewer successful clubs with superior endowments of 
resources, but more clubs with moderate and inferior performance and resources. Outliers may further 
contribute to the non-normality of residuals, but in this context they also represent under- and over-
performance by clubs, which are cases of interest and are therefore retained. 
Post-test diagnostic statistics 
Post-test diagnostic statistics are conducted to ascertain the most appropriate panel regression model. 
The F-test is used to establish whether the fixed effects and time-fixed effects models are more 
efficient than the pooled model. 
Standardised scores of fit 
Clubs have unique endowments of resources and contrasting performance outcomes, which change 
by season and financial year. To aid the cross-sectional and time-series comparability of data, the 
values of fit are standardised to z-scores (Z.FIT). Fit scores can take positive or negative values. For 
the contingency model, the z-score represents a standardised measure of under- and over-
performance or, alternatively, over- and under-resourcing. A positive z-score indicates under-
performance or, alternatively, over-resourcing for the team resources that were utilised for the actual 
sporting performance generated. Conversely, a negative z-score suggests under-resourcing or over-
performance. 
Assuming a normal distribution, 95% of values are captured within approximately two standard 
deviations above or below the mean of the distribution (Brooks, 2008). Excessive values are denoted 
by the 5% of outliers, where standardised z-scores are greater than 1.960 or less than -1.960, where 
1.960<z<-1.960 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 73). Hence, a positive z-score greater than 1.960 
indicates excessive under-performance or over-resourcing and a negative z-score of less than -1.960 
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suggests excessive under-resourcing or over-performance. The 95% confidence interval (where -
1.960<z<1.960) can then be interpreted as a zone of fit. 
Appendix 5.2: The groups 
Clubs are grouped by sporting performance to aid the identification of patterns in the formation and 
implementation of strategy. Specifically, the groups are generated from the membership of clubs by 
division (Premier League, Football League Championship, League One and League Two) since the 
1992/93 season is used to specify the permanent, growth, decline, yo-yo and volatile groups. Clubs 
that have remained in the Premier League are permanent members. Those clubs that have gained 
promotion from the third or fourth division to the Premier League are growth clubs, while clubs that 
have been relegated from the Premier League to the third or fourth division are identified as growth 
clubs. The yo-yo clubs have been members of the Premier League and Football League 
Championship, but not the third or fourth division, during the observation period. Some clubs have 
experienced both growth and decline between the Premier League and the third or fourth division, and 
are thus designated as volatile clubs. 
Permanent clubs 
Seven clubs have maintained their membership of the Premier League since its formation in 1992 
through to the 2015/16 season, which is the end of the observation period. The permanent members 
are Arsenal, Aston Villa, Chelsea, Everton, Liverpool, Manchester United and Tottenham Hotspur. 
Aston Villa were relegated at end of the 2015/16 season. This group represents the Premier League's 
most successful clubs. 
Growth clubs 
A unique characteristic of professional football leagues in England and Wales is promotion and 
relegation. This has enabled some clubs to gain promotion from the third and fourth divisions of the 
Football League to the Premier League. 13 clubs have experienced growth during the observation 
period. Eight of these clubs (Birmingham City, Bolton Wanderers, Burnley, Cardiff City, Reading, 
Stoke City, Watford and West Bromwich Albion) have been promoted from the third division to the 
Premier League, and six clubs (Bournemouth, Cardiff City, Fulham, Hull City, Swansea City and 
Wigan Athletic) from the fourth division. Clubs that are members of this group have experienced the 
most growth. 
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Decline clubs 
For each club that wins promotion, another is relegated. For clubs in England and Wales, this 
represents the most acute form of sporting failure. Premier League clubs can be relegated to the 
Football League Championship, and then to League One (the third division) and League Two (fourth 
division). 11 clubs have experienced relegation from the Premier League to League One or League 
Two. Nine of these have been relegated to the third division (Barnsley, Charlton Athletic, Coventry 
City, Leeds United, Nottingham Forest, Oldham Athletic, Sheffield United, Sheffield Wednesday and 
Wolverhampton Wanderers). Two clubs (Portsmouth and Swindon Town) were subsequently 
relegated to the fourth division. These clubs have suffered the most decline, although many have also 
enjoyed success either before or after their failure. 
Yo-yo clubs 
Relegation is a risk for most members of the Premier League and other divisions. There is, however, 
mobility between divisions, and clubs can regain their membership of a division via promotion. A 
number of clubs have experienced relegation and promotion between the Premier League and 
Football League Championship, sometimes on multiple occasions. There are eight clubs that have 
been members of the Premier League and Football League, but have not been relegated to Leagues 
One or Two: Blackburn Rovers, Crystal Palace, Derby County, Ipswich Town, Middlesbrough, 
Newcastle United, Sunderland and West Ham United. These are the so-called yo-yo clubs, and have 
all endured at least some turbulence during the observation period. 
Volatile clubs 
Some clubs have experienced both success and suffered from failure during the observation period by 
transitioning between the four divisions of the Premier League and Football League. Blackpool and 
Bradford City experienced promotion from the third division to the Premier League, but then declined 
from the Premier League. By the end of the observation period, Blackpool had been relegated to the 
third division and Bradford City to the fourth division. Five clubs (Leicester City, Norwich City, 
Manchester City, Queens Park Rangers and Southampton) were relegated from the Premier League 
to the third division, but then regained their membership of the Premier League. These are the clubs 
that have endured, but survived, the most volatility. 
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6. Empirical research: Sporting performance model 
 
Chapter summary 
• The relationship between team resources and sporting performance is confirmed, with player 
wages and player value (which are represented by operating and capital expenditure) having 
a significant effect on league rank. 
• Team resources explain most (68.8%) of the variation in league rank during the Premier 
League era, with a 13.9% increase in player wages and a 34.3% increase in player value 
required to improve sporting performance by one position. 
• There is evidence of a transition from over-performance to under-performance for clubs 
following periods of growth or concurrent to periods of decline. 
• The permanent members, and especially Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester 
United, have unique paths to sustaining success. 
 
A predictive model is adopted to confirm the relationship between team resources and sporting 
performance and to further test whether this holds for competitive and dynamic effects. Post-test 
diagnostics are conducted to explore the heterogeneity of the Premier League clubs and the dynamic 
effects of change in the internal and external competitive environment. The chapter commences with a 
summary of the panel data, followed by descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables. Then, the pre-test diagnostic statistics are examined to ensure that the assumptions of the 
linear regression model are met before testing. 
6.1. Data 
The observation period is adjusted to run from 2000 to 2016 because, as highlighted in Section 5.5, 
there is no data for player wages (WAGES) in 1993 or for player value (VALUE) from 1993 to 1998. 
This data has 226 missing values from the 2346 values, which represents 11% of data. Therefore, five 
clubs (Swindon Town, Bradford City, Oldham Athletic, Bournemouth and Barnsley) are removed from 
the sample to reduce the proportion of missing data. For the revised sample, there are 97 missing 
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values from the 2091 observations, which represent 5% of data. The number of missing cases for 
each club in the remaining sample of 41 clubs is presented in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Missing cases for sporting performance model per club 
 
 
There are no missing values for the seven clubs that have been permanent members of the Premier 
League. In contrast, many of the clubs who have been members of Football League for much of the 
observation period have the fewest complete cases. This indicates that there may be a relationship 
between missing data and club performance, and missing cases may be positively related to sporting 
and business performance. Figure 6.2 plots the number of missing cases for each of the 17 years of 
observation period from 2000 to 2016. 
Empirical: Sporting performance 
129 
Figure 6.2: Missing cases for sporting performance models per year 
 
 
The number of missing cases is mostly constant with three or four cases in all but a few years. There 
is a peak of missing data in 2004, which is due to an increase in clubs entering administration. Many 
of these insolvency events were a consequence of the failure of ITV Digital, as documented in Section 
2.4. There is also an increase in missing data at the end of the observation period, which can be 
attributed to missing data that, in previous season, is updated in subsequent editions of the Annual 
Review of Football Finance. 
6.2. Descriptive statistics 
The variables used to measure sporting and performance team resources are league rank (RANK), 
player wages (WAGES) and player value (VALUE). Table 6.1 shows descriptive statistics for the panel 
that is revised for missing data. The panel comprises individual clubs (i=41) for the observation period 
(t=17) from 2000 to 2016. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for league rank, player wages and player value 
 RANK WAGES VALUE 
Mean 23.789 39019.885 27406.975 
Median 21.000 25126.000 10803.500 
Minimum 1 2128 0 
Maximum 89 240684 268414 
Variance 274.520 1729742291.096 1915054438.169 
Standard deviation 16.569 41590.171 43761.335 
Skewness 0.987 2.356 2.855 
Kurtosis 4.154 9.132 11.785 
Total 16581 25714104 17485650 
Observations 697 697 697 
 
The data for central tendency and dispersion for all three variables is as expected. There is evidence 
that the explanatory variables do not have a normal distribution, which is a consequence of the 
presence of a small number of large clubs with much higher player wages and player value. This is 
further tested by pre-test diagnostic statistics. There is substantial variance in player wages and player 
value, which is due to the diverse resource endowments of clubs and the growth in player wages and 
value since the formation of the Premier League. Chapter 2 reveals that many performance and 
resource indicators have grown during the Premier League era. The mean values for player wages 
and player value are shown in Figures 6.3 to 6.4 for the clubs in the revised sample. 
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Figure 6.3: Mean of player wages per year 
 
Figure 6.4: Mean of player value per year 
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The increase in player wages and value for the sample of clubs is confirmed. The growth in wages has 
been mostly consistent, but there has been more turbulence in player value, due to the acquisition or 
divestment of a small number of high-value players by Premier League clubs. Player wages have 
increased much more than player value. There has been an emergence of a number of large clubs 
that have the resources and capabilities to compete in the Premier League and Champions League, 
while the Premier League era has also seen the growth and survival of smaller clubs. The distribution 
of player wages and player value are presented as boxplots in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. 
Figure 6.5: Distribution of player wages per year 
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of player value per year 
 
 
The growth in average player wages and value has coincided with an increase in the number and 
magnitude of outliers, with the data being positively skewed. These outlying values suggest that there 
may be a competitive imbalance for those clubs aiming to win the Premier League and qualify for the 
Champions League, but that competition for the rest of the Premier League and the Football league is 
more balanced. Therefore, the paths of clubs that grow or decline between divisions may not be 
mirrored. The boxplots may also indicate heteroscedasticity, which is tested in the pre-test diagnostic 
statistics. 
The average and the variance of both player wages and player value have increased during the 
Premier League era. However, professional sport leagues are competitive environments where 
different clubs experience success and failure at different times, with outcomes being temporary or 
sustained. The paths for each current and former member of the Premier League in the sample are 
plotted in Figures 6.7 to 6.9 to establish trends in sporting performance (league rank) and team 
resources (player wages and value). 
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Figure 6.7: League rank per year, by club 
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Figure 6.8: Player wages per year, by club 
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Figure 6.9: Player value per year, by club 
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Evidently, clubs follow unique paths, both in the accumulation of resources and in the success and 
failure that they generate from these resources. The league rank values confirm the sustained 
success of the permanent members of the Premier League, but also indicate that some clubs have 
experienced considerable growth and decline. The overall increase in player wages is not apparent for 
all clubs; it is mostly the permanent Premier League members where this growth is constant, while for 
other clubs there is evidence of brief periods of deflation. Player value is more turbulent, with large 
increases and decreases for many clubs, which can be attributed to the acquisition and divestment of 
players. Taken together, these key variables highlight considerable differences in the performance 
outcomes and resources of individual clubs, and considerable change during the Premier League era. 
6.3. Pre-test diagnostic statistics 
Pre-test diagnostic statistics are conducted for the assumptions of functional form, of multicollinearity, 
that average value of errors is zero, of homoscedasticity, that covariance of errors is zero,; of non-
stochastic regressors, and that disturbances are normally distributed. 
Assumption of functional form 
The relationship between player wages and player value and league rank is non-linear. Figures 6.10 
and 6.11 reveal that the distribution of player wages and player value of clubs is divergent, and 
especially those for those club competing to win the Premier League and qualify for the Champions 
League (shown towards the top right corner of each panel). In contrast, the player wages and player 
value for clubs competing for Premier League survival, or to gain entry to the Premier League 
(towards the centre of the cluster) are comparable to some clubs in the third and fourth divisions of the 
Football League (bottom left corner of panels). 
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Figure 6.10: League rank to player wages 
 
Figure 6.11: League rank to player value 
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The data is therefore transformed to establish a linear relationship between the explanatory and 
outcome variables. Transformation by natural logarithm of the explanatory variables is applied, with 
player wages (WAGES) and player value (VALUE) transformed and coded as LOG.WAGES and 
LOG.VALUE respectively. The linear-log model offers the most appropriate fit of the data, especially 
for player wages (Figure 6.12), although there is some evidence of clustering and decreasing 
dispersion for higher player value (Figure 6.13). 
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Figure 6.12: League rank to logarithm of player wages 
 
Figure 6.13: League rank to logarithm of player value 
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Assumption of multicollinearity 
There is evidence of multicollinearity between player wages and player value. Figure 6.14 plots the 
relationship between the transformed explanatory variables (LOG.WAGES and LOG.VALUE). This 
potential for multicollinearity is confirmed by a Pearson correlation statistic of 0.868. 
Figure 6.14: Logarithm of player value to logarithm of player wages 
 
 
It is expected that the value of player wages and player value of professional footballers is related as 
higher value players (based on transfer fees) are likely to receive higher remuneration. However, there 
are important exceptions and the correlation will not be perfect. The value of a club's player only 
includes players that are acquired and not those that are signed on a free transfer or that are 
developed by the club's Centre of Excellence or Academy. Both player wages and value are retained 
as they measure different types of resource endowment and represent decision-making for the 
allocation of capital (player value) and operating (player wages) expenditure. The unique contribution 
of the explanatory variables is reviewed for each regression model in Section 6.4. 
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Assumption that average value of errors is zero 
The mean value of errors is zero to 15 decimal places (0.0000000000000004), which is approximately 
zero. The assumption that the average value of errors is zero holds and there is no evident justification 
for restricting the regression through the origin. 
Assumption of homoscedasticity 
There is mixed evidence on the presence of a homoscedastic relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the model's residuals. There is no evident pattern in the model's fitted and residual 
values (Figure 6.15) and nor between the explanatory variables and the residual values in Figures 6.2 
and 6.2. The Goldfeld-Quandt test statistic is 0.911 (p=0.797) and the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity is accepted and assumed to be homoscedastic. However, the Breusch-Pagan is 
preferred as the data has been transformed and returns a test statistic is 36.340 (p=0.000). Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected and the model can be assumed to be 
heteroscedastic. 
Figure 6.15: Fitted values to residual values for sporting performance model 
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Figure 6.16: Residual values to logarithm of player wages 
 
Figure 6.17: Residual values to logarithm of player value 
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Assumption that covariance of errors is zero 
There is limited evidence of autocorrelation, or serial correlation, in the panel data. The autocorrelation 
function (Figure 6.18) indicates that lagged values of the explanatory variables may be correlated with 
the predictor variable for up to three years, which is expected in professional team sport where 
accumulated team resources explain sporting performance (see Section 4.2). However, the Durbin-
Watson panel test statistic is 0.933 (p=0.000) and the Breusch-Godfrey panel test statistic is 190.764 
(p=0.000). The null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that there is no evidence of 
autocorrelation. 
Figure 6.18: Autocorrelation function for sporting performance model 
 
 
Assumption of non-stochastic regressors 
For the sporting performance model, team resources are considered as an endogenous variable as 
they are determined by the decision-making of club owners, business executives or team managers. 
However, there may be some exogeneity in the relationship between team resources and sporting 
performance. Some component of player wages may be determined by sporting performance if 
players appropriate remuneration in the form of signing-on and bonus fees as a consequence of 
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enhanced personal or team sporting performance. Similarly, the value of a player may increase if they 
are a member of a winning team; however, this would not be reflected in the net book value of the 
player (which is determined by the transfer fee expenditure that is incurred and amortisation that is 
apportioned) until the player is traded. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that most of the relationship 
between sporting performance (league rank) and team resources (player wages and value) is realised 
by the increase revenue appropriated as a consequence of winning matches and championships 
(especially in the Premier League and Champions League), with an associated increase in profits and 
retained earnings, which is then reinvested in team resources. 
Assumption that disturbances are normally distributed 
There is some evidence of outliers in the residuals generated by the model. The distribution of 
residuals is presented in Figure 6.19 and provides some evidence of skewness. The skewness of the 
residuals is 0.325 and kurtosis is 3.355, which indicates that there is some positive skew to the 
residuals. The Jarque-Bera panel test statistic is 14.515 (p=0.001) and the null hypothesis of normality 
is rejected, and it is concluded that the distribution of residuals may be non-normal. 
Figure 6.19: Residual values for sporting performance model 
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6.4. Test statistics 
The expectation of Proposition 1 is that the team resources of Premier League football clubs have a 
positive effect on sporting performance. Panel regression models are adopted to test for cross-
sectional and time-series effects. The outcome variable is league rank (RANK) and the explanatory 
variables are the logarithm of player wages (LOG.WAGES) and the logarithm of player value 
(LOG.VALUE). Results for panel regression models tests for pooled, fixed effects, time-fixed effects 
and two-way effects are presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Panel regression models for sporting performance 
 Pooled Fixed effects 
Time-fixed 
effects 
Two-way 
effects 
 RANK RANK RANK RANK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LOG.WAGES -7.210*** -5.849*** -12.680*** -13.906*** 
 (0.652) (0.698) (0.738) (0.911) 
 t=-11.062 t=-8.378 t=-17.175 t=-15.266 
 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
LOG.VALUE -2.917*** -2.699*** -0.946** -1.058** 
 (0.362) (0.406) (0.373) (0.417) 
 t=-8.069 t=-6.653 t=-2.532 t=-2.538 
 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.012 p=0.012 
Constant 120.972***    
 (4.119)    
 t=29.371  s  
 p=0.000    
Observations 635 635 635 635 
R2 0.688 0.424 0.774 0.582 
Adjusted R2 0.687 0.383 0.767 0.540 
F 
695.704*** 
(df=2; 632) 
(p=0.000) 
217.515*** 
(df=2; 592) 
(p=0.000) 
1,055.063*** 
(df=2; 616) 
(p=0.000) 
400.549*** 
(df=2; 576) 
(p=0.000) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Pooled model 
The pooled panel regression model is: 
𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
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The F-statistic of 695.704 (p=0.000) is significant and indicates that the overall fit of the pooled model 
is good. The R2 (0.688) indicates strong correlation and that the team resources of clubs explain 
68.8% of the variance of sporting performance. Player wages has a significant effect on league rank 
(t=-8.378, p=0.000) and, as expected, the relationship is negative in that higher wages explains higher 
league rank, with the value for first place (1) being lower than last place (92). For the logarithm 
models, an increase in player wages of 1% is expected to improve league rank by 0.072 places. A 
more practical interpretation of the model is that a 13.9% increase in player wages is required to 
increase sporting performance by one position. Player value also has a significant effect on league 
rank (t=-6.653, p=0.000) and the relationship is expectedly negative. For the logarithm model, an 
increase in player value by 1% is expected to change league rank by 0.029 positions. More practically, 
a 34.3% increase in player value is required to increase sporting performance by one place. There are 
evident diminishing returns from team resource expenditure for clubs that generate superior sporting 
performance. Further tests were conducted with inclusion of lagged values for team resources and, 
although the lagged model was significant, the coefficients indicate that lagged values of player wages 
and value may have opposite effects, and are therefore not retained in the model. The combined 
effect of player wages and player value is stronger than the individual effects of either predictor. The 
pooled regression models are presented in Table 6.3 to enable comparison of the individual effects of 
player wages (Model 1) and player value (Model 2) with the combined effect (Model 3), which is 
repeated from the pooled panel regression model in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.3: Pooled panel regression models for sporting performance 
 RANK RANK RANK 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOG.WAGES -12.549***  -7.210*** 
 (0.346)  (0.652) 
 t=-36.272  t=-11.062 
 p=0.000  p=0.000 
LOG.VALUE  -6.391*** -2.917*** 
  (0.196) (0.362) 
  t=-32.668 t=-8.069 
  p=0.000 p=0.000 
Constant 149.127*** 79.298*** 120.972*** 
 (3.520) (1.815) (4.119) 
 t=42.371 t=43.701 t=29.371 
 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Observations 659 636 635 
R2 0.667 0.627 0.688 
Adjusted R2 0.666 0.627 0.687 
F 
1,315.630*** 
(df=1; 657) 
(p=0.000) 
1,067.216*** 
(df=1; 634) 
(p=0.000) 
695.704*** 
(df=2; 632) 
(p=0.000) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
The univariate models (Models 1 and 2) and the multivariate model (Model 3) are similar. Player 
wages have a stronger univariate relationship with sporting performance than player value. However, 
the multivariate model is superior to either univariate model and is preferred as it captures capital and 
operating resource expenditure. 
Fixed effects model 
The fixed effects panel regression model is: 
𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
The F-statistic (217.515, p=0.000) is significant and indicates that the overall fit of the fixed effects 
model is good. However, the R2 (0.424) signifies that there is moderate correlation and that team 
resources explain only 42.4% of the variance of sporting performance. For the logarithm model, player 
wages has a significant and negative effect on league rank (t=-8.378, p=0.000). If player wages 
increase by 1%, league rank is predicted to increase by 0.058 places. Alternatively, a 17% increase 
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(decrease) in player wages is required to increase (decrease) sporting performance by one place. 
Player value also has a significant, negative effect on league rank (t=-2.699, p=0.000). For the 
logarithm model, an increase in player value of 1% is expected to increase league rank by 0.027 
positions. More practically, a 37% increase (decrease) in player value is required to increase 
(decrease) sporting performance by one place. The fixed effects coefficients from the model are 
presented in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Fixed effects coefficients for sporting performance 
CLUB Estimate 
Standard 
error 
t p 
Arsenal 99.677 5.838 17.073 0.000 
Aston Villa 102.585 5.556 18.464 0.000 
Birmingham City 103.527 5.242 19.749 0.000 
Blackburn Rovers 104.737 5.449 19.221 0.000 
Blackpool 109.715 5.147 21.318 0.000 
Bolton Wanderers 101.058 5.466 18.487 0.000 
Burnley 106.434 4.960 21.459 0.000 
Cardiff City 111.878 5.078 22.031 0.000 
Charlton Athletic 104.984 5.225 20.091 0.000 
Chelsea 103.392 5.938 17.411 0.000 
Coventry City 108.683 5.139 21.147 0.000 
Crystal Palace 106.676 5.438 19.616 0.000 
Derby County 107.863 5.169 20.866 0.000 
Everton 99.427 5.498 18.085 0.000 
Fulham 104.745 5.457 19.195 0.000 
Hull City 108.799 5.300 20.530 0.000 
Ipswich Town 103.855 5.214 19.918 0.000 
Leeds United 107.323 5.403 19.865 0.000 
Leicester City 106.049 5.292 20.041 0.000 
Liverpool 102.350 5.776 17.721 0.000 
Manchester City 103.870 5.660 18.352 0.000 
Manchester United 101.366 5.884 17.228 0.000 
Middlesbrough 105.482 5.336 19.768 0.000 
Newcastle United 103.891 5.553 18.711 0.000 
Norwich City 106.623 5.219 20.430 0.000 
Nottingham Forest 112.211 5.091 22.041 0.000 
Portsmouth 103.833 5.365 19.352 0.000 
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CLUB Estimate 
Standard 
error 
t p 
Queens Park Rangers 110.653 5.287 20.928 0.000 
Reading 107.836 5.227 20.630 0.000 
Sheffield United 104.345 5.198 20.073 0.000 
Sheffield Wednesday 109.598 5.043 21.731 0.000 
Southampton 104.831 5.312 19.734 0.000 
Stoke City 104.600 5.148 20.318 0.000 
Sunderland 104.508 5.418 19.288 0.000 
Swansea City 102.223 5.635 18.141 0.000 
Tottenham Hotspur 100.677 5.557 18.116 0.000 
Watford 104.129 5.119 20.340 0.000 
West Bromwich Albion 101.188 5.323 19.011 0.000 
West Ham United 103.839 5.512 18.839 0.000 
Wigan Athletic 107.909 5.125 21.055 0.000 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 108.126 5.103 21.187 0.000 
 
The fixed coefficients are significant (p<0.000) for all clubs in the sample. The permanent members of 
the Premier League have relatively low coefficients but higher standard errors, which indicate a wide 
confidence interval for these cases. However, some of the clubs that have been less successful or 
experienced failure have comparable coefficients and standard errors, and it is not possible to draw 
any pattern from the fixed coefficients. 
Time-fixed effects model 
The time-fixed effects panel regression model is: 
𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
The F-statistic of 1055.063 (p=0.000) is significant and there is a good overall fit for the time-fixed 
effects model. The R2 (0.774) indicates that there is strong correlation in that team resources explain 
77.4% of the variance in sporting performance. Player wages has a significant and negative effect on 
league rank (t=-17.175, p=0.000). For logarithm models, if player wages increase by 1% then league 
rank is expected to change by -0.127 positions. Another interpretation of the model is that an 8% 
increase in player wages is required to increase sporting performance by one place. Player value has 
a negative, but insignificant, effect on league rank (t=-2.532, p=0.011). For the logarithm model, an 
increase of player value by 1% is predicted to effect league rank by -0.009 places. Practicably, a 
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106% increase in player value is required to increase sporting performance by one place. The time-
fixed effects coefficients from this model are presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Time-fixed effects coefficients for sporting performance 
YEAR Estimate 
Standard 
error 
t p 
2000 152.019 4.314 35.241 0.000 
2001 153.852 4.407 34.915 0.000 
2002 155.357 4.485 34.637 0.000 
2003 154.257 4.698 32.834 0.000 
2004 152.339 4.764 31.980 0.000 
2005 153.529 4.740 32.392 0.000 
2006 154.104 4.717 32.670 0.000 
2007 155.917 4.677 33.335 0.000 
2008 159.086 4.691 33.914 0.000 
2009 160.254 4.816 33.272 0.000 
2010 160.654 4.865 33.024 0.000 
2011 161.873 4.935 32.799 0.000 
2012 162.194 4.951 32.760 0.000 
2013 163.383 5.040 32.416 0.000 
2014 164.690 5.060 32.547 0.000 
2015 165.914 5.048 32.866 0.000 
2016 167.518 5.021 33.363 0.000 
 
The time-fixed effects coefficients are significant for all clubs in the sample. The coefficients and the 
standard errors increase for much of the observation period, which is expected as there has been 
inflation in player wages and value during the Premier League era. 
Two-way effects model 
The two-way effects panel regression model is: 
𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
The F-statistic of 400.549 (p=0.000) is significant and indicates that there is a good overall fit for the 
two-ways effects model. However, there is only moderate correlation with the R2 (0.582) showing that 
team resources explain 58.2% of the variance in sporting performance. The two-way effects model is, 
therefore, inferior to both the pooled and time-fixed effects models. 
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Post-test diagnostic statistics 
Post-test diagnostics are conducted to establish which of the models is the most robust. The F-test is 
used to ascertain whether the fixed effects and time-fixed effects models are superior to the pooled 
model. The F-test statistic for pooled and fixed effects models is 2.195 (p=0.000), and the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the fixed effects and pooled models is rejected and it is 
concluded that the pooled model can be used. For pooled and time-fixed effects models, the F-test 
statistic is 5.570 and has a p-value of 0.000, and the null hypothesis (that there is no difference 
between the time-fixed effects and pooled models) is also rejected and it is further concluded that use 
of the pooled model is appropriate. The lack of evidence for fixed effects in the sporting performance 
panel regression models is illustrated by the relationships between player wages to league rank 
(Figure 6.20) and player value to league rank (Figure 6.21) for each club in the sample. 
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Figure 6.20: League rank by logarithm of player wages, by club 
 
Figure 6.21: League rank by logarithm of player value, by club 
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For the fixed effects model, there are some evident patterns between the samples of clubs. The 
values for the permanent Premier League members tend to be clustered in the top right corner of the 
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respective panels for both player wages and player value, and this separation is especially notable for 
Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United. Conversely, the same values for clubs that have 
transitioned between the Premier League and the third and fourth divisions tend to extend from the 
bottom left corner towards the top right corner. However, there is no consistency in the player wages 
and value for these clubs, which may indicate that clubs have adopted specific strategies that led to 
growth or decline. These differences are explored further in the contingency models (see Chapters 8 
and 9). The presence of time-fixed effects is confirmed by the relationships between player wages to 
league rank (Figure 6.22) and player value to league rank (Figure 6.23) for each season and financial 
year. 
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Figure 6.22: League rank by logarithm of player wages, by year 
 
Figure 6.23: League rank by logarithm of player value, by year 
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In contrast to the fixed effects model, a pattern of time-fixed effects is evident when data is presented 
by year. During the Premier League era, there is an apparent trend of both player wages and player 
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value increasing, and that the relationship between team resources and sporting performance (league 
rank) retains its form. This is represented by the parallel movement of the distribution of values from 
left to right on each consecutive panel. 
Groups 
The paths of clubs are plotted in Figures 6.24 to 6.28 for the permanent, growth, decline, yo-yo and 
volatile groups. Each club's path is indicated by lighter, grey points from the 1999/2000 season and 
financial year, through to darker, black points for 2015/16. Over-performance, or under-resourcing, is 
indicated by those points above and to the left of the non-linear (curved) regression line24. Here, a 
club's league rank that is better than that predicted by the pooled regression model. Alternatively, 
under-performance or over-resourcing is shown by points to the right and below the line. For these 
clubs league rank is worse than expected according to its player wages. 
Figure 6.24: League rank to player wages, permanent clubs 
 
For the permanent members of the Premier League, small change can appear distinct. Arsenal and 
Manchester United are the most consistent, with Liverpool generating substantial increments in trading 
revenue towards the end of the observation period. Chelsea have recorded much more erratic player 
wages expenditure. In contrast, Aston Villa, Everton and Tottenham Hotspur have controlled 
                                                     
24 Only the paths for the bivariate relationship between player wages and league rank are shown as 
the individual effects of player wages is strongest. 
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spending, although Aston Villa and, to a lesser extent, Everton, have failed to maintain sporting 
performance. 
Figure 6.25: League rank to player wages, growth clubs 
 
Burnley, Hull City, Stoke City and Swansea City are examples of clubs that have successfully adjusted 
team resources while improving sporting performance. Most of the other clubs in this group tend to 
over-perform relative to resources during periods of growth, as indicated by points above and to the 
left of the regression line. Those that subsequently experience decline, tend to under-perform or are 
over-resourced, as shown by movement to the bottom and right of the line. The exception is Watford, 
who have managed to control player wages when they were relegated from the Premier League. 
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Figure 6.26: League rank to player wages, decline clubs 
 
Clubs that have experienced decline have generally transitioned from over-performance to under-
performance. Leeds United, Nottingham Forest and Wolverhampton Wanderers have not been able to 
maintain league rank relative to their player wages expenditure. Sheffield Wednesday have controlled 
wages as they were relegated from the Premier League to the Football league Championship and 
League One. However, there is more missing data for clubs that have experienced decline, meaning 
that a number of clubs are removed from the sample. 
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Figure 6.27: League rank to player wages, yo-yo clubs 
 
Clubs that have been members of the Premier League and Football League Championship since 1992 
are the yo-yo clubs. These clubs have struggled to match player wages to league rank, which is not 
surprising given that many have experienced multiple promotion and relegation events; for example, 
Crystal Palace have been promoted and relegated four times since 1992. Overall, there is some 
indication of a transition to under-performance, which is surprising given management of clubs is 
considered to have improved, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of administration events 
highlighted in Section 2.4. 
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Figure 6.28: League rank to player wages, volatile clubs 
 
Clubs that have been members of three or four divisions have experienced the most volatility, but are 
surprisingly adaptable, as demonstrated by Blackpool's sporting performance and perceptions of the 
capabilities of the club owners (Bounds, 2010). Initially, Leicester City and Southampton were over-
performing clubs, probably due to the constraints of their stadiums before relocation. Norwich City and 
Queens Park Rangers have not been able to control player wages relative to their league rank. 
Manchester City is an exception, where new investors have enabled the club to transition from one 
that was over-performing in the Football League Championship to winning the Premier League 
champions in just ten years. 
6.5. Conclusions: Sporting performance 
A predictive model is deployed to test Proposition 1, and confirms the relationship between team 
resources and sporting performance. Player wages and value explain 68.8% of the variance in league 
rank, with a change 13.9% in player wages being associated with a change in rank of one place, and 
likewise a 34.3% change in player value affecting a change of one position. League rank is 
determined by marginal points and the panel regression model does not consider the effect of 
membership of different divisions or the effect of the gaps between and within divisions (see Section 
2.8). 
Some patterns are noticeable between and within groups of clubs. Of the permanent members, four 
clubs (Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United) have unique paths and are becoming 
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detached from other clubs. Manchester City, who are not a permanent member of the Premier 
League, now share many of the characteristics of this group in terms of their resources and 
performance outcomes. There is evidence of transition from over-performance to under-performance 
for clubs subsequent to period of growth or concurrent to periods of decline. Growth has mostly been 
achieved by sustained over-performance, although many clubs then have difficulty in adjusting once 
they have secured their membership of the Premier League. Conversely, some clubs have managed 
to withstand decline in sporting performance as they have been relegated to the Football League. 
Many of the yo-yo clubs have experienced some difficulty in responding to the growth and divergence 
of the Premier League and Champions League, but in most instances have promptly compensated for 
any incompatibility between resources and performances. However, as with the group of clubs that 
have experienced volatile paths of growth and decline, there is considerable within-group variation. 
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7. Empirical research: Business performance model 
 
Chapter summary 
• The significant relationship between sporting performance and business performance is 
confirmed, with league rank explaining 64.9% of matchday and commercial revenue. 
• Each incremental increase of league rank is associated with increased trading revenue of 
0.059%, which demonstrates how the modest incremental rewards in the Football League 
compare to the substantial returns on sporting performance in the Premier League. 
• The permanent members of the Premier League, and specifically Arsenal, Chelsea, 
Liverpool and Manchester United, plus Manchester City, have commercialised their sporting 
success by generating superior matchday and commercial revenue. 
• Clubs that have grown from League One and League Two have generated relatively modest 
increase in trading revenue, which suggests that most business performance growth has 
been appropriated from broadcast rights. 
 
A predictive model is deployed to empirically confirm the relationship between the sporting 
performance of Premier League clubs and their business performance. The results are supplemented 
with post-test diagnostics to explore differences between and within groups of clubs. The chapter 
opens with summary statistics for the panel data, and the dependent and independent variables are 
then described. Pre-test diagnostics are presented to test that the assumptions of the linear regression 
model prior to the test statistics. 
7.1. Data 
The revenue of Premier League and Football League clubs is segmented into matchday, commercial 
and broadcasting from 1999, as indicated in Section 5.5. Therefore, to capture trading revenue, the 
observation period is set from 1999 to 2016. 11% of data is missing, due to 226 missing values from 
the 2346 total values. Ten clubs are removed from the sample to reduce the proportion of missing 
data: Swindon Town, Bradford City, Oldham Athletic, Bournemouth, Barnsley, Crystal Palace, 
Swansea City, Blackpool, Coventry City and Portsmouth. The revised sample has 97 missing values 
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from 2091 observations, representing 4% of data. Figure 7.1 plots the number of missing cases for 
each of the remaining 36 clubs in the sample. 
Figure 7.1: Missing cases for business performance model per club 
 
 
None of the permanent members of the Premier League have missing cases, whereas the clubs with 
the fewest complete cases tend to have been members of the Football League for most of the 
observation period. This further suggests a relationship between the number of missing cases and the 
sporting and business performance of clubs in the retained sample. The number of missing cases for 
each year of the observation period are presented in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: Missing cases for business performance model per year 
 
 
Of the remaining 17 years, there is considerable fluctuation in missing data, with peaks of missing 
data in 2003 and 2010. This coincides with an increase in clubs entering administration due to the 
failure of ITV Digital and Setanta Sports, as documented in Section 2.4. This may adversely affect the 
findings and any conclusions that can be drawn from analysing the performance of clubs that 
experienced this form of business failure. 
7.2. Descriptive statistics 
Two variables are employed to measure business performance and sporting performance. The 
variables are trading revenue (TRADING) and league rank (RANK). The descriptive statistics each 
variable are presented in Table 7.1 for the panel data that is revised to account for the missing data. 
The panel comprises individual clubs (i=36) for the observation period (t=17) from 2000 to 2016. 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics for trading revenue and league rank 
 TRADING RANK 
Mean 36774.829 21.660 
Median 18784.500 20.000 
Minimum 2162 1 
Maximum 387508 82 
Variance 2383030361.108 214.906 
Standard deviation 48816.292 14.660 
Skewness 3.059 0.809 
Kurtosis 14.066 3.752 
Total 20667454 13256 
Observations 612 612 
 
The central tendency and dispersion for both variables is as expected. The outcome variable does not 
appear to have a normal distribution, which is a consequence of the presence of a small number of 
large clubs generating superior matchday and commercial revenue. Further tests are conducted with 
pre-test diagnostic statistics. There is a considerable variance in trading revenue, which is due to the 
stadium and brand resources of clubs, as well as an increase in matchday and commercial revenue 
during the Premier League era. This growth is documented in Chapter 2. The mean values for the 
trading revenue of clubs in the sample from 2000 to 2016 is shown in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3: Mean of trading revenue per year 
 
 
As anticipated, the trading revenue of clubs in the sample has increased, and this trend has been 
mostly consistent. The principal contributor to the growth in Premier League club revenue has been 
from broadcast rights, although clubs have also been able to increase matchday and commercial 
revenue. The larger clubs that have generated trading revenue from their membership of the Premier 
League and Champions League. Concurrently, smaller clubs have emerged to gain promotion to, and 
retained their membership of, the Premier League. Figure 7.4 uses a boxplot to illustrate the 
distribution of the variables for trading revenue. 
Empirical: Business performance 
169 
Figure 7.4: Distribution of trading revenue per year 
 
 
The increase in the number and variance of outliers suggests a divergence in trading revenue. The 
average trading revenue for clubs in the sample is relatively stable. However, the data has an 
apparent positive skew, although this is not consistent, and is further tested in the pre-test diagnostic 
statistics. These excessive values indicate that more matchday and commercial revenue is being 
appropriated by clubs that are members of the Premier League and, perhaps more importantly, the 
Champions League. For matchday and commercial revenue, it appears that the rich are getting richer, 
and the very rich are getting extremely rich. The total value and the dispersion of trading revenue has 
increased during the Premier League era. This suggests that some clubs may be generating superior 
business performance relative to other clubs, but it may be that this performance is not sustained. The 
paths for all the clubs in the revised sample are shown, with business performance (trading revenue) 
in Figure 7.5 and sporting performance (league rank) in Figure 7.6. 
Empirical: Business performance 
170 
Figure 7.5: Trading revenue per year, by club 
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Figure 7.6: League rank per year, by club 
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Much of the growth in matchday and commercial revenue appears to have been generated by the 
permanent members of the Premier League, and specifically Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and 
Manchester United, plus Manchester City. In contrast, Tottenham Hotspurs' growth has been more 
modest, while Aston Villa and Everton have not been able to monetise their membership of the 
Premier League. 
7.3. Pre-test diagnostic statistics 
Pre-test diagnostic statistics are used to confirm the assumptions of functional form, of 
multicollinearity, that average value of errors is zero, of homoscedasticity, that covariance of errors is 
zero, of non-stochastic regressors, and that disturbances are normally distributed. 
Assumption of functional form. 
There is a non-linear relationship between league rank and trading revenue. Figure 7.7 show that the 
trading revenue of those clubs competing to win the Premier League and qualify for the Champions 
League (to the right of the panel) is much higher. In contrast, Football League clubs' trading revenue 
(to the left of the cluster) is substantially lower. This provides an indication of the gap between 
divisions, especially between the Premier League and Football League Championship, and, 
importantly, within divisions, such as those Premier League clubs aiming to qualify for, and 
participating in, the Champions League. 
Empirical: Business performance 
173 
Figure 7.7: Trading revenue to league rank 
 
 
The data is transformed because of the non-linearity, with a natural logarithm adopted as being the 
most appropriate form for the data. The trading revenue (TRADING) variable is transformed and 
coded as LOG.TRADING. The linear-log model represents a better fit of the data, as illustrated by 
Figure 7.8. There is, however, some evidence that residuals are more likely to be positive for the 
highest and lowest values of league rank, with negative values for the remaining cases. 
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Figure 7.8: Trading revenue to logarithm of league rank 
 
 
Assumption of multicollinearity 
The assumption of multicollinearity is not applicable as there is only one predictor. 
Assumption that average value of errors is zero 
The mean value of errors is zero to 18 decimal places (0.0000000000000000005) and is 
approximately zero. The assumption that the average value of errors is zero is confirmed and there is 
no known justification for restricting the regression through the origin. 
Assumption of homoscedasticity 
There is contradictory evidence of homoscedasticity in the relationship between the model's 
explanatory variable and its residuals. There is no obvious pattern between the fitted and residual 
values in Figure 7.9, but there is some evidence of diverging residuals coinciding with the values for 
the explanatory variable (Figure 7.10). The Goldfeld-Quandt test statistic is 0.989 (p=0.536), meaning 
that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is accepted and the data is assumed to be 
homoscedastic. However, the data has been transformed and therefore the Breusch-Pagan is 
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preferred, with this test statistic being 36.551 (p=0.000). The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected and the model is assumed to be heteroscedastic. 
Figure 7.9: Fitted values to residual values for business performance model 
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Figure 7.10: Residual values to league rank 
 
 
Assumption that covariance of errors is zero 
There is mixed evidence of autocorrelation in the data. The autocorrelation function (Figure 7.11) 
reveals that lagged values of the league rank may be correlated with business performance, which 
suggests that clubs generate and appropriate matchday and commercial revenue as a consequence 
of historic sporting performance, as suggested by Kuper and Szymanski (2012). But, in contrast, the 
Durbin-Watson panel test statistic is 0.618 (p=0.000) and is supported by the Breusch-Godfrey panel 
test statistic of 279.263 (p=0.000). The null hypothesis is rejected and no evidence of autocorrelation 
can be drawn. 
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Figure 7.11: Autocorrelation function for business performance model 
 
 
Assumption of non-stochastic regressors 
For the business performance model, sporting performance is considered an exogenous variable. 
League rank is determined by a club's team resources (player wages and value), as confirmed by 
Proposition 1 (Chapter 6), and by the management of these resources. Sporting performance, and 
especially superior performance in the Premier League and Champions League, is anticipated to have 
an effect on matchday and commercial revenue. This trading revenue does not have a direct 
relationship on sporting performance as clubs do not win more matches or championships because 
they generate more revenue. Instead, and similar to the sporting performance model, there is an 
indirect relationship: Clubs that generate superior revenue may return a profit and retained earnings, 
which are then reinvested in team resources. These resources, conceptualised and measured by the 
variables of player wages and value, are then exogenous to the model specified for Proposition 2. 
Assumption that disturbances are normally distributed 
There is evidence of outliers in the residual values. Figure 7.12 suggests that the distribution of 
residuals is skewed. The residuals have a skewness of 0.431 and kurtosis of 3.462, indicating some 
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positive skew to the distribution. The Jarque-Bera panel test statistic is 22.356 (p=0.000), meaning 
that the null hypothesis of normality is rejected and it that the distribution of residuals may be non-
normal. 
Figure 7.12: Residual values for business performance model 
 
 
7.4. Test statistics 
The premise of Proposition 2 is that the sporting performance of Premier League football clubs has a 
positive effect on their business performance. Panel regression models are utilised to test for cross-
sectional and time-series effects, with tests conducted for pooled, fixed, time-fixed and two-way 
effects. The outcome variable is the logarithm of trading revenue (LOG.TRADING) and the 
explanatory variable is the logarithm of league rank (RANK). The results for the pooled, fixed effects 
and time-fixed effects and two-way effects models are presented in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2: Panel regression models for business performance 
 Pooled Fixed effects 
Time-fixed 
effects 
Two-way 
effects 
 LOG.TRADING LOG.TRADING LOG.TRADING LOG.TRADING 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RANK -0.059*** -0.031*** -0.059*** -0.029*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
 t=-32.149 t=-19.657 t=-32.931 t=-22.841 
 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Constant 11.160***    
 (0.042)    
 t=263.181    
 p=0.000    
Observations 562 562 562 562 
R2 0.649 0.424 0.666 0.506 
Adjusted R2 0.648 0.384 0.656 0.456 
F 
1,033.585*** 
(df=1; 560) 
(p=0.000) 
386.402*** 
(df=1; 525) 
(p=0.000) 
1,084.473*** 
(df=1; 544) 
(p=0.000) 
521.715*** 
(df=1; 509) 
(p=0.000) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Pooled model 
The pooled panel regression model is: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺. 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
The F-statistic (1,033.585, p=0.000) is significant and provides evidence of a good overall fit for the 
pooled model. Furthermore, the R2 (0.649) indicates that there is a strong correlation, with sporting 
performance explaining 64.9% of the variance of business performance. League rank has a significant 
effect on trading revenue (t=-0.059, p=0.000) and the anticipated negative relationship is evident, as 
lower values for league rank are related to higher values for trading revenue because the value for first 
place (1) is lower than for last place (92). For logarithm models, an increase of league rank by one 
place is expected to increase trading revenue in value by 0.059%. This illustrates the relatively small 
incremental returns from trading revenue in the Football League, which then increase as clubs 
progress in the Football League Championship, Premier League and, ultimately, the Champions 
League. Further tests were conducted with inclusion of lagged values for league rank but they did not 
have a significant effect on trading revenue and are there not retained in the model. 
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Fixed effects model 
The fixed effects panel regression model is: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺. 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
The F-statistic of 386.402 (p=0.000) is significant and indicates that the overall fit of the fixed effects 
model is good, but the R2 (0.424) indicates that there is only a moderate correlation, with the sporting 
performance of clubs explaining 42.4% of the variance in business performance. For the logarithm 
model, league rank has a significant and negative effect on trading revenue (t=-19.657, p=0.000). For 
the fixed effects linear-log model, an increase in league rank by one place is expected to increase 
trading revenue in value by 0.031%. The fixed effects coefficients from this model are presented in 
Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Fixed effects coefficients for business performance 
CLUB Estimate 
Standard 
error 
t p 
Arsenal 11.660 0.076 153.479 0.000 
Aston Villa 10.775 0.078 138.384 0.000 
Birmingham City 10.264 0.083 123.118 0.000 
Blackburn Rovers 10.178 0.081 125.555 0.000 
Bolton Wanderers 10.502 0.085 123.881 0.000 
Burnley 9.941 0.089 111.357 0.000 
Cardiff City 10.145 0.097 104.076 0.000 
Charlton Athletic 10.152 0.091 111.519 0.000 
Chelsea 11.770 0.076 154.809 0.000 
Derby County 10.439 0.092 113.442 0.000 
Everton 10.593 0.077 137.287 0.000 
Fulham 10.365 0.080 128.974 0.000 
Hull City 10.138 0.102 99.170 0.000 
Ipswich Town 10.342 0.087 118.606 0.000 
Leeds United 11.093 0.097 114.556 0.000 
Leicester City 10.522 0.092 114.722 0.000 
Liverpool 11.607 0.076 152.341 0.000 
Manchester City 11.305 0.077 146.310 0.000 
Manchester United 12.143 0.076 159.934 0.000 
Middlesbrough 10.321 0.088 116.990 0.000 
Newcastle United 11.177 0.078 143.387 0.000 
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CLUB Estimate 
Standard 
error 
t p 
Norwich City 10.546 0.088 119.963 0.000 
Nottingham Forest 10.289 0.105 98.427 0.000 
Queens Park Rangers 10.221 0.099 103.386 0.000 
Reading 10.389 0.089 117.324 0.000 
Sheffield United 10.244 0.101 101.745 0.000 
Sheffield Wednesday 10.364 0.102 101.333 0.000 
Southampton 10.444 0.086 121.898 0.000 
Stoke City 10.131 0.085 118.645 0.000 
Sunderland 10.720 0.080 134.423 0.000 
Tottenham Hotspur 11.280 0.077 147.045 0.000 
Watford 10.105 0.088 114.801 0.000 
West Bromwich Albion 10.221 0.082 125.269 0.000 
West Ham United 10.920 0.079 138.032 0.000 
Wigan Athletic 9.595 0.090 106.281 0.000 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 10.483 0.088 119.120 0.000 
 
All of the fixed effects coefficients are significant (p<0.000). The permanent members of the Premier 
League have relatively high coefficients and low standard errors, which is indicative of a narrow 
confidence interval. However, there are clubs whose business performance has been erratic that 
share similar values and, furthermore, there does not appears to be any pattern for the coefficients 
and standard errors, regardless of whether clubs have experienced growth, decline or sustained 
sporting failure during the observation period. Therefore it is not possible to draw conclusive findings 
from the fixed effects coefficients. 
Time-fixed effects model 
The time-fixed effects panel regression model is: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺. 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
The F-statistic (1,084.473, p=0.000) is significant and suggests that the overall fit of the time-fixed 
effects model is good. The R2 (0.666) indicates that there is strong correlation, with sporting 
performance explaining 66.6% of the variance of business performance. League rank has a 
significant, negative effect on trading revenue (t=-32.931, p=0.000). For the fixed effects linear-log 
model, an increase in league rank by one place is expected to increase trading revenue in value by 
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0.059%. The time-fixed effects coefficients from the panel regression model are presented in Table 
7.4. 
Table 7.4: Time-fixed effects coefficients for business performance 
YEAR Estimate 
Standard 
error 
t p 
2000 10.848 0.098 111.061 0.000 
2001 10.878 0.099 110.102 0.000 
2002 11.081 0.098 113.343 0.000 
2003 10.982 0.101 108.869 0.000 
2004 10.995 0.098 112.069 0.000 
2005 11.059 0.100 110.760 0.000 
2006 11.132 0.097 114.742 0.000 
2007 11.129 0.096 115.457 0.000 
2008 11.169 0.097 115.698 0.000 
2009 11.233 0.098 114.888 0.000 
2010 11.146 0.099 112.196 0.000 
2011 11.212 0.098 114.182 0.000 
2012 11.222 0.097 115.631 0.000 
2013 11.293 0.095 118.273 0.000 
2014 11.344 0.097 117.442 0.000 
2015 11.416 0.097 117.747 0.000 
2016 11.460 0.098 116.816 0.000 
 
All of the time-fixed effects coefficients all significant. The coefficients increase for much of the 
observation period, while the standard errors are reasonably constant. This is expected as trading 
revenue has increased during the observation period. 
Two-way effects model 
The two-way effects panel regression model is: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺. 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
The F-statistic (521.715, p=0.000) is significant, meaning that the overall fit of the two-ways effects 
model is good. However, the R2 (0.506) shows that there is moderate correlation, with sporting 
performance explaining 50.6% of the variance of business performance. Therefore, both the pooled 
and time-fixed effects models are preferred to the two-way effects model. 
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7.5. Post-test diagnostic statistics 
Post-test diagnostics are used to ascertain the most appropriate model. The F-test identifies whether 
the fixed effects and time-fixed effects models are more robust than the pooled model. The F-test 
statistic for pooled and fixed effects models is 33.500 (p=0.000), which means that the null hypothesis 
of no difference between the fixed effects and pooled models can be rejected and, instead, it is 
appropriate to specify the pooled model. For pooled and time-fixed effects models, the F-test statistic 
is 3.577 and has a p-value of 0.000, and the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
time-fixed effects and pooled models is rejected and the pooled model can be used. Figure 7.13 
demonstrates the relationships between league rank and trading revenue for each club in the sample. 
Empirical: Business performance 
184 
Figure 7.13: Logarithm of trading revenue to league rank, by club 
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For fixed effects, there is no evident pattern for the clubs in the sample. The values for clubs that have 
been permanent members of the Premier League – and most notably for Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool 
and Manchester United – tend to be clustered in the top right corner. Clubs that have grown or 
declined between the Premier League and Football League are more dispersed, and no pattern is 
obvious. This suggests that clubs have adopted unique paths to success and failure. The differences 
within the sample are further examined in the contingency models (see Chapters 8 and 9). Figure 7.14 
confirms the presence of time-fixed effects in the panel regression model. The relationships between 
league rank and trading revenue is shown for each season and financial year in the observation 
period. 
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Figure 7.14: Logarithm of trading revenue to league rank, by year 
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In contrast, the time-fixed effect is evident when data is presented by season and financial year. The 
relationship between sporting performance (league rank) and business performance (logarithm of 
trading revenue) is maintained throughout the observation period. There is an increase in trading 
revenue for all clubs, and especially those clubs that have superior sporting performance. 
Groups 
Figures 7.15 to 7.19 show the paths of clubs by the permanent, growth, decline, yo-yo and volatile 
groups. Paths start from the lighter, grey points (the 1999/2000 season and financial year) and end 
with the darker, black points in 2015/16. Points that are above and to the left of the dashed, non-linear 
regression line indicate over-performance in that clubs are generating more trading revenue than is 
predicted by their league rank. Conversely, points to the right and below the line indicate under-
performance, where clubs are generating less trading revenue than could be expected from their 
league rank. 
Figure 7.15: Trading revenue to league rank, permanent clubs 
 
 
Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United have been able to appropriate incremental 
matchday and commercial revenue from their sporting performance. The increased trading revenue 
generated by Manchester United indicates that the club have been able to monetise sporting 
performance through the increased capacity of its Old Trafford stadium and the development of their 
sponsorship and licensing programmes. Aston Villa, Everton and, to a lesser extent, Tottenham 
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Hotspur have not been able to generate comparable performance. This suggests that Arsenal, 
Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United and Manchester City may represent a distinct group. 
Figure 7.16: Trading revenue to league rank, growth clubs 
 
Growth clubs have generated relatively modest increases in trading revenue relative to permanent 
members. There is only indication of modest growth when clubs such as Burnley, Cardiff City, Hull 
City and Stoke City have achieved promotion to the Premier League. This may indicate that these 
clubs have not been able to commercialise their sporting performance but instead are reliant on 
broadcast revenue to cover increased player wages expenditure. 
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Figure 7.17: Trading revenue to league rank, decline clubs 
 
Similarly, it does not appear that matchday and commercial revenue declines as much as broadcast 
revenues for clubs that are relegated. This is likely due to the strong loyalty of football fans. However, 
it is noticeable that the trading revenue of Leeds United has declined, despite matchday attendances 
remaining reasonably robust. This may be due to discounted ticket price and a reduction is 
sponsorship and licensing revenue from when the club were competing at the top of the Premier 
League and in the Champions League. 
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Figure 7.18: Trading revenue to league rank, yo-yo clubs 
 
There is no evident pattern in the paths of the so-called yo-yo clubs. As with the management of team 
resources, this suggests that these clubs are reasonably adept at commercialisation, and are able to 
appropriately market and price their products and services according to whether they are competing in 
the Premier League or Football League Championship. 
Figure 7.19: Trading revenue to league rank, volatile clubs 
 
Manchester City are evidently a unique member of this group, and their recent sporting and business 
performance has had more in common with the permanent members of the Premier League. The path 
of Manchester City shows how they have been able to generate matchday and commercial revenue 
from their sporting performance, and have not just relied on broadcast revenue. Other clubs with new 
stadiums (Leicester City and Southampton) have generated incremental revenue from Premier 
League membership compared to clubs with older venues. Queens Park Rangers' proposals to 
expand or relocate have been thwarted, and instead branded themselves as a "boutique club" (Moore, 
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2008). For small- and medium-size clubs, the quality of the stadium and facilities may be as important 
as the quantity (capacity). 
7.6. Conclusions: Business performance 
Proposition 2 confirms the relationship between sporting performance and business performance by 
use of a predictive model. The variation in league rank of clubs can be explained by 64.9% of 
matchday and commercial revenue, with a change in rank of one position being associated by a 
0.059% change in trading revenue. This confirms the financial rewards that can be appropriated from 
incremental sporting performance between the Football League and the Premier League (see Section 
2.8) and, furthermore, from the Premier League to the Champions League. 
There are notable differences between the groups of clubs but also within groups, which constrain any 
conclusions that are drawn. Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United, as permanent 
members of the Premier League, plus Manchester City have commercialised their superior sporting 
performance by generating substantial trading revenue. In contrast, the remaining permanent 
members and most of the clubs that have gained promotion from the Football League have generated 
modest incremental revenue from matchday sales and commercial rights, with more revenue growth 
being appropriated from Premier League broadcast rights. Clubs that have experienced deteriorating 
sporting performance have usually had an associated decline in trading revenue, whether from fewer 
customers, lower prices, or both. Perhaps surprisingly, the yo-yo clubs have maintained trading 
revenue despite relegation to the Football League, which may indicate strong fan loyalty and that club 
owners and executives have the necessary capabilities for managing turbulence. Clubs that have 
endured volatility have been more adept at maintaining revenue if they have a new stadium. These 
trends highlight the difficulties for smaller clubs to generate incremental trading revenue from 
promotion to the Premier League and their reliance on broadcast revenue. 
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8. Empirical research: Contingency models 
 
Chapter summary 
• Contingency theory is applied to explore Premier League club performance, with fit modelled 
as mediation, moderation and deviation. 
• The fit or match between team resources (player wages and value) and sporting 
performance (league rank) has no discernible effect on financial performance (operating 
profit), whether fit is modelled as mediation, moderation or deviation. 
• The standardised scores for deviation reveal that the degree of misfit is usually moderate 
and temporary, with most clubs maintaining fit or, when they experience misfit, are able to 
promptly and sufficiently refit. 
• Further analysis of deviation as fit indicates that there is some evidence of patterns in the 
paths of clubs in the permanent, growth and decline groups, but, conversely, many of the yo-
yo and volatile clubs are idiosyncratic and adopt unique paths. 
 
Contingency models are utilised to explore the concept of fit between inputs and contingency effects, 
and the effect of this fit on the outputs of Premier League clubs. The data and descriptive statistics for 
the dependent, independent and contingency variables used in the models are presented. The test 
statistics for Propositions 3, 4 and 5 extend the input–output regression models adopted in 
Propositions 1 and 2 through the application of mediation, moderation and deviation models. Post-test 
analysis of the deviation scores is conducted, with further exploration of fit values by group. 
8.1. Data 
The specified observation period is from the 1999/2000 season and financial year until 2015/16. There 
is no data for player wages (WAGES) in 1993 nor for player value (VALUE) from 1993 to 1998 (see 
Section 5.5). The original data has 328 missing values from the 3128 values, which is 12% of data. 
Swindon Town, Bradford City, Oldham Athletic, Bournemouth and Barnsley are therefore removed, 
meaning that there are 134 missing values from the 2788 observations in the revised sample, which 
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represents 5% of data. Figure 8.1 plots the number of missing cases for each of the retained 41 clubs 
in the sample. 
Figure 8.1: Missing cases for contingency models, by club 
 
 
There is more missing data for clubs that have experienced sporting and financial failure, such as 
Portsmouth. In contrast, complete cases of data are available for all permanent members of the 
Premier League. As with the predictive models, there may be a relationship between missing data and 
club performance, with missing cases being positively related to sporting and financial performance. 
The number of missing cases for the observation period are presented in Figure 8.2. 
Empirical: Contingency models 
194 
Figure 8.2: Missing cases for contingency models per year 
 
 
There is missing data in every year, with a peak in 2004. This is further evidence of the increase in 
administrative events associated with the failure of ITV Digital, (see Section 2.4). More missing cases 
are evident at the end of the observation period. It is anticipated that some of this data will be included 
in future editions of the Annual Review of Football Finance. Overall, the number of missing cases is 
relatively consistent and ranges from three to four per year in most of the observation period. 
8.2. Descriptive statistics 
For the contingency models, variables are adopted to measure financial performance, team resources 
and sporting performance. The outcome variable is operating profit (PROFIT) and the explanatory 
variables are player wages (WAGES) and player value (VALUE). The contingent variable is league 
rank (RANK). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 8.1 for the panel of individual clubs (i=41) 
during the observation period (t=17) from 2000 to 2016. 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics for operating profit, player wages, player value and league rank 
 PROFIT WAGES VALUE RANK 
Mean 2193.235 39019.885 27406.975 23.789 
Median -1258.500 25126.000 10803.500 21.000 
Minimum -81636 2128 0 1 
Maximum 173464 240684 268414 89 
Variance 388937842.335 1729742291.096 1915054438.169 274.520 
Standard deviation 19721.507 41590.171 43761.335 16.569 
Skewness 2.697 2.356 2.855 0.987 
Kurtosis 18.640 9.132 11.785 4.154 
Total 1447535 25714104 17485650 16581 
Observations 697 697 697 697 
 
The central tendency and dispersion data is as anticipated and suggests that the distribution of data is 
non-normal. In particular, there is evidence of kurtosis for operating profit and considerable variance in 
operating profit, which, together, suggests that many clubs are usually breaking-even or recording 
modest profits or losses, with relatively few examples of significant profits or losses. The distribution of 
data is further examined in the pre-test diagnostic statistics. Most of the key performance indicators, 
for both performance and resources, have increased since 1992 (see Chapter 2). Figures 8.3 to 8.5 
show the mean values for operating profit, player wages and player value for the sample of clubs 
during the Premier League era. 
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Figure 8.3: Mean of operating profit per year 
 
Figure 8.4: Mean of player wages per year 
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Figure 8.5: Mean of player value per year 
 
 
The change in operating profit from 2013 to 2014 appears to be a shock; however, the profits 
generated by Premier League clubs are relatively modest when compared to revenue, and the change 
can be attributed to relatively small improvement in financial performance. Furthermore, the average 
operating profit for the Premier League may be affected by a few influential cases as the operating 
profit margin prior to the shock was relatively low. Therefore, the distribution of the operating profit, 
player wages and player value variables are presented as boxplots in Figures 8.6 to 8.8. 
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Figure 8.6: Distribution of operating profit per year 
 
Figure 8.7: Distribution of player wages per year 
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Figure 8.8: Distribution of player value per year 
 
 
There is evidence of an increase in the average and dispersion of many key performance and 
resource indicators since 1992. Recently, more clubs are recording very high operating profit, with a 
reduction of the number of clubs reporting very low operating losses. Within the sample of clubs, there 
been examples of sustained success, plus growth, decline and persistent failure. The paths for each 
club's operating profit (financial performance), player wages, player value (team resources) and 
league rank (sporting performance) are shown in Figures 8.9 to 8.12, which highlight the variety of 
inputs and outputs. 
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Figure 8.9: Operating profit per year, by club 
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Figure 8.10: Player wages per year, by club 
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Figure 8.11: Player value per year, by club 
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Figure 8.12: League rank per year, by club 
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The fluctuation in operating profit during the observation period can mostly be attributed to the 
performance of a few clubs, such as Arsenal, Manchester City and Manchester United. This recent 
growth may be due to change in club ownership and to club owners' objectives, as well as to the 
introduction of Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play by UEFA, as highlighted in Section 2.4. This 
trend has coincided with an increase in player wages and value for the most successful Premier 
League clubs, who have maintained their league rank at or near the top of the Premier League. 
However, there are obvious differences between these successful clubs and the other clubs, many of 
which have experienced growth, decline, or both growth and decline. 
8.3. Test statistics 
Tests are conducted to establish the tripartite relationship between team resources, sporting 
performance and financial performance. Sporting performance is conceptualised and measured as 
league rank, which acts as a contingency effect between team resources (player wages and player 
value) and financial performance (operating profit). Specifically, the tests explore the fit between the 
explanatory variables of player wages and value (WAGES and VALUE) and the contingency factor of 
league rank (RANK) and its relationship with the outcome variable of operating profit (PROFIT). The 
concept of fit is modelled as mediation in Proposition 3, moderation in Proposition 4, and deviation in 
Proposition 5. 
Fit as mediation 
Proposition 3 states that sporting performance mediates the relationship between team resources and 
financial performance. This is established by a three-step procedure (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
First, the explanatory variables are confirmed to have a significant effect on the outcome variable: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
The second step ascertains whether the explanatory variables have a significant relationship on the 
mediating variable: 
𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
The third step is to check that the mediator is a significant predictor of the outcome variable and that 
the relationship between the explanatory variables is zero (for complete mediation) or at least reduced 
(for partial mediation). 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
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The results of the contingency model where fit is modelled as mediation are shown in Table 8.2. 
Models 1 to 3 correspond to the aforementioned steps. 
Table 8.2: Panel regression model for fit as mediation 
 PROFIT RANK PROFIT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
WAGES 0.137*** -0.000*** 0.087** 
 (0.042) (0.000) (0.044) 
 t=3.255 t=-8.271 t=1.988 
 p=0.002 p=0.000 p=0.048 
VALUE 0.078* 0.000 0.078* 
 (0.040) (0.000) (0.040) 
 t=1.923 t=0.064 t=1.951 
 p=0.055 p=0.950 p=0.052 
RANK   -244.045*** 
   (67.119) 
   t=-3.636 
   p=0.001 
Constant -5,235.999*** 29.191*** 1,887.818 
 (1,075.675) (0.630) (2,230.208) 
 t=-4.868 t=46.302 t=0.846 
 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.398 
Observations 637 637 637 
R2 0.201 0.396 0.217 
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.395 0.213 
F 
79.551*** 
(df=2; 634) 
(p=0.000) 
208.264*** 
(df=2; 634) 
(p=0.000) 
58.463*** 
(df=3; 633) 
(p=0.000) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
The results of the model where fit is modelled as mediation are mixed. The model indicates that 
league rank partially mediates the relationship between player wages and operating profit. However, 
there is no such moderating effect from league rank on the relationship between player wages and 
operating profit. Overall, sporting performance has limited mediating effects on the relationship 
between team resources and financial performance and there is insufficient evidence to support the 
applcation of fit as mediation (Venkatraman, 1989). 
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Fit as moderation 
Proposition 4 predicts that sporting performance acts as a moderator on the relationship between 
team resources and financial performance. This is tested by employing a two-step procedure (Hair et 
al, 2010). The relationship between the explanatory variables (player wages and player value) and the 
outcome variable (operating profit) is established: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
Next, an interaction term is incorporated so that financial performance (operating profit) is predicted by 
the multiplicative effect of team resources (player wages and player value) and sporting performance 
(league rank): 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
The results of the contingency model where fit is modelled as moderation are shown in Table 8.3. The 
original model (Model 1) is a pooled regression model which regresses sporting performance on 
financial performance. This is then compared to the moderated model (Model 2), which is another 
pooled model that regresses the moderated contingency effect (the interaction between team 
resources and sporting performance) on financial performance. 
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Table 8.3: Panel regression model for fit as moderation 
 PROFIT PROFIT 
 (1) (2) 
WAGES 0.137***  
 (0.042)  
 t=3.255  
 p=0.002  
VALUE 0.078*  
 (0.040)  
 t=1.923  
 p=0.055  
WAGES×RANK  -0.023*** 
  (0.003) 
  t=-7.348 
  p=0.000 
VALUE×RANK  0.030*** 
  (0.004) 
  t=7.843 
  p=0.000 
Constant -5,235.999*** 6,658.623*** 
 (1,075.675) (1,422.602) 
 t=-4.868 t=4.681 
 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Observations 637 637 
R2 0.201 0.101 
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.098 
F 
79.551*** 
(df=2; 634) 
(p=0.000) 
35.546*** 
(df=2; 634) 
(p=0.000) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
The F-statistic (35.546, p=0.000) for the moderated model suggests that the interaction term does not 
contribute to financial performance. Furthermore, the R2 of the moderated model (0.101) indicates that 
it explains less of the variance in operating profit than the original model (0.201). Therefore, the effects 
of player wages and value on operating profit is not moderated by league rank. Centering predictor 
variables as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) does not have any discernible effect on 
the significance of the model. In conclusion, there is no empirical evidence that the key relationship 
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between the team resources of a club and its sporting performance is moderated by sporting 
performance, as conceptualised Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) and Venkatraman (1989). 
Fit as deviation 
Proposition 5 states that the deviation between team resources and sporting performance has an 
effect on financial performance. Here, the value of fit (FIT) is the residual of the regression of the 
contingency factor (league rank) on the explanatory variables (player wages and player value): 
𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
The fit value (FIT) is then used as a predictor in the regression model to predict operating profit 
(PROFIT): 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Table 8.4 shows the results of the regression models where fit is modelled as deviation. In Model 1, 
league rank is the contingency effect, and is regressed on player wages and value. This generates the 
values of fit (FIT) between the explanatory variables and contingency factor, which is then used in 
Model 2 to predict operating profit (PROFIT). 
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Table 8.4: Panel regression model for fit as deviation 
 RANK PROFIT 
 (1) (2) 
WAGES -0.000***  
 (0.000)  
 t=-8.271  
 p=0.000  
VALUE 0.000  
 (0.000)  
 t=0.064  
 p=0.950  
FIT  -18.558 
  (75.727) 
  t=-0.245 
  p=0.807 
Constant 29.191*** 2,381.192*** 
 (0.630) (793.703) 
 t=46.302 t=3.000 
 p=0.000 p=0.003 
Observations 637 637 
R2 0.396 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.395 -0.001 
F 
208.264*** 
(df=2; 634) 
(p=0.000) 
0.060 
(df=1; 635) 
(p=0.807) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
The F-statistic of 0.060 (p=0.807) of the contingency model indicates that there is no significant effect 
from the fit between team resources (player wages and value) and sporting performance (league rank) 
on the financial performance (operating profit) of Premier League clubs. The values of fit do not 
explain any of the variation in operating profit, as indicated by the R2 (0.000). When fit is modelled as 
deviation, there does not appear to be any contingent effect between team resources and sporting 
performance on financial performance. Figure 8.13 shows the relationship of fit between team 
resources and sporting performance (the residuals from Model 1) on financial performance. If 
deviation effects are present, the distribution should resemble the hat symbol (^), with high positive 
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and negative values of fit (x-axis) associated with low performance (y-axis), and low values of fit (zero) 
being associated with high performance. 
Figure 8.13: Operating profit (PROFIT) to fit (ABS.FIT) 
 
 
There is no evidence of fit as deviation being a significant contingency effect. Values are dispersed 
between positive and negative misfit, but there is no obvious effect where values at or near fit (where 
FIT equals zero) are related to expected high performance. There are a small number of high values 
over-fit, but they are not associated with low financial performance. 
Fit as absolute deviation 
The limitation of including values of fit as a predictor variable in a regression model is that the 
relationship between fit and performance is not expected to be linear. Low values of fit are 
hypothesised to be associated with high performance, whereas high values – whether positive or 
negative – are related to low performance. Therefore, Table 8.5 shows the output of the regression 
models where fit is modelled as absolute deviation. It differs from the preceding model only in that the 
absolute values of fit (ABSOLUTE.FIT) between the predictor and contingency effect are generated 
(Model 1). These absolute values are then used to predict the outcome (Model 2). 
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Table 8.5: Panel regression model for fit as absolute deviation 
 RANK PROFIT 
 (1) (2) 
WAGES -0.000***  
 (0.000)  
 t=-8.271  
 p=0.000  
VALUE 0.000  
 (0.000)  
 t=0.064  
 p=0.950  
ABSOLUTE.FIT  0.481 
  (124.732) 
  t=0.004 
  p=0.997 
Constant 29.191*** 2,377.184* 
 (0.630) (1,307.334) 
 t=46.302 t=1.818 
 p=0.000 p=0.070 
Observations 637 637 
R2 0.396 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.395 -0.002 
F 
208.264*** 
(df=2; 634) 
(p=0.000) 
0.000 
(df=1; 635) 
(p=0.997) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
The F-statistic of 0.000 (p=0.997) of the contingency model suggests that the deviation effects are not 
significant where fit is modelled as absolute deviation. The model has no explanatory effect, as 
demonstrated by the zero value for R2 (0.000). This adds further evidence that the deviation between 
team resources and sporting performance does not predict financial performance. Figure 8.14 shows 
the relationship between absolute fit and financial performance. If deviation effects are present, there 
should be a negative linear distribution, with low values of fit (x-axis) associated with high performance 
(y-axis), and high values of fit for low performance. 
Empirical: Contingency models 
212 
Figure 8.14: Operating profit (PROFIT) to absolute fit (ABS.FIT) 
 
 
No evidence is provided that absolute fit as deviation represents a significant contingency effect. 
There is no obvious relationship between the values of fit to high performance or, conversely, that 
misfit is related to low performance. There are a small number of values of excessive misfit, but no 
indication that they are related to superior (or inferior) performance. It is concluded that there is no 
evidence that the deviation of fit between team resources and sporting performance has any 
significant effect on financial performance, and therefore the concept of fit as deviation (Venkatraman, 
1989) is not applicable. 
8.4. Post-test diagnostic statistics 
The results of the regression models suggest that there are no significant contingency effects, whether 
fit is modelled as mediation, moderation or deviation. Post-test diagnostics are used to explore 
possible explanations for the results. Specifically, the model of fit as deviation (Proposition 5) provides 
further data from standardised scores of fit (Z.FIT). This data enables analysis of the contingency 
effects for each club and for each year of the observation period. The distribution of the standardised 
fit scores are shown by year in Figure 8.15. 
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Figure 8.15: Standardised fit (Z.FIT) by year 
 
 
The average and dispersion of fit values is mostly consistent during the Premier League era. There is 
some fluctuation in 2004 and in 2010, which may be further evidence of the failure of some clubs to 
adjust to the contagion caused by the failure of ITV Digital in 2002 and Setanta in 2009 (see Section 
2.4). There are no excessive values of under-fit, but there are, however, some outlier values of over-fit 
towards the start and the end of the observation period. The values at the start of the period are 
particularly surprising even though the data has been standardised. There has been considerable 
growth in player wages and value, plus some increase in operating profit, and therefore the onset of 
more excessive values of fit toward the end of the observation period is expected. Further statistical 
examination of the outliers by club is conducted. Table 8.6 lists the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for the standardised values of fit for each club in the sample. The clubs are 
listed in alphabetical order. 
Table 8.6: Descriptive statistics of standardised fit (Z.FIT) 
CLUB Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Arsenal 0.111 1.067 -1.936 2.147 
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CLUB Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Aston Villa -0.187 0.808 -1.807 1.207 
Birmingham City -0.124 0.991 -1.686 1.763 
Blackburn Rovers -0.378 1.016 -1.959 2.136 
Blackpool -0.053 0.653 -1.066 1.071 
Bolton Wanderers -0.092 0.910 -1.566 1.535 
Burnley 0.068 0.857 -1.178 1.810 
Cardiff City -0.067 0.814 -1.466 1.729 
Charlton Athletic -0.302 0.996 -1.785 1.268 
Chelsea 0.302 1.079 -1.498 2.349 
Coventry City -0.018 1.149 -1.623 1.923 
Crystal Palace 0.518 1.009 -1.062 2.078 
Derby County -0.515 1.059 -1.964 1.740 
Everton 0.307 1.244 -1.716 2.460 
Fulham 0.350 1.125 -1.465 2.656 
Hull City -0.214 0.886 -1.511 1.488 
Ipswich Town -0.049 1.013 -1.519 1.751 
Leeds United -0.510 0.685 -1.503 0.761 
Leicester City -0.036 0.946 -1.819 1.603 
Liverpool 0.291 0.927 -1.165 1.993 
Manchester City 0.254 1.001 -1.325 2.025 
Manchester United -0.055 0.936 -1.553 1.663 
Middlesbrough -0.017 0.587 -0.897 1.073 
Newcastle United -0.332 0.616 -1.254 0.752 
Norwich City -0.251 0.869 -1.724 1.070 
Nottingham Forest 0.227 0.793 -0.987 1.455 
Portsmouth 0.163 0.969 -1.241 1.506 
Queens Park Rangers 0.093 0.776 -1.129 1.922 
Reading 0.376 1.103 -1.395 3.458 
Sheffield United 0.210 0.831 -1.239 1.584 
Sheffield Wednesday 0.065 1.196 -1.130 3.552 
Southampton -0.421 1.054 -1.626 1.353 
Stoke City -0.104 1.327 -1.550 3.962 
Sunderland -0.234 0.951 -1.518 1.996 
Swansea City -0.123 1.004 -1.463 1.343 
Tottenham Hotspur -0.031 0.906 -1.625 1.412 
Watford 0.490 1.275 -1.116 4.412 
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CLUB Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
West Bromwich Albion 0.024 1.268 -1.803 2.995 
West Ham United -0.215 1.056 -1.795 1.899 
Wigan Athletic -0.033 0.887 -1.325 1.910 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.581 1.265 -1.131 3.837 
 
There are no evident patterns between or within groups of clubs. For example, the average and 
dispersion of fit values differ for the seven clubs that have been permanent members of the Premier 
League. Some of these clubs, such as Manchester United and Tottenham Hotspur, have an average 
standardised fit value (z-score) close to zero, but so do clubs that typically generate inferior financial 
performance, such as Middlesbrough and West Bromwich Albion. Similarly, there is no apparent 
relationship between the dispersion of fit values, as indicated by standard deviation, and financial 
performance. Standardised values for fit in excess of two standard deviations above or below the 
mean represent the cases of clubs and years for which the most excessive misfit is recorded. These 
standardised values of misfit are listed in chronological order in Table 8.7. 
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Table 8.7: Excessive values of standardised fit (Z.FIT), by year 
YEAR CLUB Z.FIT 
2001 Watford 4.412392 
2001 Sheffield Wednesday 3.552195 
2001 West Bromwich Albion 2.994843 
2002 Stoke City 3.962306 
2002 Reading 3.457632 
2003 Arsenal 2.146736 
2004 Fulham 2.655792 
2006 Derby County -1.964202 
2008 Manchester City 2.025398 
2009 Chelsea 2.348653 
2009 Blackburn Rovers 2.135690 
2011 Wolverhampton Wanderers 2.469406 
2011 Chelsea 2.275293 
2012 Sunderland 1.995772 
2013 Wolverhampton Wanderers 3.836655 
2013 Everton 2.067034 
2013 Liverpool 1.993011 
2013 Fulham 1.980184 
2016 Everton 2.460140 
2016 Crystal Palace 2.077662 
 
There is no obvious trend of excessive values of misfit during the observation period. All such values 
are positive (under-fit), and are examples of over-performance (or under-resourcing). The values are 
distributed throughout the observation period, with occurrences of misfit in 11 of the 17 years. There 
are no more than three values in any year (2001 and 2013), with the three-year gap from 2013 to 2016 
being the longest period between cases. The list includes some permanent Premier League members 
and it may be that owners are occasionally taking risks to achieve or maintain success. The 
standardised values for excessive misfit are also listed in alphabetical order in Table 8.8. 
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Table 8.8: Excessive values of standardised fit (Z.FIT), by club 
YEAR CLUB Z.FIT 
2003 Arsenal 2.146736 
2009 Blackburn Rovers 2.135690 
2009 Chelsea 2.348653 
2011 Chelsea 2.275293 
2016 Crystal Palace 2.077662 
2006 Derby County -1.964202 
2013 Everton 2.067034 
2016 Everton 2.460140 
2004 Fulham 2.655792 
2013 Fulham 1.980184 
2013 Liverpool 1.993011 
2008 Manchester City 2.025398 
2002 Reading 3.457632 
2001 Sheffield Wednesday 3.552195 
2002 Stoke City 3.962306 
2012 Sunderland 1.995772 
2001 Watford 4.412392 
2001 West Bromwich Albion 2.994843 
2011 Wolverhampton Wanderers 2.469406 
2013 Wolverhampton Wanderers 3.836655 
 
The incidents of misfit are dispersed by case as well as by time. 16 clubs have had at least one 
season of excessive misfit, which represents 39% of clubs in the sample. However, only four clubs 
(Chelsea, Everton Fulham and Wolverhampton Wanderers) have had two years of fit. Furthermore, 
these incidents of excessive misfit are never in consecutive seasons and are separated by two years 
(Chelsea and Wolverhampton Wanderers), three years (Everton) or nine years (Fulham). No club 
experienced three or more seasons of excessive misfit. This indicates that clubs do not endure misfit 
for multiple years and, when they misfit, are able to promptly adapt. 
8.5. Scores of fit by group 
The scores of fit are further analysed by the identification of patterns between and within groups of 
clubs. The scores are identical to those produced with the sporting performance model, but here they 
are analysed for the effect of the fit between player wages and league rank on the clubs' financial 
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performance. The paths of clubs are plotted in Figures 8.16 to 8.20 for the permanent, growth, decline, 
yo-yo and volatile groups, with the expected line of fit indicated by the dashed non-linear line. 
Figure 8.16: Fit of league rank to player wages, permanent clubs 
 
The limitations of pooled model are further highlighted by the evidence that permanent clubs have 
adopted a unique path to the other groups. There were substantial increases in player wages 
expenditure by Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United towards the end of the observation 
period, which indicates that these clubs, plus Manchester City, are diverging from others in the group. 
The remaining clubs are more clustered, but have nonetheless sustained sporting performance. This 
highlights the difficulty even for permanent members to compete for the Premier League and 
Champions League (while generating and sustaining an operating profit). 
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Figure 8.17: Fit of league rank to player wages, growth clubs 
 
The maintenance of fit is epitomised by Burnley, Hull City, Stoke City and Swansea City, despite some 
of these clubs entering administration during the observation period. Watford have controlled team 
resource expenditure during promotion to the Premier League and subsequent relegation to the 
Football League Championship. In contrast, Birmingham City, Bolton Wanderers, Cardiff City, Fulham, 
Reading, Wigan and West Bromwich Albion have transitioned to under-performance (or over-
resourcing) at the end of their growth period. Nevertheless, most of these clubs have continued to 
manage player wages despite their subsequent decline in sporting performance, although this has not 
necessarily resulted in improved financial performance (such as for Birmingham City and Bolton 
Wanderers). 
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Figure 8.18: Fit of league rank to player wages, decline clubs 
 
Some of the clubs that have suffered from declining sporting and financial performance, such as 
Sheffield Wednesday, have not increased player wages expenditure. In contrast, Nottingham Forest, 
Sheffield United and Wolverhampton Wanderers have moved to under-performance (or over-
resourcing) while enduring inferior sporting performance. Charlton Athletic, Leeds United and 
Portsmouth have been more erratic, although there is missing data for Portsmouth during their period 
of failure. Many of the clubs removed from sample due to missing data would otherwise be members 
of this group. 
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Figure 8.19: Fit of league rank to player wages, yo-yo clubs 
 
 
In contrast to some of the volatile clubs, the yo-yo clubs have experienced a lot more turbulence 
between over- and under-fit. Many of these clubs have not been able to adjust to the Premier League, 
and there is a general pattern from over-performance at the start of the Premier League era to under-
performance (or over-resourcing towards the end of the observation period. However, there is no 
notable pattern between the degree of fit, or instances of excessive misfit, and the financial failure of 
clubs, such as Crystal Palace and Ipswich Town, that have been put into administration. 
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Figure 8.20: Fit of league rank to player wages, volatile clubs 
 
 
Two types of paths are evident for volatile clubs. This group includes both large and small clubs. 
Managed decline and growth has been demonstrated by Blackpool and Manchester City and, after 
relocating to a new stadium and entering administration, by Leicester City and Southampton. In 
contrast, Norwich City and Queens Park Rangers have experienced misfit, notably towards the end of 
the observation period. Their paths suggest that they may have been unable to refit during a period 
when the Premier League has grown. This does confirm, however, that relegation and administration 
need not lead to administration. 
8.6. Conclusions: Contingency models 
There is limited evidence in support for contingent relationships where financial performance is 
conditional on the fit between team resources and sporting performance, whether fit is modelled as 
mediation, moderation and deviation. League rank partially mediates the relationship between player 
wages and operating profit, but not between player value and profit. Furthermore, league rank does 
not moderate team resources to operating profit. Where fit is modelled as deviation, there is no 
significant statistical evidence of any relationship between deviation of fit (between team resources 
and sporting performance) and the financial performance of clubs. Further examination of deviation 
scores, or scores of fit, does not reveal any discernible patterns between or within groups of club, nor 
during the observation period. Most clubs have maintained fit for at least most of the observation 
Empirical: Contingency models 
223 
period and any misfit is usually controlled and temporary. There is some commonality in the paths of 
certain clubs in the permanent, growth and decline groups; however, many of the yo-yo and volatile 
clubs have adopted unique paths. 
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9. Empirical research: Sporting, business and financial 
performance model 
 
Chapter summary 
• Contingency models are extended to incorporate sporting, business and financial 
performance with clubs' team and stadium resources and resource management 
capabilities, and to appraise the effect of the degree of fit between team resources and 
sporting performance. 
• Comparative and dynamic analysis of clubs during the Premier League era reveals unique 
paths, both between and within groups of clubs. 
• There is no obvious positive or negative relationship between the degree of fit and different 
forms of sporting success and failure, including winning the Champions League or promotion 
to, or relegation from, the Premier League, or with business failure in the form of insolvency 
events. 
• Club owners and business executives make strategic decisions with regard to team 
managers and stadium resources and these also do not appear to have any demonstrable 
effect on fit, which indicates that clubs possess or utilise the capabilities to match their 
resources to the changing competitive environment. 
 
Contingency models are further applied to explore the relationship between Premier League clubs 
resources, the fit between resources and contingency effects, and performance. First, the data from 
the extended sample and observation period used in the model is described. Second, the data 
displays are introduced. The data displays are analysed by groups of clubs, with further analysis of 
sporting, business and financial performance, and of clubs' team and stadium resources and resource 
management. 
9.1. Data 
The assumptions of the classic linear regression model are not applicable to the cross-sectional time-
series data displays, but the threshold of 5% of missing values is retained to ensure that there is 
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sufficient data for visual analysis. To further optimise the sample and observation periods, only player 
wages is utilised to generate fit scores. This enables the observation period to be extended to 1994 to 
2016 because, as highlighted in Section 5.5, there is data for player wages (WAGES) from 1994, but 
player value (VALUE) is only available from 1999. This panel has 227 missing values from the 3174 
values, which represents 8% of data. This requires just two clubs (Swindon Town and Bradford City) 
to be removed from the sample to reduce the proportion of missing data to 5% of the total. For the 
revised sample, there are 154 missing values from the 3036 observations. The number of missing 
cases for each club in the remaining sample of 44 clubs is presented in Figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1: Missing cases for sporting and business performance model per club 
 
 
As with the preceding empirical models, there are no missing values for the seven clubs that have 
been permanent members of the Premier League. Many of the remaining clubs with the fewest 
complete cases have been members of the Football League for most of the observation period and 
Oldham Athletic, Bournemouth, Barnsley, Portsmouth, Swansea City, Coventry City and Crystal 
Palace have all entered administration during the era. This further indicates that there may be a 
relationship between missing data and club performance, and missing cases may therefore be 
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positively related to sporting and business performance. Figure 6.2 plots the number of missing cases 
for each of the 23 years of observation period from 1994 to 2016. 
Figure 9.2: Missing cases for sporting and business performance models per year 
 
 
There are fewer missing cases from 1994 to 2002, which was when Deloitte published data on third 
and fourth division clubs, and because there are fewer insolvency events for the sample of clubs, with 
Bournemouth (in 1997) and Crystal Palace and Portsmouth (both in 1999) being the only clubs to 
enter administration before 2001. Since then, the number of missing cases per year is consistent. 
There is more missing data in the most recent years as errors and omissions are typically updated in 
subsequent editions of the Annual Review of Football Finance. 
9.2. Data displays 
The resources, performance and contingency effects per year for each club is shown in Figures 9.3 to 
9.46 of Appendix 9.1. For each club, three panels are used to show different types of data, 
encompassing team and stadium resources, plus sporting, business and financial performance. The 
horizontal axis is constant for all three panels and for each club, and indicates the financial year and 
season during the observation period. 
Empirical: Sporting, business and financial performance 
227 
The first panel shows the sporting performance of each club and charts league rank per season. Each 
case is identified by a point, which includes the club's position in the division for that season. Divisions 
are indicated by horizontal dotted lines25. The thick solid black vertical lines highlight the Premier 
League winners, with thin solid black vertical lines for promotion to Premier League and thin dashed 
black vertical lines for relegation from Premier League. The small black circles represent the FA Cup 
winners and small grey circles the EFL Cup winners, with large black circles for the Champions 
League winners and large grey circles for the Europa League winners. 
The second panel presents data on business and financial performance and stadium resources. The 
light grey rectangle indicates when a club has relocated to a new stadium. The dark grey area 
indicates clubs' revenue, the black line is operating profit (with the origin indicating the break-even 
point), and the dashed line is net cash. The black triangle signifies if and when a club has entered 
administration. The panel only includes the key financial indicators of revenue, profit and cash, which 
indicate relative success and failure. For clarity, expenditure for team and stadium resources is not 
shown, but instead is part of the expenditure that is deducted from revenue to determine the club's 
profit or loss. 
The third panel plots the standardised degree of fit between player wages (WAGES) and league rank 
(RANK), with the origin indicating fit. Positive and negative values represent misfit. Positive values 
indicate over-fit, where a club has under-performed or, alternatively, is over-resourced26. Negative 
values indicate under-fit, where clubs have under-performed or are over-resourced. The grey 
rectangle represents a zone of fit, which is approximately two standard deviations above and below 
the mean. Each case is indicated by a white point, with cases of excessive misfit (being those that are 
plotted outside of the zone of fit), being highlighted by a black point. 
9.3. Groups 
Clubs are grouped by sporting performance and specifically their membership by division since 1992. 
Each club is assigned to either the permanent, growth, decline, yo-yo or volatile group (see Appendix 
                                                     
25 The horizontal lines indicate divisions and broken when the Premier League and Football League 
was restructured in 1995/96 (see Footnote 5). 
26 Positive values of misfit are associated with under-performance as league rank is a reverse-order 
variable where low values indicate superior performance (for example, a rank of 1 in the Premier 
League is the champion) to high values, which indicate inferior performance (where the last-placed 
Premier League team has a rank of 20). 
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5.2). This enables comparative analysis of clubs within and between groups. Specifically, it analyses 
the paths of the club during the observation period. 
Permanent clubs 
Only a few of the permanent members of the Premier League – and most notably Arsenal – have 
maintained fit for most of the observation period, which is expected given the size of their capital and 
operating expenditure relative to other clubs. The ownership models of Premier League clubs has 
changed (see Section 2.5) and this appears to have had a positive effect on the degree of fit of those 
clubs that have been acquired by new owners. Chelsea have become more consistent during the 
Premier League era and stabilised almost immediately after being acquired by Roman Abramovich in 
2003. This period of relative stability included when they were Champions League winners in 2012. 
Manchester United endured a period of turbulence between over- and under-performance (including 
winning the Champions League for the first time in 1999), which continued for two years after being 
taken over by Malcom Glazer in 2005. The degree of fit has since stabilised, including in 2008 when 
the club were Champions League winners for the second time. For Liverpool, there has been an 
apparent trend of both increasing turbulence and over-performance, including the season that they 
were Champions League winners in 2005 and the financial years before and since the acquisition by 
Kop Football in 2007 and New England Sports Ventures in 2010. Similarly, Manchester City were 
much less stable when they were relegated to and promoted from the third division, before Sheikh 
Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan purchased the club in 2008. They became more stable within four 
years, and were subsequently Premier League champions in 2012 and 2014. In contrast, Aston Villa 
maintained fit before and since the acquisition by Randy Lerner in 2006, while Everton and Tottenham 
Hotspur have recorded large and consecutive change between over- and under-performance. Both 
have had consistent ownership during the Premier League era (Everton until 2016) and both clubs 
have sought to relocate, with Tottenham Hotspur opening their new stadium in 2019. 
Growth clubs 
Many of the clubs that grew from League One to the Premier League experienced some form of shock 
at the onset of their growth. Some clubs (including Birmingham City, Bolton Wanderers, Reading and 
Stoke City) recorded excessive misfit that coincided with the start of their period of growth. A number 
of clubs have endured multiple cases of misfit, including Birmingham City and Burnley (twice) and 
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Reading (three times). However, clubs such as Cardiff City maintained fit during the entire observation 
period, while others recorded misfit before or after their period of growth. The shock that prompts 
growth is usually negative, but can be positive, and may be single or multiple. The precursor to growth 
from the fourth to the first division for Bournemouth, Hull City and Swansea City was an administration 
event. More positively, Hull City and Swansea City opened new stadiums. Bolton and Reading 
experienced a coincidental negative shock of administration with a positive shock of a new stadium. 
Decline clubs 
In contrast, there is no evident pattern to the paths of clubs that have experienced decline. Only some 
of the clubs in this group have entered administration, which further indicates that the consequences 
of sporting performance failure is not necessarily financial failure. Furthermore, many of the insolvency 
events occurred during decline (for example, Leeds United and Portsmouth) or after the period of 
decline (for example, Barnsley, Coventry City and Oldham Athletic). Coventry City were the only club 
in this group to relocate to a new stadium during the Premier League era. There are numerous 
possible explanations for this apparent pattern and may indicate that affected clubs had both inferior 
team and stadium resources. Many clubs in the group have recorded cases of excessive misfit, while 
others have entered administration or relocated to a new stadium. However, Charlton Athletic and 
Sheffield Wednesday have experienced none of these characteristics during their decline from the 
Premier League to League One, although, like a number of clubs in this group, there is some missing 
data. 
Yo-yo clubs 
Clubs that have had erratic sporting performance and, in particular, experienced promotion and 
relegation between the Premier League and Football League Championship, have been subject to 
more change than clubs whose membership of a division has been constant. Fewer yo-yo clubs have 
suffered from financial failure than the decline clubs, with Crystal Palace (twice) and Ipswich Town 
(once) being the only clubs to enter administration. This group includes Blackburn Rovers, who won 
the Premier League at the start of the observation period, but have since been relegated from the 
Premier League on two occasions. Only three clubs (Derby County, Middlesbrough and Sunderland) 
relocated to a new stadium, and in each case this was at the start of the observation period. There is 
no evidence of excessive misfit or ongoing cases of misfit for the yo-yo clubs, and it is therefore 
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difficult to identify any distinct patterns in the performance, resources and resource management of 
clubs in this group. 
Volatile clubs 
The clubs in this group have experienced the most volatility, but are characterised by their 
heterogeneity. Some of the clubs have recorded sporting success, with Manchester City (twice) and 
Leicester City (once) winning the Premier League. Both of these clubs, and Southampton, have 
relocated to new stadiums. However, Leicester City and Southampton were two of three clubs (with 
Queens Park Rangers) that experienced financial failure during the observation period, when they 
entered administration. Despite the volatility in their sporting and financial performance, only three 
clubs recorded excessive misfit. However, all three clubs did so on multiple occasions: Leicester City 
and Manchester City had two cases each of excessive misfit, while Norwich City endured misfit three 
times. But even these cases were dispersed, which indicates that even volatile clubs are able to refit 
team resources to sporting performance. 
9.4. Performance 
Proposition 5 established that the effect of the fit between team resources and sporting performance 
(conceptualised and measured by league rank) on the financial performance of clubs is limited. The 
data displays further suggest that the fit between team resources and league rank does not have any 
predictive relationship on other forms of sporting performance. This applies both to sporting failure and 
success. 
There is no evidence of a relationship between fit and sporting failure in the form of relegation from the 
Premier League. No club has ever suffered relegation in the same season as it experienced excessive 
misfit, although some have been on the threshold of the zone of fit, while there are very few instances 
where excessive misfit immediately precedes or follows relegation. This suggests that clubs are able 
to adapt to relegation, and may benefit from the so-called parachute payments, where relegated 
Premier League clubs receive a reduced proportion of broadcast rights for up to three years (Deloitte, 
2018). There may, however, be a lagged effect from relegation where, if the club is not promoted back 
to the Premier League, the parachute payments end. This effect can be "almost as severe" as 
relegation (Deloitte, 2008). 
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Very occasionally, excessive misfit immediately precedes promotion, but there are no examples of 
promotion leading to excessive misfit in the next year. Excessive misfit more often coincides with 
promotion than it does with relegation. However, there are still relatively few occurrences given the 
number of clubs that are promoted each season. These occurrences are often recorded during a 
period of volatility in fit scores, which suggest that such clubs struggle to adapt to success. 
This analysis of relegation and promotion suggests that excessive misfit is more often recorded at 
about the same time as inferior sporting performance than it is with superior performance, albeit with 
very few examples of either. Furthermore, there are even fewer cases of clubs experiencing excessive 
misfit at the same time as winning the Premier League. Some of these clubs have experienced 
excessive misfit, but this has always been many years before winning the championship and is 
typically intervened by relegation, promotion, stadium relocation and even administration events. 
There are also few cases of misfit that coincide with winning the Champions League, Europa League, 
FA Cup or EFL Cup, which suggests that clubs are able to manage these shocks. Success in cup 
competitions often coincides with other league or cup performance, although occasionally a club is 
relegated in the same season that it wins a cup competition. This complementarity between league 
and cup performance is particularly evident for the Champions League and Europa League, which 
require qualification based on domestic league or cup performance in the previous season. 
There is no evident pattern between the standardised scores of fit and business performance 
(revenue), or between fit and financial performance (operating profit). Furthermore, the paths of clubs 
reveal no pattern in the fit between team resources and sporting performance before and after 
business performance failure, conceptualised and measured by insolvency events. Many clubs survive 
administration (Szymanski, 2015) and have the capability to manage their resources accordingly. 
Unfortunately, these events often coincide with missing data, which limits the analysis of this effect. 
Overall, there is more evidence for a relationship between excessive misfit and promotion to the 
Premier League than for any other performance outcome. There is no evidence of misfit being related 
to other forms of sporting success, be it league or cup, or to sporting or business failure. Clubs that 
enjoy success and Premier League and Champions League have the necessary capability to 
formulate and implement appropriate strategies as they experience changing performance outcomes. 
For other competitions, the limited financial rewards associated with winning the FA Cup, EFL Cup, 
Europa League are not sufficient to affect resources. This may be specific to the Premier League, 
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where clubs have been relatively unsuccessful in the Europa League (see Table 2.7). Failing clubs are 
able to maintain fit when relegated from the Premier League, which may be due to compensation from 
the parachute payments. 
9.5. Resources 
The key resources for professional sport clubs are teams and stadiums (Borland, 2006a). However, it 
is not only the ownership or control of these resources that generate performance; it is the 
management of the resources, as discussed in Section 4.2. Therefore, decisions that determine the 
change of team manager and of the club's stadium are essential to any analysis of professional sport 
club performance. The data displays enable the empirical model to incorporate resource management 
capabilities with resources, and to explore any relationship with sporting and business performance. 
Specifically, the model encompasses team and stadium resource management capabilities and the 
relationship between change in these capabilities and the degree of fit for each club. There were some 
examples where clubs have adopted a successful resource management strategy, but these are 
contradicted by examples of similar strategies which have returned inferior performance. 
Team resource management 
Clubs have adopted divergent strategies for the management of their team resources. Some clubs 
only occasionally change their team manager, while other clubs have done so repeatedly. Four clubs 
in the sample have team managers who have completed ten seasons or more: Arsenal's Arsène 
Wenger (20 seasons from 1996 to the end of the observation period), Manchester United's Sir Alex 
Ferguson (19 seasons from the Premier League's inaugural season to 2012); Charlton Athletic's Alan 
Curbishley (10 seasons from 1995 to 2005) and Everton's David Moyes (10 years from 2002 to 2012). 
Three of these four clubs are permanent members of the Premier League. It is expected that team 
managers who generate sustained success will maintain their tenure. Alternatively, it may indicate that 
these team owners have longer-term objectives and are less likely terminate the contract of their team 
manager due to short-term failure. However, Aston Villa, Chelsea and Tottenham Hotspur have not 
retained any of their managers for more than three complete seasons during the observation period, 
but maintained their Premier League membership. Uniquely, Chelsea have enjoyed sustained sporting 
success by recruiting and terminating the contracts of a succession of team managers. Liverpool have 
had three managers with between three to five complete seasons. Five clubs have not employed any 
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manager who has completed three or more seasons: Crystal Palace, Nottingham Forest, Oldham 
Athletic, Southampton and Swansea City. These clubs have had different levels of success and 
failure, and in different eras. There is no apparent relationship between the tenure of team managers 
and sporting performance. Instead, clubs adopt contrasting approaches to the hiring and firing of team 
managers. Furthermore, there is no pattern between the degree of fit and the tenure of a club's team 
manager, nor of the decisions by club owners to terminate and recruit a new manager. Successful 
professional sport clubs may therefore possess or utilise efficient and effective human resource 
management capabilities. 
Stadium resource management 
17 clubs in the sample have relocated to new stadiums during the Premier League era, with most (15) 
being opened in the ten years from 1997 to 2006: Middlesbrough, Bolton Wanderers, Derby County, 
Stoke City and Sunderland (all 1997), Reading (1998), Wigan Athletic (1999), Southampton (2001), 
Hull City, Leicester City and Wimbledon (2002), Manchester City (2003), Coventry City and Swansea 
City (both 2005), Arsenal (2006), Cardiff City (2009) and West Ham United (2016). As illustrated in 
Section 2.3, Arsenal are the only permanent member of Premier League to move to new stadium 
during the observation period. Most stadium projects were completed by Football League clubs, with 
some having their inaugural year in the season immediately before or after promotion to, or relegation 
from, the Premier League. Furthermore, a number of clubs entered administration immediately before 
or after relocating. Club owners and business executives have often had to manage stadium 
relocation, which is the usually the most critical resource decision that a club makes, during a period of 
considerable and uncertain change. 
There is no evidence that substantial investment in stadium resources – and specifically when a club 
relocates to a new venue – has a positive or negative affect on the club's degree of fit. This may be 
because clubs are prevented from excessive team resource expenditure due to financial constraints of 
debt or equity that is issued or raised to fund new capital investment. Alternatively, clubs may maintain 
team player wages and transfer fee expenditure to ensure that sporting performance is not detrimental 
to the commercial opportunity of the new stadium. This suggests that the business executives of 
professional football clubs are adept at maintaining fit or, where there is evidence of misfit, refitting 
their resources to sporting performance. This would mean that some professional football clubs have, 
or at least temporarily utilise, appropriate capabilities in the management of large capital projects. 
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9.6. Conclusions: Sporting, business and financial performance 
Proposition 6 explores the sporting, business and financial performance of Premier League clubs. It 
utilises a more complex model that incorporates team and stadium resources and introduces resource 
management capabilities. There is more evidence that promotion to the Premier League is related to 
excessive misfit than for any other performance outcome, whether positive or negative. But, overall, 
there is no discernible link between fit and other forms of sporting success, be it league or cup 
competitions, or between misfit and sporting failure (such as relegation) or business failure (insolvency 
events). Most clubs are usually able to accomplish sporting and business performance success, or 
endure failure (including relegation and administration), without any sustained, excessive effect on fit 
scores. 
The permanent members of the Premier League have maintained fit for at least most of the 
observation period, including those seasons when clubs have won the Premier League or Champions 
League. This indicates that they have the necessary capabilities to manage their superior resource 
endowments. However, even these most successful clubs have occasionally experienced misfit and 
excessive misfit, which suggests that readjustments are necessary to sustain Premier League and 
Champions League membership. This may be particularly so in a growing and increasingly intense 
competitive environment, with competition from new clubs and from existing rivals with new owners 
(see Section 2.5). 
Many of the clubs that have grown from the third and fourth divisions of the Football League to the 
Premier League have experienced excessive misfit at the onset of their growth. In contrast, there is no 
evidence that excessive misfit is always, or even usually, a consequence of relegation for clubs that 
yo-yo between the Premier League and Football League. Surprisingly, deviation is not necessarily 
associated with decline or failure, be it sporting or business performance. Even excessive under-
performance does not necessarily lead to administration (Szymanski, 2015). Clubs in the yo-yo and 
volatility groups usually maintain fit or can refit as and when necessary. This suggests that, despite the 
widening gap between and even within divisions, clubs can acquire, develop and divest the necessary 
resources and capabilities to bridge the gap (see Section 2.8). 
The resilience and adaptability of clubs is demonstrated by the formulation and implementation of their 
resource strategies. Clubs have differentiated human resource strategies for the termination and 
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appointment of multiple managers, which result in varying performance outcomes. Those clubs that 
generate and sustain sporting success usually maintain fit, and may have or utilise superior human 
resource management capabilities. Similarly, the relocation to a new stadium does not have any 
apparent sustained and excessive effect on a club's willingness or ability to match its resources to 
performance. These clubs have, or utilise, the necessary capabilities for the management of such 
capital projects. 
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Appendix 9.1: The clubs 
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Figure 9.3: Performance and resources, Arsenal, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.4: Performance and resources, Aston Villa, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.5: Performance and resources, Barnsley, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.6: Performance and resources, Birmingham City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.7: Performance and resources, Blackburn Rovers, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.8: Performance and resources, Blackpool, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.9: Performance and resources, Bolton Wanderers, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.10: Performance and resources, Bournemouth, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.11: Performance and resources, Burnley, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.12: Performance and resources, Cardiff City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.13: Performance and resources, Charlton Athletic, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.14: Performance and resources, Chelsea, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.15: Performance and resources, Coventry City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.16: Performance and resources, Crystal Palace, 1994 to 2016 
 
Empirical: Sporting, business and financial performance 
251 
Figure 9.17: Performance and resources, Derby County, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.18: Performance and resources, Everton, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.19: Performance and resources, Fulham, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.20: Performance and resources, Hull City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.21: Performance and resources, Ipswich Town, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.22: Performance and resources, Leeds United, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.23: Performance and resources, Leicester City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.24: Performance and resources, Liverpool, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.25: Performance and resources, Manchester City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.26: Performance and resources, Manchester United, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.27: Performance and resources, Middlesbrough, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.28: Performance and resources, Newcastle United, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.29: Performance and resources, Norwich City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.30: Performance and resources, Nottingham Forest, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.31: Performance and resources, Oldham Athletic, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.32: Performance and resources, Portsmouth, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.33: Performance and resources, Queens Park Rangers, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.34: Performance and resources, Reading, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.35: Performance and resources, Sheffield United, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.36: Performance and resources, Sheffield Wednesday, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.37: Performance and resources, Southampton, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.38: Performance and resources, Stoke City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.39: Performance and resources, Sunderland, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.40: Performance and resources, Swansea City, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.41: Performance and resources, Tottenham Hotspur, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.42: Performance and resources, Watford, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.43: Performance and resources, West Bromwich Albion, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.44: Performance and resources, West Ham United, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.45: Performance and resources, Wigan Athletic, 1994 to 2016 
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Figure 9.46: Performance and resources, Wolverhampton Wanderers, 1994 to 2016 
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10. Conclusions: The conclusions to and 
recommendations from the thesis 
 
Chapter summary 
• The management of Premier League clubs is prudent, whether clubs are experiencing 
sustained success, growth, failure, decline or both growth and decline. 
• The concept of fit is applied to explore the performance of clubs, and specifically cases of 
sustained or temporary advantage, and of over- and under-performance 
• There are relatively few and always temporary instances of excessive misfit, with clubs 
promptly refitting and often compensating for over-or under-fit. 
• Professional team sport clubs are simple firms in terms of their resources and performance 
outcomes, but models of strategy and of business and sporting performance are complex. 
• The resource and resource management strategies that clubs adopts are unique and the 
paths of realised and unrealised performance outcomes – which are observed in the Premier 
League and Football League – are divergent and equifinal. 
• Professional sport clubs are resilient and adaptable to internal change, and specifically 
change in performance outcomes (especially between and within divisions) and to team and 
stadium resources and resource management capabilities, as well as to external change, 
such as the growth, globalisation and commercialisation of the Premier League. 
• The utilisation of panel data is essential for capturing competitive and dynamic dimensions of 
professional sport club performance, and enables the paths of successful and failing clubs to 
be plotted. 
• However, professional team sport performance cannot be predicted with absolute certainty 
as sport is not deterministic and, fundamentally, depends on at least some element of 
uncertainty of outcome for it to be purposeful and viable. 
 
The thesis aims to contribute to theory and to practice. It develops and applies sport management 
theory and contingency theory (encompassing change and the concept of fit) to provide an 
explanation of the practice of professional sport club management. The research complements and 
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extends strategy and management research of professional sport teams and leagues. The adopted 
research methodology and the findings have practical application for club and league executives, and 
for other professional team sport practitioners. Specifically, it can inform the decision-making of club 
owners and business executives on the formulation and implementation of a club's resource and 
resource management strategy and the evaluation of performance outcomes. Conclusions are 
provided on the development and application of theory, the research methodology, and the practical 
findings drawn from the research. Recommendations for further theoretical development, empirical 
research and professional team sport strategy and management practice are offered. 
The objectives of the research are to explain how and why Premier League football clubs utilise their 
resources to generate and sustain performance. This is addressed with three research questions. The 
first two research questions are intended to confirm that the team resources of professional football 
clubs explain superior sporting performance and that sporting performance is related to business 
performance. As expected, player wages and player value explain most of the variation of the league 
rank of clubs. Player wages are more influential than player value, but the retention of both variables 
enables the incorporation of operating and capital resource expenditure. Similarly, league rank is a 
strong predictor of business performance. However, neither relationship is deterministic and, in both 
models, there are cases of under- and over-performance. These clubs are outliers but, conceptually 
and empirically, are more interesting than the confirmed trends between team resources, sporting 
performance and business performance. The third research question explores how and why clubs 
utilise their team and stadium resources to generate and sustain superior sporting, business and 
financial performance. The concepts of change and fit are introduced and, although limited trends and 
patterns are evident, the contingency models reveal that clubs adopt unique paths to success and 
failure. Premier League clubs are resilient and adaptable to internal and external change that is 
perceived and observed by club owners and business executives. 
10.1. Principal findings 
Since 1992, there has been considerable internal and external change – both positive and negative – 
for clubs, leagues and the professional team sport industry. In particular, growth and change in the 
financial, insurance, information and communication industries has enabled the commercialisation and 
globalisation of the Premier League. Growth has been realised from matchday, commercial and, most 
notably, broadcast revenue; however, the increase in revenue has not always been mirrored by 
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profits, with a number of clubs entering administration. Concurrently, there is a widening gap between 
the Premier League and the Football League and between the Premier League and Champions 
League. 
Few models of sport management theory incorporate sporting and business performance. Those 
models that do have limitations with the exclusion of key constructs, such as team resources, or 
simplified relationships. Most assume that all clubs are homogenous and are static. Therefore, they do 
not consider the competitive and dynamic nature of competition, which is becoming even more 
important as the gap between divisions and leagues widens. 
Conceptualising and measuring the competitive and dynamic dimensions of professional sport club 
performance and resources is essential in a changing competitive environment. Relative inputs and 
outputs are essential when evaluating strategy as clubs compete with other clubs in the league for 
sporting success and with other clubs, leagues and industries for revenue. The dynamic dimension is 
required as club owners and business executives acquire, accumulate and divest resources to 
generate and sustain performance. The outputs of clubs are conceptualised as sustained performance 
advantage, and inputs as accumulated resource advantage. 
The empirical research confirms the relationships between team resources and sporting performance 
and between sporting performance and business performance. Player wages and value are a strong 
predictor of league rank, while a club's league rank predicts trading revenue, which comprises 
matchday and commercial revenue. There are few discernible patterns between and within groups of 
clubs, although some of the permanent members of the Premier League and clubs that have 
experienced promotion from, or relegation to, the Football League, have adopted distinctive paths. 
A series of contingency models are developed and applied to empirically explore whether the 
relationships between inputs and outputs are conditional on change. The capability of owners and 
business executives to match their club's resources to change in performance and the competitive 
environment is conceptualised and measured as fit. Fit is modelled as mediation, moderation and 
deviation. It is hypothesised that the relationship between team resources and business performance 
is contingent on sporting performance. However, there is limited statistical evidence that league rank 
mediates or moderates the relationship between player wages and player value and a club's trading 
revenue. Deviation from the fit between team resources and sporting performance is also not a useful 
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predictor of business performance, and further analysis of the scores of fit – whether by year, club or 
groups of clubs – does not reveal many demonstrable patterns. 
Further empirical research is conducted to explore the more complex relationships between sporting, 
business and financial performance. It examines how and why clubs generate and sustain 
performance advantage from their team and stadium resources, including the use of related resource 
management capabilities. Visual analysis reveals that clubs appear to be prudently-managed, with 
owners and executives being willing and able to match resources to performance. Most clubs maintain 
fit in most years, and if and when misfit does occur, they promptly refit and often compensate for 
previous under-performing or over-performance (or over or under-resourcing). There is some evidence 
of a link between instances of excessive misfit being related to promotion to the Premier League, but 
otherwise there are no discernible patterns between misfit and other forms of sporting success, 
including winning the Premier League and domestic and European cup competitions. Nor is there any 
relationship between fit and sporting failure (relegation from the Premier League) or business 
performance failure (insolvency proceedings). Clubs are resilient and adaptable to shocks, and appear 
to have the appropriate resource management capabilities to efficiently and effectively bridge the 
widening gap between divisions. 
10.2. The development of professional team sport management 
theory 
Resources are a strong predictor of performance, but professional team sport is not deterministic. 
Premier League club owners and business executives can and do change strategy and this affects the 
performance generated by clubs. The findings support Szymanski's (2015, p. 206) assertion that, 
despite evidence of sporting and business failure, many professional football clubs are "doing their 
best" to avoid financial failure. Premier League club owners and business executives appear to be 
prudent in their pursuit of mutual business and sporting performance advantage. 
The concept of fit (Rumelt, 1987) is introduced to explain the effects of resources on performance in a 
changing competitive environment. There are cases where an excessive value of misfit is related to 
business performance failure (such as an administration event), to sporting performance failure (for 
example, in the form of relegation), or to simultaneous business and sporting failure. However, there 
are further examples of clubs surviving excessive misfit, and clubs suffering from inferior financial 
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performance or financial failure despite maintaining fit. There is no statistical or visual evidence that 
the degree of fit between team resources and sporting performance explains the financial performance 
of clubs. This is regardless of whether fit is conceptualised as mediation, moderation or deviation 
(Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Venkatraman, 1989). 
Professional team sport clubs are simple firms, while the professional sport leagues in which they 
compete represent discrete and mostly closed competitive environments. However, any model that 
aims to explain the strategy is confounded by the competitive and dynamic dimensions of sporting and 
business performance. The contingency models use different panels of data and demonstrate that fit 
as deviation is sensitive to change in the variables, sample and observation period. This sensitivity 
may be due to a small number of influential cases, rather than any change in strategy or performance 
by all or most of the clubs in the sample. For example, the mobility of clubs is fluid as clubs can be 
promoted and relegated in consecutive seasons. Furthermore, misfit may be the consequence of 
change by other clubs as the acquisition, accumulation or divestment of resources by other clubs can, 
consequently, affect the regression model from which value of fit (residuals) are derived. Change by a 
number of clubs or substantial change by one or a small number of influential clubs may affect the line 
of best fit. Therefore, misfit may not necessarily be due to the realisation of a club's strategy and, 
conversely, a club that maintains fit or refits may do so despite, and not because of, its strategy. 
Complexity 
The formulation and implementation of professional sport club strategy is further complicated as 
change to clubs' resources are often infrequent, uncertainty, irreversible, multi-functional and 
occasional (Rumelt, 1984) and, furthermore, fluctuating performance outcomes may be intended or 
unintended (Mintzberg, 1973). The acquisition, accumulation and divestment of resources can be 
prevalent in sport, such as the termination and recruitment of a team manager, or a special project, 
such as relocating to a new stadium. Some of the changes in performance are intended as they are 
the rewards of success, such as clubs aiming to qualify for the Champions League or gain promotion 
to the Premier League, while others are unintended, such as relegation or administration events, thus 
representing the risk of failure. 
Change can be internal and external and the contingency models therefore incorporate both 
properties, as recommended by Anderson and Paine (1975) and Paine and Anderson (1977). 
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Internally, a club may change its resources and resource management capabilities, while externally 
there may be change to the league, including the other member clubs, and the competitive 
environment of the league. Change has two further dimensions: The effects of decision-making on the 
league and competitive environment, and the effects of change on the decisions made by club owners 
and business executives. 
Furthermore, the performance outcomes of clubs are not determined only by the observed, or 
objective, change in these internal and external contingency factors. The difference between objective 
and perceived change is critical imperative. The objective change may not have been predicted or, 
alternatively, the prediction may have differed from what was subsequently observed. Differences in 
perceptions may vary between clubs, but also within clubs, such as the perceptions of owners and 
business executives. The performance generated from strategic decision-making depends on the 
perceptions of change, and not just on observed or objective change (Anderson and Paine, 1975; 
Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Bourgeois, 1985; Milliken, 1987). 
The proposed conceptual model of professional team sport performance is simple, but may be too 
simplistic to capture all of the key relationships. More complex models could integrate internal and 
external constructs with multiple relationships, but must not be so complex that they cannot be tested 
or are not practicable (Whetten, 1989). The model proposed in Figure 5.6 and empirically tested in 
Chapter 9 is more comprehensive than the simple models of Szymanski, 2015, Dobson and Goddard, 
1998 and Pinnuck and Potter, 2006. Clubs need to consider sporting, business and financial 
performance. Furthermore, there are multiple predictors of performance, including league and cup 
performance in sport, and different sources of revenue as well as predictors and key performance 
indicators such as profit and cash. However, the incorporation of additional constructs into variables 
will mean that models become more complex. 
Divergent and equifinal paths 
The clubs in the sample utilise distinct bundles of resources and generate varying performance 
outcomes in different eras. Therefore, they adopt unique paths. The predictors that explain 
Manchester United 's sustained success are not necessarily the same as those that explain the 
perennial failure of clubs to reach the Premier League, and nor do they necessarily explain the growth 
of cubs such as Fulham and Hull City nor the decline and failure of Portsmouth. Similar paths are 
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evident for clubs with contrasting performance outcomes, while, conversely, clubs that have followed 
similar paths do not necessarily generate the same or similar outcomes. The paths of clubs during the 
Premier League can be divergent or equifinal. The research builds on some of the empirical research 
that introduce differentiated models for clubs in different geographical locations and markets (Dobson 
and Goddard, 1998) and by size of club (Baroncelli and Lago, 2006).but others such as different 
owner objectives. Different stages of lifecycle, sustained or temporary and growth or decline. Change, 
including decision-making on resources and resource management and performance outcomes from 
strategy. Specific to Premier League, generalisable to European sport leagues, notably football, but 
less so for major sport leagues. Also period of growth and may not be applicable to leagues in other 
stage of lifecycle, such as introduction or decline. 
Resilience and adaptability 
There are very few examples of excessive misfit or extended periods of excessive misfit. Most clubs 
have maintained fit or have appropriately adjusted or refitted their team resources to match their 
sporting performance. Premier League clubs are adaptable and have been resilient to considerable 
change, including substantial and immediate change to: 
• Resources, such as the relocation to a new stadium or the termination and recruitment of a 
team manager. 
• Sporting and business performance, such as promotion or relegation, especially between the 
Premier League and Football League Championship, or administration events. 
• To the competitive environment, such as the failure of ITV Digital and Setanta Sports or the 
effects of the Bosman case. 
This suggests that suggests that the owners and business executives of professional football clubs in 
England and Wales have formulated and implemented appropriate change to match or adapt their 
resources and resource management capabilities to a changing competitive environment: "The 
resilience and adaptability of these clubs should not be underestimated" (Deloitte, 1999, p. 12). 
10.3. Empirical sport management research 
The Premier League provides a unique context for analysing the performance of professional sport 
clubs. It enables analysis of financial and non-financial performance and of tangible and intangible 
resources. Furthermore, the Premier League includes both successful and failing clubs, such as those 
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that win championships or gain promotion with those that are relegated or enter administration. 
Premier League clubs have similar resources and performance outcomes to other professional sport 
clubs. Regardless of the league or sport, most professional sport clubs utilise team resources 
(players) and stadium (or arena) resources. However, while the Premier League is similar to other 
European football leagues and especially to those in France, Germany, Italy and Spain (Deloitte, 
2017a), there are some significant differences to North America major league sports (Andreff and 
Staudohar, 2000; Neale, 1964; Hoehn, 2006; Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Noll, 1974; Sloane, 2006). 
The applicability to practice in other leagues may be inappropriate. 
The generalisability of the context is limited because of its uniqueness. The Premier League is one of 
most valuable leagues in the world and, since its formation in 1992, has experienced sustained growth 
(see Chapter 2). Further research could be conducted in the context of smaller leagues or of leagues 
that have experienced decline or are at other stages of the lifecycle (Miller and Friesen, 1984). This 
could include other professional football leagues in Europe or other sports, including team or individual 
sports. In particular, the conceptual and empirical model could be replicated in the major sport leagues 
of North America, including Major League Soccer, to compare and contrast the respective 
geographical markets. 
The conceptual model represents a holistic and practicable model of professional sport club strategy. 
However, it may be too simplistic to provide adequate insights into complex clubs, league and 
competitive environment factors or for the analysis of competitive and dynamic effects. It can be 
extended with additional constructs and relationships. Only Proposition 6 incorporates management 
capabilities, meaning that Propositions 1 to 6 assume that team and stadium resources are managed 
as effectively and efficiently by each club and for each year, which is not a realistic assumption. The 
dynamic nature of performance and resources requires further consideration. Financial performance – 
and specifically retained earnings from profits – can be reinvested with further capital investment (for 
example, from debt and equity), so that they become financial resources that can then be used to 
enhance team and stadium resources. Financial performance can also be appropriated by owners and 
lenders in the form of dividends and interest. 
The sample and observation period appear to be sufficient. The sample includes all clubs that are, or 
have been, members of the Premier League, and therefore reduces success and survivor bias. The 
observation period extends from the formation of the Premier League to the season for which the most 
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recent data is available. It can be continued as the competition continues and as financial data from 
the 2016/17 season is published. Panel data is useful for the simultaneous analysis of cross-sectional 
competitive effects between clubs and for time-series dynamic effects of cumulative resources and 
sustained performance. 
There is scope to extend the sample of clubs and observation period. The revised sample could 
include all clubs that have been members of the Football League since 1992/93, which would increase 
the sample to clubs that have never been members of the Premier League since its formation. 
However, the availability of data for clubs in the third and fourth division is limited. Increasing the 
observation period to pre-1992/93 would enable a comparison between the Premier League era to the 
Football League, and hence between a period of growth and an era of volatility and decline. However, 
the availability of data for clubs in the third and fourth division is limited. As explained in Section 5.5, 
sporting performance and stadium resource data is available for all or most clubs and years, but data 
collection for business performance is less consistent. 
The research adopts variables for sporting, business and financial performance and for team and 
stadium resources. These physical and human resources are tangible and further research could 
incorporate intangible resources, such as club brands and fan loyalty, and resource management 
capabilities, including team and stadium management. However, it is necessary to measure such 
unobservable resources and capabilities using methods other than the difference between 
performance (outputs) and resources (inputs), otherwise this would be replicate performance as both 
part of the predictor and as the outcome of the predictive model. 
The propositions enable empirical testing of professional sport club performance from different 
perspectives. These models provide confirmation of the predictive relationships that were established 
in the Literature Review (Section 3.3), plus the exploration of contingent relationships incorporating 
change and the concept of fit. Further research is recommended to incorporate the performance, 
resources and resource management capabilities of clubs, including: 
• For financial performance and resources, has the issue of debt and equity made clubs more 
prudent, especially where the equity has introduced new owners to a club? 
• For team resources, does the relationship between a club's team manager and its business 
leaders, such as the Managing Director or Chief Executive, have an effect on performance, 
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as may be evident by the coincidental tenure of Sir Alex Ferguson with Ken Friar (to 2000) 
and Keith Edelman (from 2000 to 2008) at Manchester United and Arsène Wenger with 
Martin Edwards (to 2003) and David Gill (from 2004 to 2013) at Arsenal? 
• For stadium resources, have new facilities enabled clubs to generate and appropriate 
incremental matchday and commercial revenue, or have they made clubs more prudent due 
to the obligation to generate operating profit to cover capital expenditure? 
There is further scope to introduce marketing resources into the conceptual model, comprising the 
club brand and fan loyalty resources, as well as the necessary marketing capabilities. 
Each model required the collection of a panel of archived data for the specified variables and for a 
sufficient sample and observation period. Statistical analysis is utilised for empirical tests of predictive 
models and for different types of fit, including deviation, moderation and mediation. The panel 
regression models confirm the predictive trends between team resources, sporting performance and 
business performance, while, importantly, the examination of outliers enables the paths of clubs to be 
explored. Alternatively, the relationships between a network of variables could be analysed with a 
structural equation model, as applied by Galariotis et al (2017). Visual analysis enables further 
exploration of the paths of individual clubs during the observation period and to establish patterns 
between and within groups of clubs. 
There are constraints to the collection of archival data that is required for the panel data. Archival data 
is not always consistent and comparable. There is some missing data due to revised data collection by 
Deloitte and for individual clubs, most commonly by clubs that have entered administration. There are 
concerns about potential bias as data on failing clubs is thereby excluded from the panel during the 
period of failure. There is also some inconsistency between financial years, especially in player value, 
due to accounting standards. 
There are further limitations to the analysis of the panel data. Although many of the performance 
outcomes and resources of professional football clubs are quantitative and the use of statistical 
analysis is appropriate for simplifying complex models, it can reductionist and remove some factors 
that may otherwise have been of interest (Remenyi et al 2008). Furthermore, the panel regression 
model does not explicitly test for causality, with reverse causality being highlighted in a number of 
models. The utilisation of the Granger test of causality for panel data (Brooks, 2008) may be 
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advantageous for testing the precedence of resources and performance outcomes. For visual 
analysis, the drawing conclusions from patterns observed by inspection of data displays presents 
some unique findings and more in-depth analysis that is specific to individual clubs. However, there 
are substantial limitations to the recognition of patterns by comparing and contrasting multiple 
variables for 44 clubs over 23 years, let alone the identification of competitive and dynamic 
relationships between these variables. Further case study research, which should incorporate 
quantitative and qualitative data, may provide further insights, especially into resource management 
capabilities. The assumption of heterogeneity is addressed by the analysis of clubs by group, which 
are designated by the clubs' sporting performance during the observation period. There is scope to 
create alternative groups based on business and financial performance, by team and stadium 
resources, or by a combination of factors. Longitudinal or time-series cluster analysis could be applied 
for this purpose to capture group membership by time. 
10.4. Professional team sport management practice 
The findings and the methodologies have potential application for club management and league 
governance. For club owners and business executives, the models can inform strategic decision-
making, and the evaluation of dynamic performance relative to competitors. The competitive and 
dynamic dimensions of the model may be especially useful for forming and implementing strategy in a 
competitive environment where there is considerable internal change (to resources and capabilities) 
and for managing perceived and objective change (specifically growth) in the external competitive 
environment. For executives of leagues, governing bodies and federations, the empirical model can 
facilitate the monitoring and control of clubs. Specifically, it can be used to evaluate the performance 
and resources of clubs during periods of growth or decline. The data can be applied to analysis of the 
competitive balance of clubs, and this could be extended to national competitions (such as the 
Premier League) and international competitions (such as the Champions League). For both sets of 
stakeholders, the adopted methods enable the analysis of relative and sustained sporting, business 
and financial performance of clubs and of leagues and divisions. However, the predictive models do 
have limitations as professional sport leagues require some uncertainty of outcome in order to create 
and maintain sporting and financial viability. 
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The performance of Premier League clubs 
Professional football clubs in England and Wales have comparable and consistent resources and 
performance outcomes. However, they are not homogeneous. They adopt unique strategic paths, and 
there are important differences between and within groups of clubs that have common performance 
outcomes. In particular, there are unique characteristics between those clubs that have sustained 
performance advantage, experienced growth, and suffered decline. These represent broad strategic 
types that clubs owners and decision-makers could use to identify potential resource-based strategies 
and for the identification of competitors in both sporting and business competitive environments. 
The permanent members of the Premier League are clubs that have sustained success but, 
nevertheless, have had to adapt to substantial and dynamic change in the competitive environment, 
including the formation and growth of the Premier League and the Champions League. Arsenal, 
Manchester United and, to a lesser extent, Liverpool have established a dominant sporting and 
business performance advantage. But even this competitive environment is changing with competitors 
emerging from within the group, such as Chelsea, and from other groups, with the emergence of 
Manchester City. The permanent members have been affected by change in the Premier League and, 
moreover, have affected change to the Premier League. 
Clubs that have experienced growth and decline have endured considerable change. Those clubs that 
have grown during the observation period have not only had to manage change as they achieved 
promotion from the third or fourth division to the Premier League, but have had to do so while the 
revenue, and especially broadcast rights, of the Premier League, and to a lesser extent the Football 
League, has grown. The growth of clubs from the Football League to the Premier League has often 
coincided, or been prompted, by a shock, whether a positive change (such as relocation to a new 
stadium) or a negative effect (such as an administration event). Furthermore, change has often had to 
be formulated and implemented in concurrent seasons. Conversely, clubs that have suffered from 
consecutive relegation have had to adapt to manage their decline. Some, but not all, have failed to do 
so and entered administration as a consequence. This has been exasperated by the widening gap 
between divisions. 
The yo-yo and volatile clubs are the most adaptable clubs but, by definition, have endured the most 
change in performance outcomes. However, there are few evident patterns in their resource and 
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resource management strategy, with many differences between and within these groups of clubs. This 
may be because these clubs have had to make substantial and sometimes recurrent change to their 
resources and capabilities, which then enables them to adapt to their changing internal and external 
competitive environment. 
Some clubs appear to be more resistant to sporting failure and have maintained business and 
financial performance, despite the reduction in broadcast revenue. This may indicate that they have 
strong marketing resources, such as the club brand and fan loyalty, or have marketing capabilities to 
optimise demand and prices. Further exploration of the formulation and implementation of clubs' 
ticketing, hospitality, retail, merchandise, licensing and sponsorship strategies may reveal useful 
insights that explain relative performance. Despite the growth in broadcast revenue, the failure to 
invest in stadium resources may have severe consequences for clubs. Portsmouth failed to redevelop 
their stadium or relocate, and suffered repeated relegation and administration events. This 
demonstrates the importance of matchday and commercial revenue to clubs and the risk of relying on 
league broadcast revenue, most of which is appropriated by clubs competing in the Premier League 
and Champions League, and the strategic relevance of the club's stadium resources. 
Predicting and protecting unpredictable Premier League performance 
However, the models have limited application as predictive models. The sporting and business 
performance of clubs is mostly, but not entirely, predictable. Sport has to be unpredictable for it to be 
purposeful. If participants knew who was going to win matches and championships then there would 
be no purpose in competing. For professional team sport, the demand from spectators for the clubs' 
products and services would be reduced if the outcome was certain, thus diminishing the viability of 
clubs and leagues. Sport therefore relies on at least some uncertainty of outcome, and sport 
management theory and practice must incorporate this unpredictability. 
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